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Each Article in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) has its 
unique grammar, and, whenever coverage overlaps, translation has 
proven difficult. Some of the most useful work in commercial law 
scholarship tries to reconcile the separate gram.mars in the areas of 
overlapping coverage. The collision between Article 6 (bulk sales) 
and Article 9 (security interests in personal property) is the subject 
of a particularly strong essay by Steven L. Harris,1 who has ex-
1. Harris, The Interaction of Articles 6 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Study in Conveyancing, Priorities, and Code Interpretation, 39 VAND. L. REV. 179 (1986). 
Although my comments will often tend to a critical mode, I wish to state that Harris's arti­
cle is excellent commercial law scholarship indeed. His article is brimming with cleverness 
and insight. Many times I found myself initially disagreeing with a proposition, only to be 
won over by Professor Harris's careful argumentation. Countless times Harris's article has 
saved me from making mistakes in the analysis that is about to proceed. 
However, having been invited to join this symposium in order to write on the same 
subject as Professor Harris, I can't just agree with him on each and every issue, can I? It is 
incumbent upon me to find some .things to disagree with. Accordingly, my essay tends to 
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haustively analyzed every problem that might arise in priority 
disputes between the secured creditors of bulk sellers and bulk 
buyers2 (together with their various transferees). Professor Harris's 
findings on these priority contests are summarized in Figure One: 
work. In an effort to counteract this impression, whenever I have set forth a conceptual idea 
that was developed first in Harris's article, I have endeavored to give his article credit in the 
footnotes. Undoubtedly, I have not done this enough. There are very few stones left un­
turned by Professor Harris's treatment of this subject. 
2. One isn't supposed to use the phrase "bulk buyers" under the UCC. One has to say
«bulk transferee." U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying' . . .  does not include a transfer in 
bulk"). The new Article 6 would change this. It refers generally to buyers and sellers. See 
U.C.C. Article 6 (1988). This new Article 6 fails to amend UCC section 1-201(9), so that
buying still does not include a transfer in bulk, even while Article 6 refers to "buyers" in
bulk. The new Act also fails to amend the references to "transferee in bulk" that appear in
section 9-301(1)(c) and section 9-301(2). In the spirit of the revisions, and because I don't
see how it matters much, I will refer to "buyers" or "transferees" in bulk indiscriminately.
Incidentally, some courts have found that the exclusion of bulk transferees from the 
definition of "buyer" has substantive significance. Thus, where bulk transferees claim to 
have taken free of inventory security interests under UCC section 9-307(1), courts have said 
that bulk transferees are not buyers and therefore are not entitled to the protection of sec­
tion 9-307(1). E.g., Bank of.the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 
1169-70 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988). These courts could also have said that bulk transferees. are 
buyers, but not buyers in tlie ordinary course of business. Such reasoning also would have 
disqualified the use of section 9-307(1) by bulk transferees. 
I am compelled to admit, however, that there is one substantive difference caused by 
excluding bulk transferees from the concept of buyer. This difference is felt with regard to 
the priority of discretionary future advances. 
Suppose S and SP1 agree that certain collateral will serve as collateral for any discre­
tionary advance SP1 may choose to give. If S has sold the collateral to B (out of the ordinary 
course of business) and if SP1 is senior to B, SP1 may give senior advances-i.e., advances 
that encumber B's newly bought property-until SP1 learns of the sale. This privilege runs 
out after forty-five days, however. That is, the privilege has a maximum life of forty-five 
days. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1987). 
Suppose, though, thatB is a bulk transferee. According to section 1-201.(9), "'[b]uying' 
... does not include a transfer in bulk." If taken literally, SP1 does not have the forty-five 
day privilege described in section 9-307(3). What then is the status of SPi's discretionary 
future advances? 
One answer would take this definition of "buyer" seriously and would play upon the 
fact that the forty-five day privilege was added in the 1972 amendments to the UCC. Ac­
cordingly, one should apply whatever privilege existed before 1972 to bulk transferees. 
Unfortunately; the status of the future advance prior to 1972 was opaque. One group said 
that discretionary advances simply expanded the old security interest and did not create a 
new one. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY§ 35.6 at 937-38 (1965) 
(asserting that no difference exists between a nondiscretionary future advance and a discre­
tionary one). Another thought each new discretionary advance created a new security 
interest with a different priority from the ones associated with other advances. Coogan & 
Gordon, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon Receivables Financing-Some 
Answers and Some Unresolved Problems, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1529, 1549-51 (1963) (in case of 
a discretionary future advance, attachment is deferred). One major clue that existed as of 
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1962 appeared in the old fixture priority section. Under the 1962 version of section 9-
313(4)(c), discretionary future advances under real estate mortgages had separate priorities. 
U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1962). Similarly, the 1962 version of the accession section (still in ef-
fect) also applies different priorities to each discretionary future advance. U.C.C. § 9-314(3) 
(1987). Therefore, if these provisions are evidence of the true pre-1972 rule, and if we apply 
them to bulk transferees, SP1 may give no future advances after a bulk sale-at least when 
the purchaser complies with the rules of Article 6. This seems fair. Article 6 compliance 
implies that SP1 has received full notice and therefore will know not to give any future 
discretionary advances on the strength of B's collateral. See infra text accompanying notes 
55-60. This puts bulk buyers and other buyers on exactly the same footing-both are free of 
discretionary future advances once the secured party knows the transfer has occurred. 
A separate answer simply ignores the definition of "buyer" in section 1-201(9) and ap-
plies the rule of section 9-307(3) to bulk transferees. This is justified by the fact that the 
newly revised version of Article 6 uses the word "bulk buyer," in spite of section 1-201(9). In 
addition, the definition of "buying" quoted above appears in a section that commences with 
the definition "buyer in the ordinary course of business." It should be possible to argue that 
the definition of "buyer" that excludes bulk transferees is effective only with regard to the 
phrase "buyer in the ordinary course of business." This would allow us to maintain that 
bulk transferees can be buyers out of the ordinary course of business. On the other hand, 
this latter point-ignoring section 1-201(9)-must in turn ignore the fact that, in section 9-
301(1)(c), buyers out of the ordinary course of business and bulk transferees are treated as 
mutually exclusive categories. 
Bulk transferees are not the only fly in the ointment with regard to discretionary future 
advances. According to section 9-307(3), only buyers out of the ordinary course of business 
are subject to the forty-five day rule. Buyers in the ordinary course of business are immune 
from this privilege-or are subject to the pre-1972 rules, whatever they may be. The drafters 
of the 1972 amendments thought that this posed no problem because buyers in the ordinary 
course of business take . free of future advances-and free of any perfected security inter-
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Figure One represents a legal system that Harris would prefer. 
Unfortunately, the doctrinal materials are in rebellion in each and 
every one of the four quadrants presented.3 
Let us quickly review this Cartesian domain. In the northwest 
quadrant, a perfected secured party faces a complying buyer. Pro-
fessor Harris takes the position that the security interest should 
survive the bulk sale, a position for which he has strong statutory 
support.-' Yet, a recent opinion from the Fifth Circuit states that a 
buyer who complies with Article 6 takes free of all earlier perfected 
security interests. In National Bank of Texas v. West Texas 
Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee)/' a noncomplying buyer took 
inventory encumbered by perfected security interests. The court 
held that the perfected security interests had priority over the 
noncomplying bulk buyer· (although only for six months!).6 The 
Fifth Circuit's comments about a complying buyer therefore can be 
contemned as mere dictum. Professor Harris, in his article, spends 
a great deal of time pulverizing this dictum. Perversely, I will de-
fend McBee as better commercial law than Professor Harris would 
give credit for. I will claim that the McBee case protects secured 
parties adequately well and responds to an unfortunate "double re-
covery" effect that the "proceeds" provision of Article 9 has. 
The southwestern quadrant of Figure One should have been a 
placid desert. If a complying buyer has no knowledge of an earlier 
unperfected security interest, then the complying buyer should 
win.7 Not so according to the Second Circuit in Aircraft Trading & 
est-under section 9°307(1). See U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 4 (1987). They overlooked the fact 
that section 9-307(1) destroys only the security interests created by the seller. Thus, if S 
issues a security interest on inventory to SP1 and S then sells to a buyer in the ordinary 
course of business, then clearly these buyers are free from discretionary future advances. 
But what if S makes a bulk sale to B, and B sells to B2 in the ordinary course of her 
business? Now section 9-307(1) fails to kill SP1's security interest. Furthermore, section 9-
307(3) does not govern; and so we must find some other future advance rule. 
3. Of course, Harris recognizes this and therefore criticizes the contrary doctrine, ex-
cept that in the southwest quadrant some contrary case law postdates Harris's essay. See 
infra text accompanying notes 67-75. 
4. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987), 
5. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983), reversing 20 Bankr. 361 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982). 
6. See McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327-30. This part of McBee is criticized infra in the text 
accompanying notes 245-56. 
7. U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987) ("[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to 
the rights of ... a person ... who is a transferee in bulk ... to the extent that he gives value 
734 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 41:3:729 
Services, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc.8 In this case, a debtor sold collateral 
to a buyer with no knowledge of the unperfected security interest. 
Later, the secured party did perfect. When the buyer sold to a sub-
sequent buyer, the secured party now had priority: 
This case is undeniably bad commercial law. Every commer-
cial law scholar knows of opinions like this, in which judges, 
unfamiliar with the . arcane grammar of commercial law, make a 
complete incoherent mess of the case before them. It is my belief 
that commercial law is subject to an implicit paradigm which case 
law must honor. If case law is within this paradigm, the precedent 
is honored and subsumed. If bad cases fall outside of the para-
digm, then they become alms for oblivioJ?.,9 subject to a grand 
unspoken conspiracy whereby the precedent is simply forgotten. 
Indeed, articles like this one are positive dangers in this process, 
because, by discussing bad cases, it becomes more difficult to pull 
off the process of forgetting. In other words, if a commercial law 
opinion is a disaster, for heaven's sake don't write a law review 
article about it! Rather, let the natural process of forgetting take 
its course. Hence, this Article is built on a certain contradiction, 
being both dedicated and indifferent to high quality commercial 
law. 
In the northeast quadrant of Figure One, a perfected secured 
party faces a noncomplying buyer. To put it another way, the hero 
of Article 9 faces the villain of Article 6. Predictably, the hero loses 
and the villain wins, at least in the long-term, in that the hero is 
given a very short statute of limitations. According to the pesky 
McBee court, the six-month statute of limitations in Article 610 ap-
plies to perfected security interests.11 On the other hand, if the 
secured party does beat the short statute of limitations, the same 
case holds that the secured party not only gets the inventory actu-
ally transferred in the bulk sale, but a bonus-any inventory the 
and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before 
it is perfected."). 
8. 819 F.2d 1227, 1235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (9187). 
9. "Time hath, my lord, a wallet at hi_s back, Wherein he puts alms for oblivion, A 
great-siz'd monster of ingratitudes." W. Shakespeare, THE HISTORY OF TROILUS AND CRES-
SIDA, Act III, scene 3, lines 145-47. 
10. See U.C.C. § 6-111 (1987). 
11. National Bank of Texas v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re, McBee), 714 
F.2d 1316, 1328 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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noncomplying buyer acquires thereafter.12 Or, in other words, the 
buyer becomes liable on the seller's after-acquired property clause, 
even though the buyer did not expressly agree to be liable. 
The southeast quadrant in Figure One contains the only genu-
ine analytical puzzle. In this .quadrant, neither the bulk buyer nor 
the secured party has fulfilled the obligations imposed by Article 6 
and Article 9. Even here, we can be confident that, where the non-
complying buyer knows of the earlier unperfected security interest, 
the unperfected secured party clearly has priority13-at_ least for 
six months.14 But. if the noncomplying buyer is in good faith in all 
respects except for complying with the rules of Article 6-'-that is, if 
she is a noncomplying buyer without knowledge of the earlier un-
perfected sec1.1rity interest-,-the proper priority is difficult to 
fathom, because neither the unperf ected secured party nor the Ar-
ticle 6 noncomplying buyer has done what the la..w demands .. As to 
this priority puzzle, I will take issue with Profe,ssor Harris's solu~ 
tion. He would say that the . buyer destroys the unperfected 
security interest under Article 9,15 but Article 6 resuscitates the 
dead security interest and saves the secured party.16 I will attempt 
to show that this solution is founded upon a contradiction. Instead, 
if the unperfected secured party is to win out, it must be on a the-
ory Harris expHcitly rejects (but implicitly accepts). The theory 
must be that a bulk buyer who fails to comply with Article 6 is not 
a bulk buyer at all, within the meaning of Article 9. 
·· These quadrants represent the four categories of possible pri-
ority disputes. We now proceed through them, one at a time. · 
12. Id .. at 1331. 
13. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987). Later, we will see that some authorities insist that 
bulk transferees who fail to comply with Article 6 are not bulk transferees at all, for the 
purposes of section 9-301(1)(c). See infra text accompanying notes 267-289. If this principle 
is followed, then section 9-301(l)(c) cannot establish the priorities. Some .other principle 
must be found. According to this other principle, the bulk transferee always loses to an 
unperfected secured party, whether knowledgeable or not of the existence of any security 
interest. This result is dictated by the residual rule in section 9-201, which provides that 
secured parties always win unless some specific provision of the UCC says otherwise. See 
U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987). If a would-be bulk transferee cannot use section 9-301(1)(c) because 
she is not really a bulk transferee by virtue of having failed to comply with Article 6, then 
no other provision gives her priority either. Accordingly, the unperfected secured party al-
ways has priority. 
14. The short statute of limitations is the dubious conclusion of the McBee court. Mc-
Bee, 714 F.2d at 1328. 
15. Harris, supra note 1, at 205. 
16. Id. at 208. 
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I. THE PERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE COMPLYING BUYER 
In the northwest quadrant of Figure One, a secured party has 
a perfected security interest in inventory. Thereafter, the debtor 
sells the inventory to a buyer in a bulk sale. Under Article 9, buy-
ers and any sub-transferees take subject to perfected security 
interests, unless the secured party authorizes the sale (i.e., waives 
the security interest). 17 The only chance, then, for showing that 
bulk sales terminate perfected security interests (when the buyer 
has complied with the require~ents of Article 6) depends on 
whether secured parties authorize such sales simply by virtue of 
acquiescing and letting the sale proceed without protest.18 
Professor Harris thinks this case cannot be made. According 
to Harris, Article 6 puts only burdens on bulk buyers.19 If Article 6 
were to allow a complying bulk buyer to take free of a perfected 
security interest, it would be affirmatively rewarding buyer compli-
ance by giving the buyer more than she would have had as a 
regular buyer. 
A. The McBee Case 
Harris asserts these views in the course of criticizing Judge 
Jerre Williams's bacchantic opinion in Nati'onal Bank of Texas v. 
West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re ·McBee).20 In this case, a 
noncomplying buyer bought already encumbered inventory from a 
seller. Subsequently, the buyer granted a security interest in the 
inventory to her own lender, so that we had the situation 
presented in Figure Two: 
17. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987) ("Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security 
interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale .... "). There are exceptions to this 
rule. Buyers of inventory in the ordinary course of business, buyers of consumer goods 
(where perfection is not by filing), and any buyer against whom a security interest for a 
future advance is claimed can each take free of the relevant perfected security interest. 
U.C.C. § 9-307 (1987). Also, a security interest dies if the secured party waives it. U.C.C. § 
9-306(2) (1987). Whether this occurs when a bulk buyer complies with Article 6 is discussed 
infra in the text accompanying notes 47-64. 
18. For a discussion of implied authority cases, see R. HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. 
NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22.02[1l(b] 
(1985 & Supp. 1986). 
19. Harris, supra note 1, at 201. 
20. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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Time--~•~ 
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S (bulk - t First in time seller) - i Second in time 
B (a noncom- SP3 plying buyer) 
Figure Two 
In McBee, Judge Williams, writing for the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, decided that the perfected security interests of SP1 (an 
inventory lender)21 and SP2 (a purchase money lender on inven-
21. McBee presents a series of puzzles, particularly with regard to the relation of SP1 
and SP2, not all of which are precisely relevant here. But since we will return to the facts of 
McBee frequently, I want to take some time to set forth some of the facts. 
The case commences with the bulk seller (Colley, whom I shall call S) as the sole pro-
prietor of the Oak Hill Gun Shop. S wishes to obtain a loan from SP1 (National Bank of 
Texas), but instead of doing so personally, S was represented by Cynthia McBee, who would 
eventually be the noncomplying bulk buyer (and whom I will designate as B). B incorrectly 
represented to SP1 that she and S were partners; As a result, B signed the security agree-
ment; S never did. Now it must have been the case that B was the agent of S with power to 
bind him. Therefore, as a result of the loan, both B and S were personally liable on the loan 
agreement. See TEx. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b § 16 (Vernon 1968) ("When a person 
... represents himself . . . or consents to another representing him to anyone, as a partner 
... he is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made."). This loan 
agreement also granted to SP1 a security interest in all present or after-acquired inventory 
of the "partners." 
SP1 filed a financing statement under the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop." If Sand B had 
really been partners, this would have been the proper thing to do. But, according to UCC 
section 9-402(7), "A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives 
the individual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other 
trade names or names of partners." U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987). Bankruptcy Judge Elliott read 
this provision to mean that SP1 had to file under the names of the individuals to whom it 
had lent. It could not use their trade names. Hence, according to Judge Elliott, SP1 was 
unperfected. SP1 tried unsuccessfully to claim that Band SP1 were "partners by estoppel," 
and that, therefore, filing under the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop" was appropriate. This argu-
ment does not follow, however. Just because SP1 was entitled to rely on B's representation 
of partnership does not mean that third parties would be bound by this, as the court of 
appeals recognized. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1322-23 (misleading trade name filing insufficient to 
beat hypothetical judicial lien creditor, even on a theory of partnership by estoppel). 
Apparently worried that this "partnership by estoppel" argument would allow SP1 to 
perfect by filing under the trade name of S, Judge Elliott chose to rule simply that there 
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tory who also claimed after-acquired inventory and accounts 
receivable) survived the sale and hence both had priority22 over B 
was no "partnership by estoppel" because evidence did not "preponderate in its favor." In 
re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361, 363 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982). This holding did not leave Judge 
Elliott with a theory as to how SP1's security interest might attach to S's inventory. 
When the Fifth Circuit reversed and found that SP1 did perfect after all, then a theory 
was needed as to how S could be bound on an agreement he did not sign. Therefore, some 
sort of agency-principal relationship must have existed between B and S. Partnership by 
estoppel seems as good a way to put it as any. See K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 
56 Cal. App. 3d 315, 319-320, 128 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (1976) ("[A] debtor who does not own 
collateral may nonetheless use the collateral for security, thereby obtaining 'rights in the 
collateral,' when authorized to do so by the actual owner of the collateral."); Bank of the 
West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 807, 813 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on 
other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) (even if bulk seller was never the owner of the 
assets, it had authority from the real owner to create a security interest in the assets). 
In any case, the Fifth Circuit reversed and ruled that SP1 had successfully perfected. 
Judge Williams read section 9-402(7) as saying only this: if you file under the name of an 
individual partnership or corporation, then you need not also list the trade name. Judge 
Williams did not read this provision as preventing filing under a trade name in lieu of other 
names. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321-22. Instead, he thought that you could file under a trade 
name if not misleading. See U.C.C. § 9-402(8) ("A financing statement substantially comply-
ing with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors 
which are not seriously misleading."). To reach such a conclusion, Judge Williams had to 
overcome this official comment: 
In the case of individuals, [section 9-402(7)] contemplates filing only in the individual 
name, not in a trade name. In the case of partnerships it contemplates filing in the 
partnership name, not in the names of any of the partners, and not in any other trade 
names. Trade names are deemed to be too uncertain and too likely not to be known 
to the secured party or person searching the record, to form the basis for a filing 
system. 
U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 7 (1987). Judge Williams had no problem avoiding this formidable 
obstacle. He thought "this comment enunciates the general rule that ... filing under a trade 
name is insufficient. This principle, however, cannot be applied blindly without reference to 
the overriding purpose it seeks to serve." McBee, 714 F.2d at 1323; Thus, according to Judge 
Williams, when trade names are certain, you can file under them. Accord Brushwood v. 
Citizens Bank of Perry, 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981). This was especially true because S and 
B, in the bulk sale, had signed an agreement that provided that S is to sell "any partnership 
interest" to R Hence, B's creditors would have looked under what they took to be the part-
nership name, "Oak Hill Gun Shop,'' and would have found SP1's financing statement. 
22. SP2, a trade creditor, took a purchase money security interest on the inventory 
supplied, plus a security interest in other existing and after-acquired inventory and accounts 
receivable. Bankruptcy Judge Elliott ruled (with some justification) that SP1 was un-
perfected and hence SP2 had priority. See McBee, 20 Bankr. at 363; supra note 2LWhen 
SP1 was saved on appeal, an issue might have arisen concerning the comparative priority of 
SP1 and SP2• To the extent that SP2 could still trace its purchase money collateral, SP2 
should have had priority as to these items of collateral. This was simply ignored because, 
according to Judge Williams, SP2 "does not assert such priority. It concedes that it took its 
security interest subject to [SP1's] prior interest and should have second priority." McBee, 
714 F.2d at 1325 n.9. One hopes that the collateral was adequate to cover the claims of both 
SP1 and SP2, so that it would be unnecessary to figure out which of the two had priority; or 
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and hence over SP3's security interest as well.23 But in the course 
of ruling that SP1 and SP2 had priority, Judge Williams set forth a 
controversial view of how Article 6 works. According to Williams, if 
the buyer had complied with the rules of Article 6, then the per-
fected security interests of SP1 and SP2 would have been 
destroyed, and the buyer would have owned the collateral free and 
clear.24 
Here is the way Judge Williams sees it: 
In the absence of a bulk sales law, creditors generally would lose all 
security interests in collateral once transferred to a new owner; the 
secured creditor's recourse would lie against the debtor-transferor, 
including an interest in any proceeds received by the transferor from 
the bulk sale. 211 
This assessment of what the law would look like in the absence of 
Article 6 is roughly correct as to unsecured creditors,26 but not cor-
rect with regard to secured creditors.27 At least when inventory is 
sold within the ordinary course of business, a perfected security 
that SP2 could not have traced the purchase money collateral (in which case the commin-
gling rules might have helped SP2; see infra text accompanying notes 214-33). If neither of 
these things is true, then the lawyers for SP2 miscalculated by making such an admission. 
23. It actually went further and said that SP1's security interest covered not only the 
inventory conveyed by the seller to the buyer but subsequent inventory the buyer acquired 
after the sale. This aspect of the opinion is criticized by Harris, supra note 1, at 232, and · 
will be more or less defended infra in the text accompanying notes 113-22. 
24. Initially, the lawyers for SP1 and SP2 missed the Article 6 issue altogether. Bank-
ruptcy Judge Elliott added it on the basis of allegations by SP1 and SP2 that they were not 
notified of the sale. In re McBee, 20 Bankr. at 364. Thereafter, McBee became primarily an 
Article 6 case. 
25. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327 (footnotes omitted). 
26. General creditors have in rem rights against B under fraudulent conveyanee law, 
so that, even as to them, Judge Williams is misdescribing the significance of bulk sales law 
(unless he views fraudulent conveyance law as subsumed in bulk sales law). 
27. Judge Williams's idea that Article 6 compliance allows a bulk buyer to be senior to 
prior perfected security interests comes from a misreading of the best-selling commercial 
treatise by James J. White and Robert Summers, who write, "In the absence of a bulk sales 
law a transferor's creditors are generally not entitled to levy or the like on assets the trans-
feror has sold to a new owner." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 768 (2d ed. 1980). As Steven Harris shows, White and Summers 
meant only general creditors in this passage, not secured parties under Ar.tide 9. Harris, 
supra note 1, at 197. 
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interest will survive the sale.28 Be that as it may, Judge Williams 
explains the effect of Article 6 as follows: 
Article 6 of the U.C.C., as adopted by Texas, changes the relative 
position of the parties affected by a bulk sale. . . . Article 6 places 
certain requirements upon the parties to the bulk sale. These re-
quirements serve to notify the transferor's creditors of the intended 
sale, thus permitting the creditors to protect their security interests 
before the transfer. They also protect the transferee and his subse-
quent creditors by bringing to light and terminating all prior 
security claims to the transferred property. 
Had Article 6 been complied with, [ SP 1 and SP 2] would have 
retained no interest in the gun shop in McBee's hands.29 
Professor Harris finds this point of view egregiously wrong.30 Nev-
ertheless, a little something might be said on behalf of the McBee 
dictum quoted above. 
B. Implications of the Strong Version of Article 6 
Texas is among the minority of jurisdictions that has adopted 
the "strong" version of Article 6. In the strong version, the buyer 
in bulk has the responsibility to retain the proceeds for the credi-
tors of the seller. Thus, in Texas: 
Upon every bulk transfer subject to this chapter for which new con-
sideration becomes payable ... it is. the duty of the transferee to 
assure that such consideration is applied so far as necessary to pay 
those debts of the transferor which are either shown on the list fur-
nished· by the transferor (Section 6.104) or filed in writing in the 
place stated in the notice (Section 6.107) within thirty days after the 
mailing of such notice.31 
This provision implies that the transferee must keep control of the 
funds until the creditors are paid. And since these funds are cash 
proceeds belonging to the perfected secured party, they should be 
28. "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in col-
lateral notwithstanding sale ... unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party . 
. . . " u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987). 
29. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1327-28 (emphasis added in part). 
30. Harris, supra note 1, at 196-201. 
31. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.§ 6.106 (Vernon 1968). The place of filing referred to 
in this provision can be any place designated in the notice sent to creditors. See U.C.C. § 6-
107(2)(b) (1987). 
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used to pay down the secured debt, thereby guaranteeing that the 
security interest is retired. This is what the McBee court may have 
meant when it thought that Article 6 compliance resulted in the 
termination of perfected Article 9 security interests. 
The McBee view might be def ended as asserting the following 
maxim: a secured party should have a property right to cash pro-
ceeds if the security interest has been destroyed in a "free and 
clear" sale to some transferee. Otherwise, if the sale is made sub-
ject to the security interest, the secured party should have no right 
to cash proceeds. 32 
Under Article 9, the secured party gets a double entitlement of 
sorts-a continuing security interest and cash proceeds. 33 Suppose 
collateral is worth $100, and the secured party claims $50. In such 
a case, a rational buyer with knowledge of the security interest 
would pay the debtor $50 for her equity. A reasonable person could 
argue that, if the collateral is still available to the secured party, 
the secured party should have no claim against the $50 the debtor 
received. But Article 9 does allow the secured party to have both a 
continuing security interest (for $50) on the collateral and a right 
to the $50 cash proceeds a buyer is likely to pay in. 34 Thus, before 
the sale, the secured party had $100 in collateral. After the sale, 
the secured party has $150 in collateral. Now if the $50 in cash is 
freely available to the secured party, there is no reason to also al-
low the secured party to go after the buyer's property. McBee can 
be seen as a rebellion against this situation under Article 9. That 
is, since (the strong version of) Article 6 requires the bulk buyer to 
hold the cash proceeds for the secured party, the secured party 
should receive cash proceeds only, and not a surviving security 
interest. 
Several objections to this defense of ~McBee might be offered. 
First, the Article 9 idea of giving the secured party a "two-for-one" 
interest in cash proceeds as well as in the original collateral might 
be defended because it coerces the debtor and the buyer to seek 
32. See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment of Liens on After-Acquired 
Property, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 505, 510 n.29 (1985) [hereinafter Carlson, Simultaneous At-
tachment]; Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 547, 566 (1984) [hereinafter Carlson, Death and Subordination]. 
33. See Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., Inc., 655 F. Supp. 807, 819 
n.8 (N.D. CaL 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988) .. 
34. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987). 
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out the secured party's authorization of the sale. This gives the 
secured party a chance to insist that the cash proceeds be turned 
over directly to the secured party, so that the buyer takes free of 
the security interest, pays the full unencumbered value of the col-
lateral, and pays off the secured party's claim to the extent of the 
collateral's value. But, significantly, this is precisely the result that 
the McBee dictum produces. That is, the strong version of Article 
6 requires that the cash proceeds be turned over to the secured 
party directly. Hence, a deep inquiry into proceeds theory of Arti-
cle 9 helps to rehabilitate the vision offered by Judge Williams in 
McBee. 
A second criticism of the idea that Article 6 compliance de-
stroys perfected security interests-at least where the strong 
version of Article 6 is in effect-is that creditors have a pro rata 
right to the cash proceeds if they are insufficient to pay all the 
creditors. Section 6-106(3) provides, "If the consideration payable 
is not enough to pay all of the said debts in full distribution shall 
be made pro rata. "35 This might be taken to imply that a secured 
party should share pro rata with the general creditors. If this were 
right, then section 6-106(3) poses a serious obstacle ~o the idea 
that a complying bulk transfer terminates perfected security 
interests. 
Such a reading of section 6-106(3) can be avoided, and many 
courts have done so. 36 Article 9 awards cash proceeds to the se-
cured party over the general creditors, so that section 6-106(3) 
provides pro rata sharing among general creditors only after the 
owner of the .cash, the secured party, is paid out to her full entitle-
ment.37 Details of this theory might work like this. Where only 
35. Id. § 6-106(3). 
36. E.g., In re Figearo, 79 Bankr. 914, 918 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987) (a perfected security 
interest in the inventory of a business attaches to proceeds recovered by a trustee in bank-
ruptcy as a result of the compromise of fraudulent conveyance litigation); Mid-American 
Indus., Inc. v. Ketchie, 767 P.2d 416, 420 (Okla. 1989) ("Article 6 neither impairs a valid 
article 9 security interest nor does it affect article 9 remedies. It does not require that se-
cured and unsecured creditors be treated equally."); Poynor v. Twin City Motor Supply, 
Inc., 47 Wash. App. 654, 660, 737 P.2d 270, 273-74 (1987) (dictum stating that secured par-
ties have priority over general creditors to the Article 6 total purchase price in a bulk 
transfer); see also Harris, Practicing Under Existing Bulk Sales Law-'-And a Look at the 
Future of Article 6, 22 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 211 (1990) ("If the goods are subject to a security 
interest ... the transferee who fails to satisfy the debt secured by the ... security interest 
may be liable in conversion to the ... secured party."). 
37. Figearo, 79 Bankr. at 918. 
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general creditors exist, no creditor has an in rem right against 
property of the seller before the bulk sale. When collateral is sold, 
and proceeds are created and held by the buyer for the benefit of 
the general creditors, each creditor obtains an in rem interest (in 
the cash) simultaneously. 38 Since the rule of "first in time is first in 
right" cannot apply to simultaneously created property rights, pro 
rata sharing is appropriate among the general creditors. 39 But 
when a secured party claims the inventory prior to the sale, the 
secured party has a senior right to cash proceeds under Article 9.40 
True, the secured party's lien on the cash arises precisely at the 
same time the property rights of the general creditors arise. 41 That 
is, the perfected security interest was simultaneously created 
along with the general creditors' in rem rights. Under Article 9, 
ties between a security interest and a judicial lien go to the secured 
party.42 If the in rem rights of general creditors are equated with 
38. For the view that Article 6 bulk.sales law creates an in rem property interest that 
resembles an unperfected security interest, see Johnson v. Mid States Screw & Bolt Co., 733 
F.2d 1535, 1536 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law as a Property 
Right, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 843 (1987). The recognition that general creditors have in rem 
rights against the inventory is much superior to the less adequate idea of the transfer being 
"ineffective" as section 6-110 states. The "ineffectiveness" language leads to strange judicial 
behavior. In Pastimes Publishing Co. v. Advertising Displays, 6 Ill: App. 3d 414, 286 N.E.2d 
19 (1972), a secured party claiming accounts receivable was denied an account that came 
from a noncomplying bulk sale. The court reasoned that the sale was "ineffective," and so 
the resulting account did not exist! This fanciful argument would destroy any secured 
party's claim to proceeds of inventory whenever the inventory is sold in a noncomplying 
bulk sale. Pastimes, 286 N.E.2d at 22. 
39. See Rome Indus., Inc. v. Intsel Southwest, 683 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984) (general creditor who garnishes the Article 6 fund in the hands of an escrow agent 
entitled only to pro rata share). 
40. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987). 
41. That is, when the bulk buyer pays cash, the general creditors obtain an in rem 
property right to the cash at precisely the same moment as the perfected secured party. It 
may be true that, when the seller owned the inventory, the secured party already had a lien 
and the general creditors had none. But this does not mean that the secured party .had a 
lien on cash proceeds earlier than the general creditors received their in rem right. A secur-
ity interest on the inventory arises at a different time from the security interest on cash 
proceeds of the inventory. 
42. The theory of the tie between the security interest and the judicial lien goes as 
follows. According to section 9-201, the secured party always wins unless a specific provision 
in Article 9 says otherwise. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1987). In case of a tie between perfecting a 
security interest and the creation of a judicial lien, no provision helps the lien creditor, and 
so the secured party wins under section 9-201. Section 9-301(1)(b) states, "An unperfected 
security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before 
the security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987) (emphasis added). This provi-
sion cannot help the lien creditor in a tie. The lien creditor must have "become a lien 
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judicial liens, 43 or, better still, if the bulk buyer .is considered a 
creditor representative in the nature of an assignee for the benefit 
of creditors, and hence a lien creditor on behalf of all general cred-
itors, 44 then Article 9 priorities dictate that the secured party 
outranks the general creditors as to the Article 6 fund.45 Under this 
theory, simultaneity affects the general creditors inter se but not 
the secured party versus the general creditors. On this view, sec-
tion 6-106(3) becomes a mini-bankruptcy provision, with secured 
parties coming first and general creditors sharing the remainder on 
a pro rata basis. 
The newly revised Article 6 obviates any confusion over the 
obligation to distribute the proceeds "pro rata." According to new 
section 6-104(1)(e), the bulk buyer is to distribute the "net con-
tract price in accordance with· the undertakings of the buyer in the 
schedule of distribution."46 This distribution rule clearly puts per-
fected secured parties above the general creditors. 
creditor" before perfection, not at the same time. Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priori-
ties Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I, 5 CARDOZO L, REv. 287, 344-
46 (1984) [hereinafter Carlson & Shupack, Part I]. 
43. The in rem rights of general creditors in this situation have been compared to an 
unperfected security interest. Note, supra note 38, at 847-48, 854-60. · 
44. See U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1987) ("A 'lien creditor' ... includes an assignee for benefit 
of creditors from the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the 
filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment."); see also Ander-
son & Clayton Co. v. Earnest_, 610 S.W.2d 846, 848 (Te:x:. Civ. App. 1980) (comparing the 
bulk buyer to a receiver). Whether the definition of "lien creditor" is expansive or restrictive 
has divided. the commentators. Compare Carlson & Shupack, Judicial Lien Priorities 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code:. Part II-Creditor Representatives, 
Bank Receivers, Fixtures, Crops, and Accessions, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 823, 828-35 (1984) 
[hereinafter Carlson & Shupack, Part II] (bank receivers should fall within the definition, 
even though not appointed by a court) with Hansford & Speegle, Lien Creditor Status 
Under the UCC-Does the FDIC Qualify?, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 13 (1983) (bank receivers should 
not fall within the definition of lien creditors). 
45. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1987). 
46. Id. § 6-104(1)(e) (1988) (emphasis added). Revised section 6-102(1)(k) defines "net 
contract price" as: 
the new consideration the buyer is obligated to pay for the assets less: 
(i) the amount of any proceeds of the sale of an asset, to the extent the 
proceeds are applied in partial or total satisfaction of a debt secured by the 
asset; and 
(ii) the amount of any debt to the extent it is secured by a security inter-
est or lien that is enforceable against the asset before and after it has been sold 
to a buyer. 
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C. Bulk Sales as Waiver of the Security Interest 
The above view that the secured party should not get a double 
entitlement-cash and collateral-has yet to be reconciled with the 
actual language of Article 9, which does admittedly authorize such 
double entitlements.47 Professor Harris suggests a theory whereby 
the McBee dictum can be brought within the terms of Article 9, 
although, in the end, he criticizes the theory as inadequate.48 Ac-
cording to Harris's theory, secured parties implicitly authorize the 
sale of the collateral whenever a buyer complies with the provi-
sions of Article 6, and hence their security interests disappear 
upon the bulk sale.49 Harris writes, "The unstated premise for the 
McBee court's view that a complying buyer in bulk takes free of a 
perfected security interest may be the court's belief that, by failing 
to assert its security interest in the face of a bulk sale notice, the 
secured party 'otherwise' authorizes the sale."110 
Harris disagrees with this version of McBee's justification, be-
cause a secured party cannot authorize a sale unless the secured 
party knows of the sale.111 Yet, Harris thinks, compliance with Arti-
cle 6 does not guarantee this. 112 For instance, the seller may leave 
the secured party off the creditor's list, and the bulk buyer need 
only inform those on the list of the sale and other persons known 
to hold or assert claims against the transferor.113 "Thus," Harris 
concludes, "to the extent that the McBee court's notion that a 
complying bulk transfer ipso facto terminates a perfected security 
interest is based on a theory of implied authorization or waiver, 
the notion is without foundatiop. "114 
This implied authorization theory, however, can be rehabili-
tated from this particular criticism. I think perfected secured 
parties will always know of a bulk sale, and hence it is possible to 
47. u.c.c. § 9-306(2) (1987). 
48. Harris, supra note 1, at 199-200. 
49. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987) ("a security interest continues in collateral notwith-
standing sale ... unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party"). 
50. Harris, supra note 1, at 199. 
51. Id. at 199 n.90. 
52. Id. at 200. 
53. U.C.C. § 6-107(3) (1987) ("The notice in any case shall be delivered personally or 
sent ... to all persons shown on the list of creditors furnished by the transferor (Section 6-
104) and to all other persons who are known to the transferee to hold or assert claims 
against the transferor."). 
54. Harris, supra note 1, at 200. 
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argue that they authorize the bulk sale by failing to protest it. If 
the security interest in the seller's inventory is perfected, a financ-
ing statement has necessarily been filed. Therefore, the buyer is 
always able to find out the identity of the secured party. The buyer 
is said to have "constructive notice" of the perfected security inter-
est; the whole notion of Article 9 filing is that the buyer is 
supposed to check the files for previous security interests. From 
this, it is a short step to the conclusion that, for the purposes of 
Article 6, the buyer has a duty to look in the files. Such a duty 
cannot be found in section 1-201(25), which provides: "A person 
'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge 
of it."55 But it can. be found in section 1-201(27), which states: 
[K]nowledge ... received by an organization is effective for a partic-
ular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention of 
the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from 
the time when it would have been brought to his attention if the 
organization had exercised due diligence.1'6 
The argument would be that notice has been brought to the atten-
tion of the secured party from the time the buyer should have seen 
it in the files. Consequently, for a buyer to be declared in compli-
ance, she must have notified all perfected secured parties. Since 
the premise of the McBee opinion is. that the buyer has complied 
with Article 6, the perfected secured party has already received no-
tice and therefore might plausibly be said to .authorize a bulk sale 
by remaining silent. 57 
55. U.C.C. § 1-201(25)(a) (1987). 
56. Id. § 1-201(27) (emphasis added). See also Harris, supra note 36, at 208 ("A court 
might impute knowledge of creditors to a transferee who affirmatively avoids discovering 
their existence or might impose liability on the transferee for failing to act in good faith." 
(citing U.C.C. § 1-203)). 
57. It is probably bad manners to quote another article on a different topic against 
Professor Harris, but, with regard to lessees, he made an "implied authorization" argument 
that is similar to the one he rejects with regard to bulk transfers. See Harris, The Rights of 
Creditors Under Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REv. 803, 813-15 (1988). 
The precise problem that Harris faced in this other article is whether lessees in the 
ordinary course of a merchant's business take free of the security interest on inventory (for 
the duration of the lease). Professor Harris thought that "buyers" was not broad enough to 
cover "lessees," but he willingly argued that secured parties impliedly authorize the leasing 
of inventory, and hence lessees take free of the security interest under section 9-306(2): 
When the collateral is the debtor's equipment, the secured party is most unlikely to 
authorize the debtor to lease the equipment free of the security interest. However, 
when the collateral is inventory that the debtor is in the business of leasing, then the 
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This point is strengthened by, and even dependent upon, the 
observation that, in Texas, the proceeds are kept on hand by the 
transferee for the benefit of the secured party,58 so that the se-
cured party has good reason, in the abstract, to approve of the 
bulk sale. Furthermore, it cannot be said in such a situation that 
mere acquiescence prejudices the secured party because the pro-
ceeds remain in place for a time after the sale goes through. 59 In 
jurisdictions where the buyer is authorized to (and actually does) 
hand over the proceeds directly to the debtor,60 an argument for 
implied authorization would seem to be much weaker because a 
secured party who is merely slow, rather than genuinely acquies-
cent, may more likely be prejudiced by not responding to the 
notice of the bulk sale. 
One major problem with this view is that the debtor. and the 
buyer have little incentive to maximize the price when the collat-
eral is overencumbered-i.e., when no positive debtor equity exists. 
If the seller and the buyer have negotiated an unreasonably low 
price, then it should not be the case that a quiescent secured party 
should be taken as approving the sale.61 Yet if the sales price ex-
ceeds the amount of the secured claim, or if the negotiated price is 
security agreement may explicitly authorize the debtor to hold the goods for lease. 
Even if the security agreement is silent on that point, a court may infer the secured 
party's authorization for ordinary course leases from the secured party's conduct, in-
cluding the fact that the secured party, without objecting, knowingly permitted the 
debtor to offer the goods for lease. 
Id. at 814. This is precisely the argument that can be offered in defense of the McBee dic-
tum. If it works with regard to leases of inventory, if ought to work for sales of inventory out 
of the ordinary course (provided the buyer holds the proceeds for the secured party). 
58. TEX. Bus. & CoM. ConE ANN. § 6.106(1) (Vernon 1968). 
59. According to section 6-106 comment 3: 
The methods by which the buyer may perform the duty stated in the section are 
various. He may, for instance, by agreement with the seller hold the consideration in 
his own hands until the debts are ascertained, or deposit it in an account subject to 
checks bearing his counter-signature, or deposit it in escrow with an independent 
agency. If the affairs of the seller are so involved that nothing else is practical the 
buyer will no doubt pay the consideration into the registry of an appropriate court 
and interplead the seller's creditors. 
U.C.C. § 6-106 comment 3 (1987). 
60. That is, in jurisdictions adopting the weak version of Article 6, buyers are not 
required to keep proceeds on hand for creditors. 
61. It can also be said that the secured party has a full opportunity to object to the 
terms of the sale in advance and thereby the secured party can be presumed to have author-
ized the sale. Hence, the danger of a shockingly low sales price does not necessarily work to 
defeat the theory that a secured party impliedly authorizes a bulk sale once notified of the 
sale. 
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reasonable, then the authorization theory raised and criticized by 
Professor Harris seems not so implausible. 
To summarize, according to the face of the language in Article 
9, a complying buyer should prevail over a previous perfected se-
curity interest only if it is true that the secured party has 
authorized the bulk sale by acquiescing to it.62 The case for acqui-
escence depends upon the secured party remaining silent. after 
having been informed of the bulk sale. This argument should only 
be allowed in those states with the strong version of Article 6 
where the buyer must hold the proceeds for the seller's creditors. 
Sound ethical arguments might be made for allowing complying 
buyers to take free of these security interests in states where the 
buyer holds the proceeds for the benefit of the secured party. That 
is, a secured party should have a surviving lien or the cash pro-
ceeds, but not both. When a sale is within the ordinary course of 
business, Article 9 clearly gives the secured party both ( unless the 
secured party waives the lien),63 but the justice of this double enti-
tlement can be questioned, where the buyer holds the cash 
proceeds for the secured party to collect. 64 
II. THE UNPERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE COMPLYING 
BUYER 
The southwest quadrant of Figure One is, or should be, an 
easy case-the only one a complying buyer might clearly win. If 
SP 1 has not perfected, and if the buyer is a bona fide purchaser, 
62. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
64. According to section 6-103(3), "[t]ransfers in settlement or realization of a lien or 
other security interests" are exempt from the provisions of Article 6. U.C.C. § 6-103(3) 
(1987). Therefore, if inventory is sold and if all the cash is given to a secured party, then, 
arguably, no further compliance with Article 6 is required. See Techsonic Indus. v. Barney's 
Bassin' Shop, 621 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); American Metal Finishers, Inc. v. 
Palleschi, 55 A.D.2d 499, 501, 391 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1977); but see Hixson v. Pride of Tex. 
Distrib. Co., 683 S. W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (Article 6 does not apply only if the 
secured party gets all the cash and the security agreement was in default); accord Stone's 
Pharmacy v. Pharmacy Accounting Management, Inc., 812 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (8th Cir. 
1987) (Texas law). According to one case, the exemption applies only if the inventory is 
transferred directly to the secured party in satisfaction of the security interest. Starman v. 
John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The Starman case has been re-
interpreted as one in which a security agreement was not in default, the secured party had 
no right to foreclose, and not all the cash was given to the secured party, so that Article 6 
still applied. Techsonic Indus., 621 S.W.2d at 334. 
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the buyer should "take free" of the security interest. Of course, if 
the buyer has knowledge of the unperfected security interest, then 
the security interest lives on and is fully enforceable and perfect-
ible.65 This result is set forth in section 9-301(1)(c): 
[A]n unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of 
(c) in the case of goods ... , a person who is not a secured 
party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in 
ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in 
ordinary course of business, to the extent that he gives value 
and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the 
security interest and before it is perfected.66 
Notice this provision does not quite say that, in case of a bona fide 
purchaser, the security interest is dead. Rather, it is subordinate to 
the rights of the buyer. Yet, subordination should be understood to 
comprehend the termination of the junior security interest. 
A. The ATASCO Case 
Unfortunately, this notion that subordinated liens are dead 
was rejected by the Second Circuit in Aircraft Trading & Services, 
Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (ATASCO).67 In ATASCO, the court was faced 
with a priority dispute resembling the one portrayed in Figure 
Three: 
65. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987). 
66. Id. (emphasis added). 
67. 819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987). 
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The case started with ATASCO's sale of a jet engine to the debtor 
on credit, secured by a purchase money security interest. Before 
ATASCO perfected,68 the debtor affixed the engine to an airplane 
and sold the whole plane (including the engine) to B (Northeast-
ern). Bin turn sold the plane to B2 (Braniff) who sold the plane to 
B3 (Condren, an individual). B3 then leased the plane to B4 with 
an option to buy. This lease was not filed with the FAA, as re-
quired by federiil law. 69 At this point, ATASCO finally filed a 
financing statement. When B 4 exercised its option to buy, B 4 could 
have found a financing statement in the federal files pertaining to 
aircraft and related parts. 70 
Judge Miner, speaking for the Second Circuit, ruled that, 
SPi's security interest was resuscitated as soon as B3 sold to B4, so 
that it could be asserted against the property of B4•
71 According to 
Miner: 
68. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1982). Although filing must occur pursuant to federal law, 
the significance of perfection of a security interest is determined entirely under the UCC. 
ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1231-32; see generally Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 
(1983); M. RICE, ASSET FINANCING 251-70 (1989). 
69. The consequence of the unrecorded lease is explored infra in the text accompany-
ing notes 97-106. 
70. See 49 U.S.C. § 1403(f) (1982). 
71. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233. 
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It is critical to note for the discussion that follows that 
AT ASCO's unperfected security interest, though subordinate, con-
tinued to exist. Section 9-301(1) explicitly provides that "an 
unperfected security interest is subordinate" to the rights of certain 
buyers and lien creditors. The language of subordination indicates 
that the secured party's rights live on, although junior to the buyer's 
rights. Contrast the language of section 9-307-"[a] buyer in the or-
dinary course . . . takes free of a security interest created by his 
seller" -which terminates the secured party's interest for all time. 
Some courts seemingly ignore the subordination language of section 
9-301(1) and state that a senior buyer "takes free" of an unperfected 
security interest, but those cases do not involve subsequent buyers 
and apparently use the phrases "takes free" and "has priority over" 
interchangeably. 72 
Once the court established that ATASCO's security interest lived 
on, it necessarily followed that B4 was not a buyer who took collat-
eral subject to an unperfected security interest. Rather, B4 took 
collateral subject to a perfected security interest, and hence section 
9-301(1)(c) did not apply to protect B4•
73 
72. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis in original). Judge Miner concluded that sec-
tion 9-307(1) extinguishes a security interest. That section refers to the buyer in the 
ordinary course of business "taking free" of security interests on inventory. U.C.C. § 9-
307(1) (1987). However, Miner determined that B2 was not a buyer in the ordinary course, 
and so the "taking free" language .did not apply. AT ASCO, · 819 F.2d at 1232-33. 
73. Because the collateral had been affixed to a plane, which was not collateral, section 
9-314, 'pertaining to accessions, should have applied. See Sigman, The Wild Blue Yonder: 
Interests in Aircraft Under Our Federal System, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 316, 370-73 (1973). This 
was overlooked entirely by the court and by the litigators. As it turns out, the case could 
have been decided the same way under section 9-314. According to section 9-314(1), "A 
security interest in goods· which attaches before they are installed in or affixed to other 
goods takes priority as to the goods installed or affixed (called in this section 'accessions') 
over the claims of all persons to the whole except as stated in subsection (3) .... " U.C.C. § 
9-314(1) (1987) (emphasis added). That is, ATASCO should have won unless something in 
section 9-314(3) states otherwise. However, section 9-314(3) does state otherwise: "The se-
curity interests described in subsection[] (1) ... do not take priority over (a) a subsequent 
purchaser for value of any interest in the whole ... if the subsequent purchase is made ... 
without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected." U.C.C. § 9-314(3) 
(1987). The two subsections, read together, establish that B "takes priority" over ATASCO. 
Thus, if the court had analyzed the problem under section 9-314, as it probably should 
have done, the court still would have faced the question, "What does it mean for a buyer 
without knowledge to take priority over an unperfected security interest?" This question is 
simply the obverse of asking, "What does it mean for an unperfected security interest to be 
subordinate to a buyer without knowledge?" There is no reason to believe that Judge Miner 
would have come out the other way. See ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233 (castigating the Ninth 
Circuit for "us[ing] the phrases 'takes free' and 'has priority over' interchangeably"). 
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The argument that "subordination" ought to mean killing off 
an unperfected security interest was specifically rejected by Judge 
Miner.74 Though not entirely unimpressed with the argument, he 
remarked: 
We decline ... to interpret section 9-301(1) in a manner that would 
give "subordinate" two different meanings in the same sentence de-
pending -upon the particular subsection that is relevant to the case 
at bar-section 9-301(l)(c) (buyers not in the ordinary course of 
business) or section 9-30l(l)(b) (lien creditors). Rather, we are con-
vinced that a plain reading of the statute requires that 
"subordinate" be given consistent meaning within section 9-301, and 
that the difference in phrasing between sections 9-301(1.) ("is 
subordinate") and 9-307 ("takes free") is to be given effect, notwith-
standing cases that use language of termination interchangeably 
with language of subordination.75 
_/ 
Thus, Miner feared attributing two different meanings to the word 
''subordinate"-one for buyers and one for secured parties and 
other lien creditors. Therefore, an absurd result was reached in an 
attempt to preserve a single denotative sense to the word 
"subordinate." - -
B. Death and Subordination 
Despite ATASCO, a good argument can be made that subordi-
nation means d~ath whether the subsequent taker is a buyer, a 
secured party, or a lien creditor. If such a result can be shown, 
then Judge Miner's reading of section 9-30l(l)(c) could be proved 
wrong. That is, it would be true that "takes free of' and "is 
subordinate to" are one and the same thing. 
What Judge Miner could have said, in pursuit of his point of view, is that B4 was not "a 
subsequent purchaser for value" of the whole "before it was perfected." Hence, B4 would 
not have been a protected subsequent purchaser. This Dracula aspect of section 9-314(3) 
was also included in the substantially identical 1962 version of the fixture priority statute. 
U.C.C. § 9~313 (1962). One of the motivations for the 1972 amendments to section 9-313 was 
to remove any implication that a senior real estate mortgage could become junior to an 
Article 9 fixture security interest if the mortgage was assigned. See Carlson, Fixture Priori-
ties, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 381, 403-04 (1983). However, section 9-314 was left untouched (with 
its anti-shelter implication intact) in 1972 because no one had made a fuss about accessions 
like they had about fixtures. 
74. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1233. 
75. Id. at 1234. 
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With buyers and bulk transferees, it is easy to imagine how 
subordination could ·mean the death of the security interest. Once 
a buyer or bulk transferee takes possession of the collateral, the 
security interest simply dies with the buyer or bulk transferee hav-
ing clean title to convey to another.76 But "subordination as death" 
is equally applicable in the case of subsequent liens. That is, if a 
second secured party or second judicial lien creditor takes collat-
eral encumbered by an earlier unperfected security interest (and if 
the party of the second part is senior), then the second lienholder 
takes free of the earlier unperfected security interest, just the same 
as the subsequent good faith buyer did. 
With regard to second senior lienholders, some explanation is 
required since most people will claim that the first unperfected se-
curity interest continues to exist even after the second security 
interest or judicial lien attaches. In order to show that subordina-
tion means death, even when the senior party holds a competing 
security 'interest, let us imagine the simplest conceivable Article 9 
priority problem, whereby SP1 .and SP2 have both received their 
security interests from the same debtor. In addition, SP1 has failed 
to perfect and SP 2 is a bona fide purchaser for value who has per-
fected. Finally, SP2 has repossessed and has held a foreclosure sale, 





t ____ First in time i.------ Second in time 
B2 
SP2 (perfected) Buyer at fore-
closure sale 
Third in time _j-
Figure Four 
76. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(c) (1987). 
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It could be said that SP2 takes free of (or has killed off) SPi's un-
perfected security interest in the following sense: subject to the 
complications caused by a perfection rule, a security interest is the 
right to sell whatever the debtor has at the time of attachment.77 
Of course, this basic formula, without more, guarantees that, if SP2 
exercises this power of sale, SP1's security interest lives on. But 
this formula is altered by Article 9's perfection rule. This perfec-
tion rule allows SP2 (if she perfects first) to sell not merely 
whatever the debtor had at the time of attachment, but to sell free 
of SP1's unperfected security interest as well.
78 Meanwhile, if SP2 
has not perfected, SP 2 may be able to sell less than what the 
debtor had at the time of attachment, if the debtor conveys a sub-
sequent security interest to a subsequent lender who perfects 
first.79 
In Figure Four, we can say that SP2 has taken free of SPi's 
security interest, when viewed from the perspective. of what SP2 
can sell to a buyer at a foreclosure sale. To say it another way, SP2 
is competent to convey good title to a buyer at the foreclosure sale 
that is free and clear of SPi's security interest. In this sense, 
viewed from the perspective of the title SP2's buyer can get, SP2 
takes free of SPi's security interest.80 Thus, subordination of a se-
curity interest implies death no matter whether the senior party 
has a lien or the rights of a buyer. 
Now pending SP2's foreclosure sale, the first lien admittedly 
continues to exist, for some purposes. This is because SP2 did not 
purport to take an absolute interest in the collateral. Rather, SP2 
has left to the debtor an equity interest in the collateral-an eq-
uity that has already been conveyed away to SP1• But SPi's rights 
to the debtor's equity are fully subject to SP2's power of sale. In 
77. See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 508-09; Carl-
son, Death and Subordination, supra note 32, at 558-63; Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: 
Conveyancing Principles and Property Interests, 59 B.U.L. REV. 811 (1979). 
78. "When collateral is. disposed of by a secured party after default, the disposition 
transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein, discharges the security 
interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto." 
U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1987) (emphasis added). The italicized portion of section 9-504(4) estab-
lishes the power of a senior secured party to transfer more than what the debtor had at the 
time her security interest attached. 
79. As the debtor did to SP1 in Figure Four. 
80. Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 513 n.38. 
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terms of what SP2 can convey to the buyer in a foreclosure sale, 
SPi's lien is already dead. Meanwhile, if we change SP2 into a full 
buyer, no equity is left to the debtor. If no equity is left to the 
debtor, then SP1 has no property rights either (because SPi's 
rights were strictly parasitic on the existence of a debtor equity). 
That is, if the debtor sells to an ignorant buyer, the security inter-
est of SP 1 is dead for all purposes. 
Thus, whether the debtor double-deals the collateral to a sub-
sequent buyer or a subsequent secured party, SP1's security 
interest has been terminated-as demonstrated by what happens 
when the senior transferee transfers to B 2 in Figure Four. A subor-
dinated security interest is a dead security interest, and the word 
"subordination'' has but a single meaning for all transferees. 
This principle-subsequent but senior transferees take free of 
the earlier subordinated· security interest-is sometimes called the 
"shelter principle. "81 This architectural metaphor is designed to 
capture the idea that the transferees from a bona fide purchaser 
are "sheltered" by the bona fide purchaser's status and therefore 
need not have any such status themselves. Thus, in Figure Four, 
B2 takes good title from SP2 even though SP1 may have perfected 
her · security interest by the time of the auction because B 2 comes 
within the "shelter" of SP 2's seniority. I have come to view this 
"shelter" metaphor as unaesthetic,82 because "shelter" wrongly im-
plies that, outside of the shelter, SP1's security interest continues 
to prowl. In fact the wolf is dead. "Shelter" is not needed. It would 
be better to say that the earlier subordinated security interest has 
been killed off, so that when the bona fide purchaser transfers the 
property to another, the dead lien is simply not a factor. It is safe 
for B2 (in Figure Four) to sleep out under the stars, if she wants to. 
Clearly, Judge Miner was wrong to rule that "subordination" 
in all contexts must mean that the junior security interest contin-
ues to exist. The opposite is true. The fixed meaning of 
subordination should be that the unperfected security interest 
ceases to exist. Taking free and clear has different details from 
context to context, but the idea is essentially uniform across all 
subsequent transfers. Thus, B4, in the ATASCO case, should have 
81. E.g., Proposed PEB Commentaries, [Current Materials] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Cal-
laghan), Current Materials Highlights Part II, at 2-3 (July, 1989). 
82. Admittedly, I used this phrase routinely in previous articles. See Carlson, Death 
and Subordination, supra note 32. 
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bought clean title through the initial buyer, who "took free" of 
SP1's unperfected security interest.
83 
In any case, on a practical level, Judge Miner's reading of the 
UCC is patently absurd, as the following example will show. Sup-
pose B buys collateral for $100 from the debtor. Unbeknownst to 
B, the collateral is encumbered by SP1's unperfected security in-
terest for $80. After B buys, SP 1 files a financing statement that 
was adequate to perfect a still-living security interest. According to 
ATASCO, Bis senior but the security interest of SP1 is not dead. 
Presumably this means that, so long as the collateral is in the pos-
session of B, SP1 is unable to repossess. But if B sells to someone 
else, SP 1 will be senior again and able to repossess. 
In this case, B has collateral worth $100 to B, but if B tries to 
sell the collateral to anyone else who knows about the security in-
terest, that party will deduct the $80 that SP1 claims and will pay 
$20. In essence, the rule of ATASCO makes the property of Bina-
lienable (although, in the precise example I used, B 2's equity 
interest of $20 was itself still valuable). Thus, if B, a bona fida 
purchaser, chooses to sell she is hurt. Subsequent purchasers are 
not hurt, because they simply reduce the purchase price by the 
amount of SPi's claim. Meanwhile, the double-dealing debtor has 
probably received full price from B, who did not know of SPi's 
unperfected security interest. And SP 1, who forgot to perfect, 
eventually realizes the full $80 secured claim. Under the rule of 
ATASCO, only the innocent bona fide purchaser for value is hurt, 
and absolutely everyone else in the universe _is all right and en-
joying a good laugh at her predicament. Yet, it is precisely the 
innocent bona fide purchaser who is supposed to be protected by 
section 9-301(l)(c).84 
Judge Miner offers some consequentialist reasoning in defense 
of his _decision. He writes: 
83. In any case, it must be said that, at the level of language philosophy, Judge 
Miner's notion that words have fixed meaning is impossible. Since Wittgenstein, most phi-
losophers have thought that words do not have meaning in and of themselves, but only have 
meaning as supplied by context. Therefore, although Judge Miner thought he was adhering 
to the one and only meaning of the word "subordination," he was in fact sub rosa switching 
contexts in order to preserve the illusion that meaning stayed fixed. If meaning is in the 
context (and not the words), then Judge Miner was guilty of switching meanings around, in 
the name of fixing the meaning. 
84. U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987). 
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The rule appellees urge us to adopt [equating death and subordina-
tion] effectively would freeze a secured party's priority status as of 
the time of the first intervening conveyance: If one failed to file a 
security interest the day of the sale, the buyer could, by immedi-
ately reselling, forever destroy the security interest. While appellees 
urge that their rule would result in an increment of certainty in such 
transactions, we believe that such an extreme result would discour-
age lenders from taking security interests and would thereby inhibit 
commerce.85 
This argument; however, profoundly misunderstands what a 
perfection rule is. The whole point of a perfection rule is to em-
power the debtor to double-deal the lender-in order to induce the 
lender to take the required perfective steps. This is not to say that 
double-dealing is a good thing in and of itself. Rather, the power to 
double-deal is the tool which encourages a secured party to perfect 
her interest. Therefore, asserting a fear of a double-dealing debtor 
cannot constitute an argument that relieves a secured party of the 
need to perfect. 86 Taken to its extreme, Miner's argument dictates 
that Article 9 . be repealed altogether and replaced with a simple 
rule of "first in tim.e is first in right." 
C. ATASCO and Shelter 
Dissatisfaction wi.th the ATASCO holding has· prompted the 
members of the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) of the UCG to 
decree a "Proposed New Comment 9 to section 9-301," plus an ad-
ditional proposed commentary on section 9-301(1).87 Disagreeing 
with AT ASCO's rejection of the shelter doctrine in that case, the 
proposed commentary states., "The shelter principle should be ap-
plied to protect [the sub-buyer]. Otherwise the value of [the 
buyer's] status, as one taking free of the security interest, is unjus-
85.. Aircraft Trading & Servs., Inc. v. Braniff, .Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1235 (2d Cir. 1987). 
86. See generally, Carlson, Rationality, Accident, and Priority Un<J,er Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 MINN. L. REV. 207, 215-16 (1986) (publication or recording of 
liens in a central location may cost less than the buyer's investments in title investigation 
and/or title insurance; a perfection requirement facilitates the movement of goods to high-
value uses). 
87. Proposed PEB Commentaries, [Current Materials] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Calla-
ghan), Current Material Highlights Part II, at 3 (July, 1989). 
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tifiably . impaired if he cannot confer that status upon his 
transferee."88 
The PEB then offers its new proposed "official" comment to 
section 9-301: 
There is no conflict between the principle of § 9-301(1) and the 
"shelter principle," which is applied at several points in the statute, 
but is most explicitly stated in § 2-403(1): "A purchaser of goods 
acquires all title which his transferor had .... '' 
Althm1gh subsection (1) fails to state the shelter principle ex-
pressly, that principle is applicable where a person who had met the 
conditions for prevailing over an unperfected security interest trans- . 
fers his right to another pei:son after the security interest is 
perfected. 89 
By this proposed comment, the PEB hopes to overrule ATASCO. 
However, the comment is subject to a logical flaw. 
In ATASCO, the lawyers for B4 argued that under UCC sec-
tion 2-403, which provides, "A purchaser of goods acquires all title 
which his transferor had or had power to trans£ er except that a 
purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of . . 
the interest purchased,"90 B4 acquired . B's immunity from 
ATASCO's security interest. That is, B's "title" included this im-
munity,. and B4 . succeede.d to it.
91 Judge Miner disposed of this 
"novel theory"92 by noting that, according to section 9-306(2), a 
security interest continues upon sale of the collateral (unless the 
secured party consents) "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise pro-
vides."93 An Article 2 provision therefore is not competent to vary 
the rule of section 9-306(2).94 Furthermore, section 2-4O2(3)(a) pro-
vides, "Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the rights 
of creditors of the seller . . . under the provisions of the Article on 
Secured Transactions (Article 9) .... "95 This provision also dis-
ables section 2-403(1) from affecting unperfected security interests. 
88. Id. 
89. Id.; see also Harrell, Sales-Related Conflicts Between Articles 2 and 9, 22 U.C.C. 
L.J. 134, 173-74 (1989) (criticizing the ATASCO court for overlooking shelter in section 2-
403(1)). 
90. u.c.c. § 2-403(1) (1987). ) 
91. Aircraft Trading & Servs., Inc. v. Braniff, Inc., 819 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir. 1987). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 1235 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1987)). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) (1987)). 
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Finally, the very text of section 2-403(1) requires us to know what 
title the seller has the power to convey, but this question is only 
settled by reference to section 9-301(1)(c).96 
For these reasons, the PEB's invocation of the shelter provi-
sion in section 2~403 is poor theory. It is better to face up to the 
fact that section 9-301(1)(c) is a murderer. It kills off the security 
interest altogether-and that Judge Miner (sitting in diversity, 
mind you, and therefore merely guessing at the content of state 
law) simply made an error. 
D. ATASCO's Application of a Race-Notice Priority Between 
Unperfected Secured Parties and Lessors 
ATASCO involved one other issue which many may find bi-
zarrely decided but which I would like to defend. In Figure Three, 
recall that B3 leased the airplane to B4 at a time when AT ASCO 
had not yet perfected its security interest. This might have raised 
the issue of whether a lessee takes free of an unperfected security 
interest-an issue not settled directly by Article 9.97 Judge Miner 
evaded this issue and found that ATASCO must win because 
AT ASCO filed · before the lessee did. He found authorization for 
this decision in section 9-312(5)(a), which provides, "Conflicting 
security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or 
perfection."98 Judge Miner thought this rule subordinated the sub-
sequent lessee because the lessee was the second to file.99 
Some will be tempted to criticize Judge Miner for using a sec-
tion that pertains to competing security interests to solve a priority 
problem between a security interest and a leasehold interest. I 
think Judge Miner's reasoning is not so bad. Ordinarily, lessees 
and buyers do not have to file anything to perfect their interests in 
96. Carlson, Death and Subordination, supra note 32, at 550 n.9. 
97. Although not directly settled, it is arguable under section 9-301(1)(c) which pro-
tects "buyers," not lessees, that lessees are temporary buyers and that the lease is therefore 
good against the unperfected secured party. Meanwhile, the unperfected security interest 
would continue to encumber the. lessor's reversionary interest in the collateral. "Buyer" is 
more or less an undefined term under the UCC, so that there is no impediment to such an 
argument. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying' ... does not include a transfer in bulk or 
as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt."). For a thorough analysis 
of whether lessees can come under various Article 9 provisions, see Harris, supra note 57, at 
815-16. 
98. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1987). 
99. ATASCO, 819 F.2d at 1236; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(c) (1982). 
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personal property.10° Federal law changes this with regard to civil 
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts.101 If 
Congress has decided that buying and leasing should be subject to 
a perfection rule, then it seems appropriate that section 9-
312( 5)(a) should apply as a supplement to section 9-301(1)(c). 
That is, a buyer of an airplane without knowledge of an un-
perfected security interest in the airplane should take priority over 
(i.e., take free of) the earlier unperfected security interest, but this 
result is reversed if the secured party is the first to file. 102 Or, to 
say it another way, federal law, when combined with the DCC, cre-
ates a race-notice priority between buyers or lessees and secured 
parties.103 
If buyers and lessees are subjected to a perfection rule, then a 
race-notice priority is useful to protect the aftermarket for security 
interests in airplanes. If I may quote myself: 
li1 a race-notice' priority, A and B have not perfected. B is a BFP 
[bona fide purchaser for value]. Between A and B, the first to per-
fect wins, so that A has the potential to regain priority from a BFP. 
Thus, A and B are engaged in a race,, but only if B was a BFP at the 
time B. gave value. This is done to protect the· aftermarket. If A is 
. the first to perfect and wants to sell to X, X could never tell from 
the record that A was not really the owner or that B ·(the BFP) 
was.104 
100. One exception is thaf buyers of accounts and chattel paper are subject to Article 
9 filing requirements. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1987); but see id. § 9-104(f) (excluding some 
sales of accounts and chattel paper). 
101. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403 (1982). 
102. See Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 413 (1983) ("Although state 
law determines priorities, all interests must be federally recorded before they can obtain 
whatever priority to which they are entitled under state law."). 
103. If I may add a few arcane refinements, federal law requires that notice of leases 
and liens on engines and planes be filed. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1403(a)(2) (1982). It also requires 
that notices of purchases of aircraft be filed. Id. § 1403(a)(l). It does not require that out-
right purchases of aircraft engines be filed. M. RICE, supra note 68, at 253. Therefore, 
between secured parties and buyers of aircraft, the UCC, combined with federal law, creates 
a race-notice priority. But as against buyers ofairplane engines, combined federal and state 
law creates only a notice priority-that is, the buyer of an engine takes free of an un-
perfected security interest in the engine, since such a buyer need not file. 
Also, if buyers and lessors who must record are to be treated as if they are secured 
parties under Article 9, pursuant to Judge Miner's suggestion, then it follows that those who 
enter sell-leaseback aircraft deals with aircraft merchants are subject to section 9-307(1). 
That is, just as section 9-307(1) terminates security interests in airborne inventory, it would 
also terminate leases in the same inventory. 
104. Carlson, supra note 86, at 259-60. 
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Transposing this analysis to our airplane problem, suppose A is an 




t L files second 
Second in time 
Figure Five 
If A wished to assign her security interest to X, and if X searched 
the record, .L would not appear until L filed a record notice of the 
lease. If L has not filed, X therefore faces a title risk if section 9-
312( 5)(a) does not govern. But if section 9-312(5)(a) does govern, 
then X will know that A has good title to the security interest by 
virtue of having filed first before any subsequent taker. Therefore, 
X faces less title risk and will accordingly pay a higher price for 
A's security interest. This greater marketability of the security in-
terest will in turn make secured lending more attractive and might 
lower the price of secured loans to the debtor. Therefore, if you 
think that lower interest rates are a good thing,105 Judge Miner's 
adaptation of section 9-312(5)(a) is not as implausible as it might 
appear at first glance.106 
105. It is often thought that lower interest rates are a good thing. However, they may 
simply reflect greater costs exported to the public through, for example, limited liability of 
corporations. Therefore, one must resist proclaiming lower interest rates synonymous with 
efficiency. See generally Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the. Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 615-19 (1989). 
106. In the above paragraph, I only wish to suggest that race-notice priorities have a 
certain rationality to them. I do not wish to be understood as making some sort of law-and-
economics efficiency argument. Only a fool would say whether priorities are per se efficient 
or not. Some of the issues that would have to be resolved to make an efficiency argument 
include: (a) whether the debtor's business enterprises (or A's or X's) produce externalities, 
such that lower interest rates and higher productivity will cause more harm than good; (b} 
whether the benefits to A and X exceed the cost to B; and (c) whether making the market 
for the debtor's goods or services more optimal will make other markets more or less opti-
mal (the second best phenomenon). All of these empirical problems (and more) would 
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Although the above discussion trespassed beyond the scope of 
my topic to discuss the rights of an unperfected security interest 
against buyers generally, everything said about buyers not in bulk 
translates directly to complying bulk transferees. The thrust of the 
discussion is that buyers without knowledge-whether complying 
Article 6 transferees or buyers who need not comply with Article 
6-always take free of unperfected security interests. That is, the 
security interest ceases to exist when a buyer or bulk transferee 
without knowledge acquires the collateral. · 
This is especially important for bulk transferees. Bulk trans-
ferees purchase inventory in bulk in order to put that inventory 
into the ordinary course of business. Ordinarily, section 9-307(1) 
terminates security interests in inventory when a customer buys 
some items out of inventory.107 But buyers in the ordinary course 
of business are not protected unless the seller of the inventory has 
created the security interest. A bulk transferee has not created the 
security interest, and so section 9-307(1) cannot help her with un-
perfected security interests created by the bulk transferor. If the 
AT ASCO case is followed, then the unperfected security interest of 
SP 1 springs back to life when the bulk transferee tries to sell some 
inventory to her customers. This means that SP1 can track down 
the bulk transferee's customers and take back any merchandise 
that the bulk transferee had acquired, even though the bulk trans-
feree fully complied with the rules in Article 6 .. Such a rule makes 
bulk transfers of inventory riskier and therefore increases the exit 
costs of doing business. 
Ill. THE PERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE NONCOMPLYING 
BUYER 
In the northeast quadrant of Figure One is the priority battle 
between the perfected secured party and the buyer who has not 
complied with Article 6. How straightforward can a priority battle 
prevent any conscientious scholar from making an efficiency argument in favor of any given 
priority system. 
107. u.c.c. § 9-307(1) (1987). 
j 
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be?108 But here one can find all sorts of startling doctrinal asser-
tions-some of them from the much maligned McBee case. In 
McBee, Judge Williams determined that noncomplying bulk buy-
ers must contribute after-acquired inventory not involved in the 
bulk sale to the wronged lenders of the seller.109 Furthermore, 
Judge Williams also suggests that, under certain circumstances, 
noncomplying buyers can cut off perfected security interests with 
a very short (six months) statute of limitations.11° Finally, Judge 
Williams decided that SP2 could never be a bona fide purchaser 
within the meaning of section 6~110,111 which provides that bona 
fide purchasers take free of Article 6 claims of creditors. 112 
The first ruling can be justified, in my opinion, while the sec-
ond cannot. The third ruling can be criticized as being somewhat 
overbroad but not totally without merit. 
A. After-Acquired Inventory 
1. Dissolving the Buyer-Seller Distinction 
a. McBee.-In McBee, the noncomplying buyer not only 
bought inventory from the bulk seller but later added inventory 
from other sources as well. Most judges would have said that the 
after-acquired property clauses in the security agreements of SP1 
and SP2 (in Figure Two) could not encumber inventory acquired 
later by the bulk buyer (which I will call "post-sale inventory") for 
the simple reason that the bulk buyer never agreed to any after-
acquired property clause. On this reasoning, SP1 and SP2 (credi-
tors of S) would have priority as to the inventory actually involved 
in the bulk transfer, and SP3 (B's creditor) would have any inven-
tory acquired by B after the bulk sale occurred. As to this post-sale 
inventory, the security interests of SP1 and SP2 would not even 
108. See e.g., First Security Bank of Idaho v. Absco Warehouse, Inc., 104 Idaho 853, 
664 P.2d 281 (Ct. App. 1983) (SP1 wins if B does not comply with Article 6). 
109. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 
F.2d 1316, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1983). Other courts have held likewise. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 125-66. 
110. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328-29. Some states lengthen this statute of limitations to a 
year. E.g., CAL. CoM. CODE § 6111 (West Supp. 1990); GA. CoDE ANN. § 11-6-111 (1982). 
111. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1330. 
112. u.c.c. § 6-110 (1987). 
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attach.113 Judge Williams writes, "At first glance this argument is 
appealing: how can a debtor-transferor give his secured creditors 
an interestin property he no longer owns and, more significantly, 
in post-transfer property acquired by the transferee which the 
transferor never owned?"114 But Judge Williams finds reason to 
give the post-sale inventory116-to which the security interests of 
SP1 and SP2 could never have attached-to SP1 and SP2: 
Upon analysis, however, the facial logical persuasiveness and the eq-
uitable underpinning of this argument disappears. The transferor 
gives his creditors a security interest in his property which may, as 
in the immediate case, cover "after-acquired property." It is Article 
6, which provides as a "sanction for non-compliance" that the trans-
fer is ineffective against creditors of the transferor .... Clearly, a 
transferee cannot complain if, by his non-compliance, the trans-
feror's creditors' claims attach to his property as they had prior to 
sale.116 
In case this argument went by you too quickly, let us take it step 
by step. (1) Article 6 imposes sanctions. (2) The sanctions are that 
the bulk transfer is "ineffective" against the creditors of the trans-
feror. (3) If the transfer is ineffective, that means we must pretend 
the seller still owns the collateral, and that the seller's creditors 
have their old rights against the collateral. (4) And yet the buyer 
now owns the collateral. (5) This contradiction can be resolved by 
seeing the buyer and seller as the same person. (6) If the seller 
obtained after-acquired inventory, the security interests of SP1 
and SP2 would attach to it. (7) Since the buyer is the seller, the 
security interests of SP1 and SP2 attach to any inventory the buyer 
· might acquire later. 
113. Harris, supra note 1, at 231. Attachment requires (a) a security agreement grant-
ing a security interest, (b) value given by the creditor, and (c) debtor rights in the collateral. 
U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1987). The theory is that the first element of attachment is absent, be-
cause the bulk buyer had no security agreement with SP1, or SP2• But see supra note 21 
(showing that in McBee, B did sign a security agreement with SP2). 
114. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328. 
115. Judge Williams limited SP1 and SP2 to the value. of the inventory transferred to 
B in the bulk sale. Id. at 1319, 1332. This result would adhere if Judge Williams had used 
the standards for commingled collateral under section 9-315. This matter is discussed infra 
in the text accompanying notes 234-43. 
116. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1328 (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CooE ANN. § 6.106 official 
comment 2 (Vernon 1968)). 
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Even critics of the McBee opinion have to admit that this rea­
soning is innovative-even Hegelian in quality. The immediate 
appearance is· that the seller and buyer are separate persons, but, 
according to Article 6, the "transfer is ineffective, "117 and this re­
sults in the sublation (Aufhebung) or merger of the seller and the 
buyer into a unified category of being. Since transfers require two 
persons, 118 this sublation of the buyer-seller distinction is what it 
means for the transfer to be ineffective. Thus, the obligations of 
the seller become the obligations of the buyer.119 
For classical liberals such as Professor Harris, such reasoning 
is untenable and perhaps even incomprehensible. The buyer and 
the seller are separate beings, and that's it!120 If the transfer is in­
effective between buyer and seller, it is not because the buyer­
seller distinction has been obliterated. This distinction may be 
taken as a deconstructible given. Rather, transfer ineffectiveness, 
as invoked by Article 6, is simply a metaphor to help us imagine 
legal rules governing the rights of the transferor's creditors. We are 
to pretend that the specific inventory in the bulk sale was never 
transferred. Then we are to imagine what rights the creditors 
would have against this inventory in such a case.121 In no sense is 
the buyer now the seller, and in no way should the seller's personal 
contractual obligations be attributed to the buyer. 
117. Id.
118. See Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception
of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077, 1184 
(1989). 
119. Judge Williams cites some cases holding that, when a security agreement provides
that the collateral is inventory, both present and after-acquired inventory are deemed to be 
covered. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1331 (citing In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93 
(D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971); In re Page, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
501, 504 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Wolfe City Nat'l Bank, 544 
S.W.2d 947, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)). These cases would be apt only if one debtor granted 
inventory security interests to all the secured parties in the case. They could not apply to 
the facts in McBee unless it can be shown somehow that the seller's security agreement was 
binding on the buyer. 
120. "Even though the buyer in bulk may continue to do business under the trade
name of the seller, at the same location, and using the same assets, the two parties usually 
are distinct legal persons." Harris, supra note 1, at 231; see Citizens Sav. Bank v. Sac City 
State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 26-28 (Iowa 1982); Burke, The Di.tty to Refile Under Section 9-
402(7) of the Revised Article 9, 35 Bus. LAW. 1083 (1980). 
121. They can levy on it, if they have judgments against the seller. U.C.C. § 6-111
comment 2 (1987). 
766 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 41:3:729 
Strangely, on the facts of McBee, the buyer and the seller 
were, in a sense, one person, or at least they were jointly and sever-
ably liable on the seller's security agreement with SP1• The 
security agreement was in fact signed by B, who represented her-
self as the partner of S. As a result, B was personally bound on the 
after-acquired property clause in the loan agreement. Therefore, it 
was proper to give SP1 priority over SP3 for the inventory acquired 
by B after the bulk sale. SP1's security interest did attach to this 
inventory.122 
This fact justifies giving post-sale inventory to SP1• It does not 
justify giving post-sale inventory to SP 2, who did not obtain B's 
signature on its loan agreement. Properly speaking, the Fifth Cir-
cuit should have found a way to vindicate SP/s seniority to the 
post-sale inventory while preventing SP2 from getting this 
inventory. 
One such theory-marshaling of assets-must be ruled out. If 
inventory can be identified-divided into definite pre-sale and 
post-sale amounts-then SP1 would have a senior security interest 
in both pools of inventory, whereas SP2 would have a security in-
terest in only one. This is a classic marshaling-of-assets situation, 
except that · SP 3 can make the same argument! That is, SP 1 has a 
senior security interest in two pools of inventory, while SP3 is jun-
ior to a single pool. One of the rules of marshaling is that it must 
not cause unfair prejudice to third parties. 123 Therefore, SP 2 and 
SP3 have identical and conflicting marshaling-of-assets claims 
which cancel each other out. 
If the inventory is perfectly identifiable, another possibility 
now exists. Recall that SP2 was a purchase money lender as to part 
of the inventory.124 If this inventory (or its proceeds) could be 
identified, then SP 2 would be senior as to it over SP 1• If this were 
true in sufficient magnitude, then the marshaling impasse just de-
scribed could be avoided. Instead, SP2 would be senior to at least 
part of the pre-sale inventory. SP1 would take the balance of this. 
To the remainder left to SP1 we could freely add post-sale inven-
tory without giving any of this collateral to SP 2• SP 3 could then 
have the residue of post-sale inventory after SP2 is paid out. If this 
122. See supra note 21. 
123. Averch & Prostok, The Doctrine of Marshaling: An Anachronistic Concept 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 U.C.C. L.J. 224, 231 (1990). 
124. See supra note 21. 
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line of reasoning had been followed, then Judge Williams's analysis 
regarding post-sale inventory would have been on the money. He 
could have given SP1 priority over SP3 without having any post-
sale inventory go to SP2• · 
Of course, whether the inventory was identifiable with this de-
gree of accuracy is not known. If not, then application of the 
commingling priority in section 9-315 becomes relevant. This sub-
ject will be taken up presently. 
b. Bulk Transfers Between Corporate Subsidiaries.-McBee 
is not the only case that dissolves the buyer-seller distinction. 
Courts have strained to do so especially when ·one corporate sub-
sidiary transfers a business to another corporate subsidiary. In 
such cases, the bulk transfer may he completely invisible to the 
naked eye.125 The key in such cases is to find a theory whereby the 
after-acquired property clause executed by the seller will be bind-
ing on the buyer. The theories developed to achieve this limited 
"piercing the corporate veil" have not always been very sound, as 
the McBee opinion has already demonstrated1 A better theory 
needs to be found. 
There has developed a standard string-cite for the proposition 
that the security agreement of S is binding on B. Yet it can be 
shown that this string-cite is a total bootstrap, if I may mix a few 
metaphors. The first case to hold B on a security interest she did 
not sign is said to be Ryan v. Rolland.126 This case turned only on 
whether the financing statement covering pre-sale inventory was 
still good to perfect the security interest in that inventory after the 
125. Certain intra-corporate transfers are exempt from compliance with Article 6: 
A transfer to a new business enterprise organized to.take over and continue the busi- · 
ness, if public notice of the transaction is given and the new enterprise assumes the 
debts of the transferor and he receives nothing from the transaction except an inter-
est in the new e~terprise junior to the claims of creditors[, is not subject to Article 6]. 
u'.c.C. § 6-103(7) (1987) (emphasis added). In the transfers we are dealing with, notice is 
rarely given and the debts of the seller are not assumed by the buyer. Hence, Article 6 will 
generally apply. 
126. 434 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1970); see Towers v. B.J. Holmes Sales Co. (In re West 
Coast Food Sales, Inc.), 637 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981); Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co., 272 
Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975). 
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sale. The court held that it was.127 There was no dissolution of the 
buyer-seller distinction there, so far as I can tell. 128 
The second case often cited for holding B to the security 
agreement of S also fails to establish.that point. In Inter Mountain 
Association of Credit Men v. Villager, Inc.,129 the secured party 
lent to a corporation in exchange for a security interest in all of the 
debtor corporation's inventory. Later, the debtor merged with 
three other related corporations. After the surviving corporation 
filed for bankruptcy, the court held the surviving corporation liable 
ort the secured party's after-acquired property clause.130 This part 
of the case is unexceptional-it is well known that, in a merger, the 
surviving corporation assumes the liabilities of the previous 
corporations. 131 
The first case that genuinely held B to S's security agreement 
(without the aid of a merger) was Fliegel v. Associates Capital Co. 
127. Ryan, 434 F.2d at 357. 
128. See Burke, supra note 120, at 1089-90. 
129. 527 P.2d 664 (Utah 1974). 
130. Villager, 527 P.2d at 672. 
131. See, e.g., White Motor Credit Corp. v. Euclid Nat'l Bank, 63 Ohio Misc. 7, 409 
N.E.2d 1063 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978). The Villager court did innovate, however, in holding 
that the after-acquired property clause. would be limited in scope to the inventory sold in 
the specific stores that the predecessor corporation owned, even though the surviving corpo-
ration now owned many stores, and even though one of the security agreements binding the 
debtor gave to the secured party "all present and future ... inventory wherever located." 
Villager, 527 P.2d at 667, 672. The broad language of the security agreement would seem to 
contradict such a restriction, but a careful reading of the case shows the secured party en-
tered into a different security agreement with the predecessor for each different store of the 
predecessor. This might lead to the view that the parties intended the after-acquired prop-
erty clause to cover inventory related to that specific store (and no other). If this is what the 
predecessor agreed to, it should also be the. extent of the surviving corporation obligation. 
The case also. contains various muddled arguments. For instance, the court is worried 
whether the secured party has purchase money status. It launches into a iengthy analysis of 
the metaphysical notion of inventory security interests and adopts the controversial "entity" 
theory, which was designed to save inventory security interests from vulnerability to voida-
ble preference law. Id. at 668-70 (citing Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 232 (1965)). None of this was necessary in the slightest 
to the issue at hand-whether the after-acquired property obligation of the predecessor cor-
poration bound the surviving corporation. The court also mentions a clause from the 
security agreement that any successor would be bound by it. Such contractual language is 
relevant only if the court is prepared to say that the security agreement created a running 
covenant on the inventory, such that whoever bought the inventory (in bulk, presumably) 
was bound on the agreement, whether she agreed or not. Such an innovation is completely 
unnecessary because the law of corporate merger makes the successor liable on all the pred-
ecessor's contracts. 
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of Delaware, Inc.132 .In this case, S was a partnership bound on a 
security agreement with an after-acquired property clause on in-
ventory. According to this security agreement, S promised that 
"[a]ll obligations of [S] shall bind its successors and assigns."133 
Subsequently, S transferred inventory to B, a wholly owned corpo-
ration set up to take over the business. B then obtained post-sale 
inventory (apparently through credit advanced by the secured 
party).134 The court simply cited Ryan and Villager (wrongly) for 
the proposition that a seller's after-.acquired property clause is 
binding on a buyer (at least in an intracorporate setting)," and then 
proceeded to follow these "precedents." 
Although the court previously emphasized its reliance on the 
so-called precedents, it does add this language as if it were an af-
ter-thought: 
In addition, further support for holding the corporation subject to 
the defendant's security agreement is provided by the terms of the 
security agreement itself which provides that "[a]ll obligations of 
[S] shall bind its successors and assigns." Since it is stipulated that 
'the newly-formed corporation was the "successor" of [S], it became 
subject to [SP1's] security [agreement].
13
G 
This language can be taken to create a kind of equitable servi-
tude on inventory, whereby a bulk buyer becomes bound on the 
after-acquired property clause of its seller. 
The second genuine case in which B became bound on S's 
agreement (without expressly consenting to it or without a merger) 
was American Heritage Bank & Trust Co. v. 0. & E., Inc.136 In 
this case, S granted two security interests on inventory, as to which 
SP1 was senior and SP2 was junior. SP2 then declared default and 
sold the business to B, a wholly owned subsidiary of SP2• B then 
acquired new inventory and commingled it with the old. SP1 then 
declared default and sought to repossess the old and the new in-
ventory. B protested that the after-acquired property clause 
132. 272 Or. 434, 537 P.2d 1144 (1975). 
133. Fliegel, 537 P.2d at 1148. 
134. Id. at 1145 ("It is stipulated that defendant had financed the purchase of all the 
items· which were repossessed."). 
135. Id. at 1148 (reading "security agreement" for "security interest" at the end of the 
passage). Accord Q.T,, Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 
436 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
136. 40 Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566 (1978). 
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between SP1 and S could not affect B's post-sale inventory. Citing 
Villager and Fliegel, the court held that SPi's security agreement 
with S was binding on B.137 Thus, we see the start of a string:cite 
that was bootstrapped out of nothing. 
Next came Towers v. B.J. Holmes Sales Co. (In re West Coast 
Food Sales, Inc.),138 which involved only one secured party (SP) 
who entered into a security agreement with S, doing business as B. 
The security agreement "contained a 'successors and assigns' 
clause purporting to bind 'any corporation or other business entity 
to which the proprietorship's business might be transferred.' "139 S 
then conveyed the business to a new corporate entity, which also 
bore the name "B.''140 
In the bulk sale, B assumed all liabilities of S.141 B then pro-
ceeded to borrow from SP as if S still owned the business. B went 
bankrupt, and the trustee claimed that B was not liable on the 
after-acquired , property clause that existed in the agreement be-
tween SP and S. Hence, the trustee argued that SP had no lien on 
any post-sale collateral. 
The Ninth Circuit (per Judge Ely) held for SP. Judge Ely 
could have decided that SP's security interest was binding on B 
because B assumed S's liabilities.142 On the other hand, he could 
have argued that the clause in S's security agreement binding sue-
137. American Heritage, 576 P.2d at 568. The American Heritage case is susceptible 
to a narrower interpretation. In this case, the post-sale inventory was commingled by B with 
pre-sale inventory. If commingling means that the property can no longer be identified, then 
SP1 would have a perfected security interest on the whole pursuant to section 9-315(1). The 
use of section 9-315(1) to establish SP1's security interest on post-sale inventory is a subject 
taken up in the next part of this Article. For now, let it suffice that the opinion does not 
really say that the old and new inventory were indistinguishable, and so this narrower inter-
pretation depends upon this unmentioned fact. 
138. 637 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1981). 
139. West Coast Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 708. 
140. SP filed a financing statement under the trade name B, which was not proper. 
U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987); but see National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. 
(In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316, 1323 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that filing under trade name is 
adequate if no one is misled). Later, when S conveyed all assets to B, the filing error was 
deemed automatically corrected. 
141. "On April 1, 1973, a newly formed entity, West Coast Food Sales, Inc. (the corpo-
ration) succeeded to the assets and liabilities of West Coast Sales Company." West Coast 
Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 708. 
142. That is, B and S expressly agreed for the benefit of SP1 that B is bound by the 
security agreement between Sand SP1• See Houchen v. First Nat'! Bank (In re Taylorville 
Eisner Agency, Inc.), 445 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (where B assumed all liabilities, post-
sale inventory was treated as subject to SP1's interest). 
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cessors and assigns to the agreement was binding on B, who took 
the assets with knowledge of this clause. This would have made the 
security agreement into an equitable servitude on the property of 
S, on which B, as a knowledgeable buyer, would have been liable, 
whether it consented or not.143 Instead, after intoning the now-
standard string-cite of authorities in which the corporate successor 
was held liable on the predecessor's security agreement, he simply 
announced that if SP's security agreement does not bind B for · 
post-sale collateral, 
a debtor would be able to evade the obligations of a validly executed 
security agreement by the simple expedient of an alteration in its 
business structure. We conclude as a matter of law that the security 
agreement executed by the proprietorship continued to be effective 
as to the accounts receivable generated by the corporation after the 
change in entity status.144 
Thus, like the other cases, Judge Ely states no theory for binding 
B on S's security agreement, except that to rule otherwise would 
be to sanction an abuse of the corporate form. 
Finally, Bank of the West u. Commercial Credit Financial 
Services, Inc.,145 is a most interesting example of dissolving the 
buyer-seller distinction. In this case (as shown in Figure Six), B 
and S were corporate siblings owned by a common parent. Pursu-
ant to a factoring arrangement, S granted a security interest in 
accounts receivable to SP1• SP2 was B's lender claiming a security 
interest in after-acquired inventory and accounts. One day the 
common parent took a beverage business away from S and "sold" 
it to B. SP 1 was unaware of the sale. The same personnel who had 
worked for S pow worked for B.146 As a result, SP1 continued to 
collect accounts for B, unaware (at least for a while) that B was a 
143. One recent case assumes such clauses routinely create equitable servitudes on in-
ventory and other personal property. Q.T., Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
144. West Coast Food Sales, 637 F.2d at 709. 
145. 655 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). 
146. Even they were confused as to which subsidiary owned the beverage business. 
Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., 852 F.2d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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different entity from S.147 In short, even after the bulk sale, SP1 
had no way of ascertaining that the sale had even occurred. 148 
147. Id. The opinions are not very clear on the relationship between SP1 and S. Ac-
cording to the appellate opinion: 
The factoring agreement provided that [SJ would assign its accounts to [SPiJ. [SPiJ 
would then collect amounts due from account debtors; three days after collection, 
[SP1] would remit to [SJ the amounts collected, less a 1 % commission, and less any 
prior advances, plus interest. Advances were to be made on accounts which remained 
uncollected 33 days following assignment. In the factoring agreement, [SJ granted 
SP1 a security interest in its present and after-acquired accounts. In a separate secur-
ity agreement to secure advances made to [SJ pending collection of accounts, [SJ also 
granted [SP1J a security interest in [SJ's present and after-acquired inventory and 
proceeds. 
Id. at 1165. From the above, it would seem that, if ever S owed SP1 for advances, any given 
account or piece of inventory was collateral. But SP1's exposure for the first thirty-three 
days after an account was signed is unclear. From the above passage, it does not seem as if 
new value was advanced at the time the account was initially assigned to SP1 for collection. 
Judge Schwarzer describes the relationship this way: "The agreement provided that 
[SP1J would purchase accounts from [SJ at a discount from their face value and then collect 
the sums due from [S's] customers. After collection, [SP1] would remit to [SJ the discounted 
amount less interest and a commission." Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 811. So de-
scribed, it seems as if SP1 was buying the accounts from S on credit and remitting the 
discounted amount (i.e., the price of the account) to S when the account was collected. If 
this is so, SP1 should not get interest and commissions. On the contrary, it is S who should 
get interest. Alternatively, when Schwarzer said "purchase," he might have meant that SP1 
took a security interest in the account in exchange for a loan. In such a case, SP1 might 
remit all proceeds (less interest on the loan plus a commission), and S might pay down 
principal on the side. That is, SP1 might have foregone its right to set off the amount of the 
advance to S (but retained a right to set off interest and the commission). 
Later Judge Schwarzer writes: 
From January through September 1984, [SPiJ purchased beverage accounts from [SJ 
with a face value· of $1,900;000, for which [SP1] paid $1,300,000 .... [IJnvoices di-
rected account debtors to pay [SP1] .... After collecting accounts and remitting 
proceeds to [SJ, [SPiJ _retained only the amount it originally paid .[SJ for the ac-
counts plus $60,000 in interest and commissions. The factoring agreement terminated 
on October 15, 1984. After that date, [SP1] retained no further collections from ac-
count debtors, except to cover one October 31, 1984 interest payment. 
Id. at 812 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Apparently, SP1 retained (not remitted) 
the purchase price. This suggests that SP1 advanced cash for the accounts and characterized 
the advance as the purchase price for the accounts. That is, SP was a buyer, not a lender. 
Yet SP1 also obtained interest and commissions above this amount and then returned the 
balance to S. Interest and commissions are inconsistent with SP1 being a buyer. Instead, it 
sounds as if SP1 was a lender on accounts. As such, SP1 might retain the initial loan (which 
Judge Schwarzer confusingly calls "the amount if originally paid" id.) plus interest and 
commissions. Any surplus over the amount of SP1's loan, interest and commissions would be 
returned to S. 
Factors who buy accounts are treated for historical reasons as if they are secured par-
ties. See 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 308 (1965). 
148. Telephone Interview with Mark R. Reiff, Attorney at Lapidus & Reiff, San Fran-
cisco, California (December 20, 1989) (represented SP1 in the litigation). 
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Within a few months, SP/s factoring agreement with S termi-
nated. 149 Therafter, SP 2, claiming the post-sale accounts as its own 
collateral, served SP 1 with a writ of possession requiring SP 1 to 
hand over any accounts proceeds it still possessed. In addition, SP 2 
sued SP1 for converting its property.160 SP1 resisted, claiming it 
had priority as to the post-sale accounts. 
149. This cancellation occurred within four months of the bulk sale. Bank of the .West, 
655 F. Supp. at 816. Therefore, SP1's financing statement was still good to perfect a security 
interest in the post-sale colla~eral, if and only if SP1 could show that its security interest 
attached to such creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987) (if financing statement becomes seri-
ously misleading, the financing statement is still good to perfect all pre-sale collateral and 
will continue to perfect post-sale collateral for only four months after the sale). 
150. The only property at issue were "accounts generated from the sale of the bever-
age business's inventory after the transfer of the beverage business from [SJ to [BJ." Bank 
of the West, 852 F.2d at 1166 (emphasis in original). 
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At the district court level, Judge Schwarzer avoided deciding 
whether SPi's security interest ever attached to the post-sale ac-
counts in question. 151 Instead, he simply noted that SP2 filed a 
financing statement '(against B) earlier than did SP1 (who filed 
against S). Applying the "first to file" rule,152 Judge Schwarzer 
awarded priority to SP2• But having done so, Judge Schwarzer 
then snatched victory from the jaws of SP 2• Although Schwarzer is 
· vague on the exact transaction between B and SP1, it appears that 
SP1 lent. funds to B in exchange for a security interest in ac-
counts.153 According to Judge Schwarzer, if SP1 had not made this 
loan, B would have collected the accounts. The proceeds from col-
lection would have been used by B for working capital. SP2 would 
never have received these proceeds. Therefore, Schwarzer rea-
soned, SP1's conversion did not proximately cause SP2's losses: 
The appropriate measure of dan;i.ages is the loss proximately caused 
by [SP1's] conversion. [SP2] is therefore entitled to recover only 
those sums which were retained by [SP2] and not returned to the 
beverage business. [SP2] may obtain that portion of the $60,000 in 
interest and commissions collected by [SP1] for accounts factored 
after [ the bulk sale from S to B]. 154 
Under this formulation, damages excluded the principal amount of 
the loan and any proceeds remitted to B. It included only the cash 
proceeds that SP1 still retained by way of commissions and inter-
est, a . tiny amount compared with the bulk of the accounts.155 
Already this was a substantial victory for SP1. 
151. Judge Schwarzer does discuss the different question of whether SPi's security 
interest attached to pre-sale accounts of S. SP2 argued that S never even owned the bever-
age business in question, so that SP1 did not even receive pre-sale collateral. Although 
ownership of the beverage business was cloudy, Judge Schwarzer authorized S to use it as 
collateral. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp at 813. This finding was unnecessary, since the 
collateral in dispute was all post-sale collateral. See Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1167 
(also unnecessarily considering attachment as to pre-sale collateral). 
152. u.c.c. § 9-312(5) (1987). 
153. "Here, the funds advanced by [SP1] were used to operate the beverage business 
and resulted in the creation of new accounts." Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 819. 
Whether SP1 was a lender, a buyer, or a debtor is discussed supra in note 147. 
The sums lent by SP1 to B (in exchange for a security interest in specific accounts) 
would constitute proceeds of SP2's collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987) (" 'Proceeds' in-
cludes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of 
collateral or proceeds."). 
154. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. at 819. 
155. There is substantial incoherence in Judge Schwarzer's solution. Judge Schwarzer 
claims SP2 can have sums retained by SP1 and not remitted to B. Schwarzer characterizes 
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SP2 appealed, but slid backwards into total defeat. Writing for 
the Ninth Circuit, Judge David Thompson decided that SP1's se-
curity interest did attach to the post-sale accounts, and that SP 1 
had total priority over SP 2• 
166 SP 1 was therefore allowed to keep its 
commissions. 
In ruling for SP1, Judge Thompson zeroed in on the attach-
ment issue. He thought the key issue was "whether [SPi] has any 
interest in collateral acquired by [B] after the transfer. At first 
blush, the answer is no."167 But Judge Thompson thought section 
9-402(7) demanded a different answer. 
In its entirety, and with each sentence separately :numbered, 
section 9-402(7) provides: 
[1] A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor 
if it gives the individual, partnership or corporate name of the 
debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names or names of part-
ners. [2] Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an 
organization its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed fi-
these sums as $60,000 in interest and commissions. But if I am right that SP1 advanced 
funds on accounts and repaid itself out of later collections, SP1 would have retained not 
only interest and commissions but the principal amount of its loan. The order that SP1 
surrender retained funds would produce far more than $60,000. 
No restatement of this result is free of contradictions either. For example, Schwarzer 
might respond to the above critique by saying that he was really trying to isolate proxi-
mately caused damages. Damages would exclude amounts that, if B had done the collecting, 
B would have used in the ordinary course of its business. These amounts correspond to the 
amount lent by SP1 to B. But this would be wrong. If B had done the collecting, B would 
have collected not only what SP1 lent, but it would have collected the $60,000 in interest 
and commission expense SP1 collected and retained. This too would have been used in B's 
business, and SP2 would have sustained no proximately caused damage at all. 
If the idea is to give SP2 $60,000 but to immunize SP1 from any further liability, Judge 
Schwarzer would have to abandon his proximate causation theory and argue simply that 
SP1 is not liable for any sum actually remitted to B. This would guarantee SP2 the $60,000 
in retained interest and commissions, but it would also give SP2 proceeds equal to the prin-
cipal amount of SP1's loan to B-a much larger sum. (The only part of the prpceeds 
remitted to B would have been the profit-the difference between the amount collected and 
SP1's total claim on the amount collected). To limit SP2 to SP1's interest and commissions, 
Judge Schwarzer might try to argue that SP1 has a superior right of setoff for the principal 
amount of the loan. But if SP1 .could set off principal, why could not it also set off interest 
and commissions? If setoff rights are superior, they should be entirely superior of all of 
SP1's claim. Furthermore, there could be no setoff here because the debts set off are not 
mutual. B owes SP1, on the one hand, and SP1 owes cash proceeds to SP2 on the other. No 
setoff is possible here. In short, Schwarzer's theory does not turn on what is remitted to B or 
not, nor can it be justified on a theory of proximate causation. 
156. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1174-75. 
157. Id. at 1168 (emphasis in original). 
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nancing statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not 
effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the 
debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new appro-
priate financing statement is filed before the expiration of that time. 
[3) A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to col-
lateral transferred by the debtor even though the secured party 
knows of or consents to the transfer.158 
This provision governs financing statements and whether they con-
tinue to perfect a security interest. In particular, the second 
sentence says to SP1, "If the corporate structure changes, so that 
people might be misled, you've got work to do. You have to get out 
and file a new financing statement. Otherwise, y()ur security inter-
est is unperfected on any after-acquired property obtained more 
than four months after the change occurs." That is, the provision 
imposes burdens only on SP1 and promises nothing of benefit. 
Judge Thompson, however, turned this provision on its head 
and made it into a kind of "piercing the corporate veil" idea. He 
reasoned that, instead of placing extra burdens on SP1, this provi-
sion could bind B on S's security agreement. His analysis deserves 
a careful review. 
Judge Thompson starts by worrying whether the second or 
third sentence of section 9-402(7) ought to apply. Judge Thompson 
noted that the third sentence applies in the case of transferred col-
lateral, but the second sentence (with its four-month grace period 
for financing statements) applies in the case of changes in corpo-
rate structure.159 The trouble was that the bulk sale could be 
characterized either as a transfer from S to B or as a mere change 
in corporate structure. And thus, after playing Hamlet for a while, 
Judge Thompson decided to characterize the bulk sale as a change 
in corporate structure. 160 
As I implied earlier, this choice should not have helped SP1• 
At best, the second sentence would have forced SP1 to file a new 
financing statement to perfect security interests in after-acquired 
property-a useless endeavor unless SP1 could show that its secur-
ity interests could attach to post-sale accounts. What SP1 needed 
was an attachment theory, given the fact that B never signed an 
158. u.c.c. § 9-402(7) (1987). 
159. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1168-70. 
160. Id. at 1170. 
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after-acquired property clause ·in favor of SP1•
161 For this reason, 
choosing between the second and third sentence of section 9-402(7) 
was a waste of time, unless the second sentence supplied an attach-
ment theory. 
The theory adopted by Judge Thompson is barely discernible. 
In his view, the bulk sale of Bank of the West was a form of de 
facto merger.162 I have italicized the relevant language so that you 
don't miss it: 
In summary, we hold that when [SJ transferred its assets to [BJ, 
this was not a bona fide third party transfer of collateral within the 
scope of the third sentence of section 9402(7). Rather, [SJ simply 
changed its corporate structure. When the transferor shifts assets to 
an affiliated company at the behest of their common parent com-
pany, and when the transaction has the same effect as a merger of 
the transferor into the transferee with the trans/ eree as the surviv-
ing corporation,· we cannot say that this is a simple transfer of 
collateral. To hold otherwise would permit debtors to decide which 
sentence of section 9402(.7) applies merely by choosing an advanta-
geous formal arrangement for the desired transaction. Thus, 
applying the second sentence of section 9402(7), we hold that 
[SP1's] security interest continued perfected in [and hence attached 
to163] those assets actually transferred to [BJ as well as those assets 
acquired by [BJ during the four months following the ... transfer. 
Because the only collateral at issue in this case consists of those ac-
counts factored in the 3 ½ -month period between [ the bulk sale] and 
[the cancellation of the factoring agreement], we need not consider 
whether the [S-B] transaction rendered [SP1's] filed financing state-
ment seriously misleading. 164 
161. And even if SP1 did have an attachment theory, all the post-sale collateral came 
into existence within four months of the bulk sale. See supra note 149. As a result, SP1 had 
an effective financing statement to cover the collateral in dispute, if an attachment theory 
could be devised. 
162. The de facto merger doctrine was developed to provide shareholder protection in 
cases when corporate subterfuge might otherwise deny it. Later, it was used in products 
liability cases, when a seller sold assets to a buyer and promptly dissolved. The idea of the 
doctrine was· to explain why the buyer might be liable on the in personam liability of the 
seller. See Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1305, 1316-17 (1976). 
163. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) (1987) ("A security interest is perfected when it has at-
tached .... "). 
164. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1171 (emphasis added). Judge Thompson also 
makes much of the West Coast Food Sales case as not permitting S to evade an after-
acquired property clause by conveying the business to B. Id. at 1170-71. But this is an in-
complete description of that case. As we have seen, there was a perfectly adequate theory to 
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Although buried in some useless discourse about financing state-
ments, the de facto merger theory genuinely explains how S's 
security agreement might be binding on B. Of course, this theory 
has nothing to do with the effectiveness of anyone's financing 
statement. Discussing this matter under section 9-402(7) is there-
fore misleading.165 
There is still the matter of SP1's priority over SP2• It will be 
recalled that at the district court level Judge Schwarzer applied 
the "first to file" rule. Judge Thompson reversed on the principle 
that the "first to file" rule does not apply when two debtors issued 
separate security interests to competing secured parties. 166 Accord-
ing to Thompson, SP1 had complete priority over SP2, even though 
SP 1 was the second to file. As applied to security interests on pre-
sale collateral for pre-sale advances, Judge Thompson would have 
been right to suspend the "first to file" rule. On the other hand, 
Bank of the West involved entirely post-sale collateral and, proba-
bly, post-sale advances. As a result, the court should have 
developed a more complex priority, as the next section of this, Arti-
cle will show. 
c. Priorities When Competing Creditors Have Different 
Debtors.-With regard to pre-sale property, the basic "first to file 
or perfect" rule of section 9-312(5) does not necessarily apply when 
there are two debtors.167 A two-debtor problem resembles the situ-
ation portrayed in Figure Seven. 
explain why SP1's security interest attached to post-sale assets; B had expressly assumed all 
S's liabilities. Since that theory was not available in Bank of the West, the reliance on West 
Coast Food Sales does not help in establishing the existence of a merger. 
165. For a more recent case declaring a de facto merger (so that B is made liable on 
S's security agreement), see Q.T., Inc. v. Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
166. Id. at 1171-73. 
167. Judge Thompson has offered a doctrinal justification for the suspension of the 
"first to file" rule in two-debtor cases, According to section 9-312(1), "The rules of priority 
stated in other sections of this Part ... shall govern where applicable." U.C.C. § 9-312(1) 
(1987). One such rule is section 9-306(2), which provides: "Except where this Article other-
wise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or 
other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the secured party .... " 
Id. § 9-306(2). The theory is that section 9-306(2) varies the "first to file" rule by providing 
that the second debtor takes subject to the security interest of SP1, and that SP2 is likewise 
limited. Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1174. This theory is compromised, however, by the 
language of section 9-306(2): "{e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides . ... " U.C.C. § 
9-306(2) (1987) (emphasis added). This language in section 9-306(2) refers us right back to 
the "first to file" language, and so we are at an impasse. 























In Figure Seven, SP1 perfects a security interest and, after that, 
the debtor sells the collateral out of the ordinary course of business 
to B. B takes subject to SPi's already perfected security interest, 
and SP 2 (B's lender who has a right to after-acquired property) is 
automatically junior, even if SP 2 was the first to file. 
When SP2 is the first to file, it must be true that SP1 prevails. 
If not, a debtor could easily disencumber her assets by selling them 
to a buyer with a venerable after-acquired lender. Meanwhile, no 
amount of re~earch in the files could protect SP1 from this risk.
168 
In contrast, where a single debtor grants security interests to 
both SP1 and SP2, the "first to file or perfect" rule allows SP1 to 
do the research necessary to protect herself. Although SP1 is "first 
in time" in a property transfer sense, SP1 could search the records 
168. Steven Harris adds this rationale for the rule: "SP2 had no interest in the goods 
and could not possibly have been disadvantaged by a secret security interest in favor of 
SP1." Harris, supra note 1, at 22.3. While this is true much of the time, it is not so universal 
as Harris suggests. One justification for pre-attachment filing is so that a secured party can 
know that she will always be senior with regard to any specific types of collateral. The sus-
pension of the "first to file or perfect" rule might defeat that expectation and therefore 
prejudice SP2• 
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to see that SP2 has already filed and accordingly has priority.
169 
















In Figure Eight, if SP1 checks the filing records under the debtor's 
name, she will find SP2's financing statement and can react accord-
ingly. Not so when there are sequential debtors, as in Figure 
Seven.170 
These jdeas have been well developed in· the work of Barkley 
Clark, 171 Steven Harris,172 and others. But Judge Thompson was 
nevertheless wrong to apply these thoughts to post-s~le property in 
light of his theory that B and S had entered into a de facto merger. 
i. De Facto Mergers, Post-Merger Property, and Future Ad-
vances.-In Bank of the West,173 Judge Thompson needed an 
169. Id. at 224. 
170. The "first to file or perfect" rule does apply in some two-debtor cases, however. 
Specifically, it occurs when the first debtor sells to the second before SP1 perfects. The 
buyer must have knowledge of the unperfected security interest. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 267-74. Alternatively, the buyer might have no knowledge but be subordinated for 
having violated the rules of Article 6 .. Harris, supra note 1, at 203-11; see infra text accom-
panying notes 268-78. 
171. B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 3.8[4] (1980). 
172. Harris, supra note 1, at 224-26. 
173. 852 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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attachment theory-a th~ory to explain why a security agreement 
signed by Sand SP1 would be binding on B, so that post-sale prop-
erty acquired by B would be encumbered by SP1's security 
interest. His solution was to declare the existence of a de facto 
merger between S and B. On top of this, Judge Thompson sus-
pended the "first to file" rule and gave SP1 priority, even though 
SP2 had filed years before SP1• 
If this case had involved pre-sale collateral and pre-sale ad-
vances, this solution would have been unassailable. A merger 
should be treated just like a sale, with regard to pre-merger prop-
erty. That is, the "first to file" rule should be suspended, and each 
secured party should be protected for. the pre-merger collateral 
each separately claims. 
But this solution seems inappropriate for post-sale· or post-
merger collateral. In such a case, each party attaches and perfects 
a security interest in the collateral at precisely the same time. It 
was arbitrary for Judge Thompson to favor the second to file over 
the first to file, with regard to post-merger collateral. Yet it would 
have been just as arbitrary to favor the first to file. In the case of a 
merger, neither side could have protected itself by searching the 
records of possible merger partners. 
A better solution is for the two competing secured parties to 
share pro rata by analogy to the commingling statute.174 This pari 
· passu rule would displace the "first to file" rule, but it would be 
consistent with the principle of "first in time is first in right." That 
is, these security interests both attached and perfected at the same 
time. There is no strong reason to subordinate one party to an-
other, and so pro rata sharing seems appropriate.175 Pari passu 
priority is justified because each party obtained perfected security 
174. There is a certain economy of word play here, because while the collateral re-
mains discrete and identifiable, the debtors commingle themselv~s. · 
175. One problem caused by pro rata priorities is that, in a foreclosure sale, neither 
security interest is senior to the other, and so it is impossible for one to foreclose the other. 
See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1987) (foreclosure discharges the security interest from being en-
forced, plus "any security interest or lien subordinate thereto"). This creates a "reverse 
prisoner's dilemma," where the first secured party to proceed loses value to the secured 
party who does nothing. Suppose, for example, that SP1 and SP2 each claims $1,000, and 
the post-merger collateral is worth $1,500. Suppose further that they are awarded an equal 
priority. SP1 elects to foreclose. A buyer would obtain the collateral subject to the other 
unforeclosed lien and so would pay $500. Later, SP2 can foreclose at her leisure and take the 
full $1,000. Thus, SP1 was the first to proceed and therefore received only $500. Yet this was 
precisely what SP1 would have received if it had been completely junior. Each secured 
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interests simultaneously, and the "first to file" rule has been sus-
pended in double-debtor cases. 
This pari passu suggestion for post-merger collateral can only 
apply to pre-merger advances or pre-merger commitments to lend 
by SP1• If, after the merger, SP1 voluntarily advances funds to B 
(with knowledge of the merger), then; in effect, a single debtor (B) 
will have granted security interests to two secured parties. Accord-
ingly, the "first to file" rule applies once again, and SP2 wins 
completely, having been the first to file.176 
In Bank of the West, the opinions do not specify when the 
advances were given. It appears likely, however, that SP1 made ad-
vances only after an account came into existence. If these were 
discretionary advances (not pursuant to a pre-merger commit-
ment), then Judge Thompson should have applied the "first to 
file" rule after all.177 But there remains this consideration: SP1 did 
not even know the merger had taken place. SP1 thought it was 
making advances to S on collateral owned by S. 
It might be possible to apply the rule of section 9-307(3). Ac-
cording to this section: 
A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes 
free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future ad-
vances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the 
purchase, or more than 45 days after the purchase, whichever first 
occurs, unless Dlade pursuant to a commitment entered into without 
party, then, has an incentive to do nothing. The second best option is to cooperate and 
foreclose together. Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 520-525. 
If these security interests are foreclosed in bankruptcy, the reverse prisoner's dilemma 
can be avoided because the bankruptcy trustee can sell free of liens and simply divide the 
proceeds pro rata. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (1988). 
· 176. Accord White Motor Credit Corp. v. Euclid Nat'! Bank, 63 Ohio Misc. 7, 409 
N.E.2d 1063 (Ct. Common Pleas 1978) ("first to file" rule applied as between SP1, whose 
security agreement was with S, and SP2, whose security agreement was with the post-merger 
entity). 
177. If it were not for the merger theory, we would have to add that advances to B are 
not secured by any collateral, unless a written security agreement exists. See U.C.C. § 9-
203(1)(a) (1987) ("a security interest ... does not attach unless ... the collateral is in the 
possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security 
agreement"). Unless B is bound on S's agreement (by virtue of having merged with S), then 
SP1 must produce a security agreement that B has signed. It is often said, however, that 
reliance by a promissee takes a contract out of the statute of frauds. Here, SP1 would have 
relied on B's promise by advancing funds, thereby making a written agreement unnecessary. 
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knowledge of .the purchase and before the expiration of the 45 day 
period.178 
Under section 9-307(3), any advances made pursuant to a pre-sale 
commitment to lend are senior to a buyer's interest in the collat-
eral actually bought. In addition, SP1 (if without knowledge of the 
sale) had a forty-five day privilege to make discretionary senior ad-
vances to S (not B). If discretionary advances (to S) are made 
within this period, they are treated like pre-sale advances. After 
that, all discretionary advances by SP1 are junior to the buyer's 
interest in the collateral actually bought. 
The de facto merger theory of Judge Thompson threatens the 
use of this provision because the advances were not to S but to a 
merged S-B. In other words, S has ceased to exist, and has been 
replaced by a sublated new entity. But since this new entity pre-
serves the attributes of S,179 perhaps we can say that advances to 
the S-B combination are legally the same as advances to S. As 
such, any committed advances and any discretionary advances 
made within forty-five days of the merger by an ignorant SP1 are 
entitled to some kind of priority.180 · · · 
But recall that the collateral in question was post-merger col-
lateral. As to this collateral (obtained by S-B), the "first-to-file" 
rule is suspended. Instead, we substitute a "first-to-perfect" rule. 
Whoever between SP 1 and SP 2 was the first to perfect should have 
priority. If they are tied, they should share pro rata priority. 
In Bank of the West, it is hard to tell whether SP1 had com-
mitted to make advances (prior to the merger), or whether it had 
discretion to advance every time an account was tendered to 
SP1•
181 If SP1 was committed to advance funds on proffered ac-
178. u.c.c. § 9-307(3) (1987). 
179. According to Hegel (our leading philosopher of mergers and acquisitions): 
What is sublated [i.e., merged] is not ... reduced to nothing ... it is a non-being ... 
which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in itself the determinateness 
from which it orginates. "To sublate" has a twofold meaning in the language: on the 
one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to 
cease, to put an end to. 
G. HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF Lome 107 (A.V. Miller trans. 1969) (emphasis in original), 
180. In other words, we are equating mergers and sales for the purpose of applying 
section 9-307(3). 
181. Judge Thompson writes: "Advances were to be made on accounts which remained 
uncollected 33 days following assignments." Bank of the West, 852 F.2d at 1165 (emphasis 
added). Judge Schwarzer writes: "The agreement provided that [SP1] would purchase ac-
counts from [SJ .... " Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp at 811. He also hints that the 
784 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 41:3:729 
counts, then all of its advances should have been treated as pre-
merger advances. If such was the case, SP1 and SP2 perfected se-
curity interests in post-merger accounts at the same time. Since 
the "first to file" rule is suspended, SP1 and SP2 should share the 
collateral pro rata. 
If, on the other hand, SP 1 had discretion to lend or not, all 
discretionary advances for the first forty-five days must be treated 
as pre-merger advances, to the extent that SP1 had no knowledge 
of the merger. 182 These initial protected advances should generate 
for SP1 a pro rata share of post-merger property. After the privi-
lege in section 9-307(3) lapses, SPi's discretionary advances to B 
should be subordinated to SP2's claims. Now a common debtor has 
created the security interests of both SP1 and SP2: Hence, the 
"first to file" rule is reinstated. Under this rule, SP2 is senior to 
SP1• Thus, if all advances are discretionary, .the post-merger ad-
vances falling under section 9-307(3) will be entitled to a pro rata 
priority, and all others will be junior. 
ii. Other Atta.chment Theories.-De facto merger is not the 
only attachment theory that Judge Thompson could have adopted 
to. show how SP1 might claim post-merger property, but none of 
the other possibilities succeeds in producing a better priority for 
SP1• For instance, McBee established the principle that noncom-
plying bulk transferees are personally liable on the security 
agreements of S. 183 This theory-based upon a strange notion that 
"ineffective transfers" mean that the buyer .and the seller are 
merged as the same person-has already been criticized.184 Possi-
bly, this theory is the same one which prevailed in the Bank of the 
West appeal. In any case, at best it supports pro rata sharing be-
tween SP1 and SP2•
185 
factoring agreement came to a natural end, i.e., that SP1 did not use its discretion to end it. 
Id. at 812 ("The factoring agreement terminated on October 15, 1984."). For a discussion of 
what constitutes a "commitment to lend," see U.C.C. § 9-105(k); Carlson and Shupack, Part 
I, supra note 42, at 368-70. 
182. U.C.C. § 9-307(3) (1987). There is no finding on this question in the reported 
opinions, but SP1 did claim to be a holder in due course of checks received from account 
debtors. Such a claim would involve the assertion that SP1 knew nothing of the merger. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 109-24. 
184. Id. 
185. Judge Schwarzer ruled that Article 6 did not apply because SP1 claimed "ac-
counts," and Article 6 covers only "inventory" (plus auxiliary equipment). Bank of the 
West, 655 F. Supp. at 816; see also U.C.C. § 6-102(1),(2) (1987). This holding is correct, 
insofar as it applied to SP1's claims to the accounts, but it should be remembered that S 
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A second theory is that, after the sale, B simply assigned ac-
counts to SP1-one at a time. That is, even if S's security 
agreement did not cover these accounts, B's agents independently 
assigned the accounts to SP1• This theory has a flaw, however. Ac-
cording to UCC section 9-203(1)(a), B must sign the security 
agreement. In Bank of the West, only S signed. Some method 
must be found to satisfy this signature requirement. Even if this 
impediment could be overcome, this attachment theory subordi-
nates SP1 to BP2 because SP2 clearly has priority under the "first 
to file" rule.186 Whereas, before, Judge Thompson could claim 
(wrongly in my view) that the "first to file" rule is suspended in 
double-debtor cases, now it must be admitted that SP1 and SP2 
have the same debtor, B, so that the "first to file" rule would 
clearly apply. 
A third theory might be that B implicitly consented to liability 
on S's security agreement. If so, then SPi's security interest at-
tached to post-sale inventory by virtue of the after-acquired 
property clause in S's security agreement. This theory requires 
some evidence of B's consent, and just as important, some way 
must be found to evade the requirement that B sign the security 
agreement.187 Even if this is possible, SP 1 and SP 2 would have had 
a single debtor, so that the "first-to-file'; rule applies to 
subordinate SP1• 
A fourth theory might hold that, even if B did not consent 
implicitly, Bis stuck with S's security agreement because the busi-
ness assets were encumbered by an equitable servitude making the 
possessor of business assets liable on the obligations Qf the seller. 
also transferred inventory, and SP1 had a perfected security interest in that inventory. 
Whereas Article 6 would not permit SP1 to claim a property interest against accounts, SP1 
might have been a creditor of S. (This is uncertain, see supra note 147). As such, SP1 would 
have had rights against the inventory that S transferred to B. 
A second idea of Schwarzer was that SP2 seemed to be a bona fide purchaser for value 
of inventory and equipment by virtue of its after-acquired property clause in the security 
agreement with B. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp, at 816. (No evidence was presented on 
what SP2 knew of the bulk sale). Such a status would cut off SP1 from any claim on inven-
tory. U.C.C. § 6-110 (1987). However, it would have no effect on SP1's claims to accounts, 
which Judge Schwarzer thought unaffected by Article 6. 
On appeal, Judge Thompson seemed to assume that Article 6 did apply. Bank of the 
West, 852 F.2d at 1170 n.6. As a result, B could not claim to have cut off SP1's security 
interest under section 9-307(1) at the time of the bulk sale. 
186. u.c.c. § 9-.312(5) (1987). 
187. Id. § 9-201(l)(a). 
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Such a theory is fanciful, but recall this is a California case. In 
California, equitable servitudes spring up in the darnedest places. 
Thus, in Ray v. Alad Corp.,188 also a case involving intracorporate 
transfers, B never agreed to assume the products liability of S. 
When a person was injured after the bulk sale, he sued B and won, 
because the obligation to pay for such torts "ran" with the factory. 
It is not so great an extension to apply this principle to security 
agreements. 189 Such a theory does not supply SP 1 with priority in 
Bank of the West, however. If B became bound on the servitude 
when it "bought" the beverage business, then, B has agreed .to en-
cumber its after-acquired property for the first time .. Since both 
SP1 and SP2 have a common debtor, the "first-to-file" rule of sec-
tion 9-312(5) applies, which subordinates SP1 to SP2•
100 
One theory that would not work to establish attachment of 
SP/s security interest on B's post-merger property is that S made 
a fraudulent conveyance to B thereby reviving the after-acquired 
property clause against B. Fraudulent conveyance law gives in rem 
rights in B's property.191 . SP1 needs a theory that establishes B's in 
personam obligation on the security agreement of S. In any case, 
SP2 would have been a bona fide purchaser for value who takes 
free of any in rem right created by fraudulent conveyance law.192 
Nor is it clear that fraudulent conveyance law could encumber 
post-merger property. 
188. 19 Cal. 3d 2~, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); For comparsion of Ray v. 
Alad to equitable servitudes, see Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unify-
ing Themes of Iniertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products 
Liability, and Toxic Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1987). For a history 
of this development in the law of products liability, see Note, supra note 162. 
189. For cases expressly approving of the equitable servitude idea, see Q.T., Inc. v. 
Thomas Russell & Co., 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 433, 436 (E.D. Va. 1989); Fliegel v. 
Associates Capitol Co. of Delaware, Inc., 537 P. 2d 1144, 1147 (1975). These cases involved 
express contractual language creating the servitude, whereas Alad Corp. does not. 
190. One commentator thinks that the entire line of cases analyzed in the text is a 
category mistake: "A few courts have regarded the transfer of items of inventory as some-
how tantamount to a transfer of the category, such that items later acquired by the 
transferee independent of the transferor debtor have been held to fall within. the inventory 
clause of the original security agreement." Knippenberg, Debtor Name Changes and Collat-
eral Transfer Under 9-402(7): Drafting From the Outside-In, 52 Mo. L. REV. 57, 107-08 
(1987) (footnote omitted). 
191. See Note, supra note 38. 
192. This is. what Judge Schwarzer ruled. Bank of the West v. Commerical Credit Fin. 
Servs., 655 F. Supp. 807, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 852 F.2d 1162 (9th 
Cir. 1988). 
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m. How Bank of the West Should Have Been De-
cided.-Since the reasoning in Bank of the West has sustained 
heavy damage, it might be useful to describe how I think the case 
should have been decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
First, SPi's case depends entirely on whether it can prove a 
theory of attachment. Special emphasis should be put on the fact 
that SP1 acted honestly in thinking that it had advanced funds to 
S pursuant to its factoring agreement, instead of advancing funds 
to B, with whom it had rio agreement. Judge Thompson's de facto 
merger theory does provide an attachment theory that provides 
SP 1 with something better than a totally subordinated position. 
Accordingly, I would agree that B and S are to be treated as 
merged. This ruling has nothing to do with section 9-402(7), how-
ever, which simply governs the effectiveness of SP1's financing 
statement. Instead, the de facto merger doctrine would be adapted 
from California's free-wheeling tort law. 
Having ruled that SP1's security interest attached to the post-
sale accounts of B, I would then reverse and remand the case on 
the strength of a theory that Judge Schwarzer completely rejected. 
The best theory for SP1 is that it was a holder in due course of 
checks from the account debtors and therefore took free of SP2's 
senior security interest. 
Invariably, when SP1 obtained payment of an account, the ac-
count debtor wrote SP1 a check, or the account debtor wrote B a 
check which was negotiated over to SP1.193 These checks were pro-
ceeds of the accounts. Accordingly, SP2 had a valid security 
interest in these checks, but if SP1 took the checks as a holder in 
due course, it took free of SP 2's security interest.
194 This is a risk 
that receivables lenders face routinely. According to Professor Paul 
Shupack: 
When a secured lender relies on priority rights to after-acquired in-
tangibles, her expectations may be defeated by making those rights 
tangible and then having the tangible version of those rights ac-
quired by a good faith purchaser. If, for example, a lender relies on a 
pool of continuously renewing accounts receivable, a debtor could 
defeat the creditor's interest by having his customers embody their 
obligations in negotiable instruments. The debtor could then sell 
193. Id. at 812. 
194. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (1987) ("To the extent that a holder is a holder in due ·course 
he takes the instrument free from (1) all claims to it on the part of any person .... "). 
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these instruments to a person who qualifies as a holder in due 
course, leaving the original secured creditor without assets she legiti-
mately expected to be available to her .1911 
Judge Schwarzer rejected this theory on inadequate grounds. He 
thought that SP2 was not claiming an interest in the checks them-
selves. Instead, SP2 was claiming accounts. Accordingly, it was the 
assignment of accounts by B to SP1 that was the act of conversion. 
Therefore, a later liquidation of the accounts into checks was irrel-
evant, and so was the claim that SP1 was a holder in due course of 
those checks. This argument is founded on an erroneous premise. 
The sale of accounts cannot be an act of conversion. Article 9 spe-
cifically authorizes the transfer of debtor equity in collateral.196 In 
light of this authorization, it takes a greater interference with 
SP/s rights to constitute the act of conversion.197 
Because the assignment of accounts cannot have been the act 
of conversion, and because SP2's security interest continued to en-
cumber the accounts after the assignment, SP2 did indeed claim a 
property right to the checks themselves. These checks were pro-
ceeds of the accounts. If SP1 were a holder in due course,1
98 then 
SP 1 would take free of property claims of third parties, such as 
SP2.1ee 
The worst result in commercial law is when ordinary account 
debtors are made to pay twice. There is no danger of that here. 
According to section 9-318(3), "The account debtor is authorized 
to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives notification 
that the amount due ... has been assigned .... "200 This provision 
would allow the account debtor to pay SP1 until SP2 notified the 
account debtor of its senior security interest. Although SP 1 is not 
the assignor, SP1 took by assignment everything the assignor (B) 
195. Shupack, Defending Purchase Money Security Interests Under Article 9 of the 
UCC From Professor Buckley, 22 IND. L. REV. 777, 788 (1989). 
196. u.c.c. § 9-311 (1987). 
197. See Nickles, Enforcing Article 9 Security Interests Against Subordinate Buyers 
of Collateral, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 526 (1982). 
198. Because Judge Schwarzer thought it impossible for SP1 to be a holder in due 
course, he declined to find whether SP1 was without notice. Bank of the West, 655 F. Supp. 
at 820 n.9. 
199. U.C.C. § 3-305(1) (1987); see id. § 9-309 ("Nothing in this Article limits the rights 
of a holder in due course ... [and] [f]iling under this Article does not constitute notice of 
the security interest to such holders or purchasers."). 
200. Id. § 9-318(3). 
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had, including the power in section 9-318(3) to double-deal senior 
assignees by demanding payment from account debtors before they 
hear of the senior assignment. 201 Hence, the account debtors were 
authorized to pay SP1• Furthermore, as a holder in due course, SP1 
has no liability· for receiving this payment. 
Bank of the West therefore should have been remanded to de-
termine the extent to which SP1 was a holder in due course of each 
check it received. For every such check, SP2's conversion claim is 
defeated.202 
201. Compare supra note 170 (describing how junior buyers inherit the debtor's power 
to double-deal senior unperfected secured parties). 
. 202. I have implied in the text that SP1 needs an attachment theory in order to be a 
holder in due course. Behind this claim lies ·some difficult and tenuous analysis. 
Suppose the de facto merger theory is rejected. The other theories, see supra text ac-
companying notes 183-92, fail to establish that B signed a security agreement in favor of 
SP1, as required by section 9-203(1)(a) (''a security interest is not enforceable against the 
debtor or third parties . .. unless ... the debtor has signed a security agreement.") (empha-
sis added). Without a security agreement signed by B, SP1 is neither a purchaser of 
accounts nor the owner of an unperfected security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1987) 
("this Article applies ... (b) to any sale of accounts"). As a result, SP1 never took a security 
interest in any account. Or, to say it another way, B never sold or otherwise transferred any 
accou_nts to SP1• Yet SP1 is the holder of checks made out to it by B's account debtors. 
-Putting these two legal conclusions together, it appears that SP1 has not given value 
and is not a holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(a) (1987). Instead, SP1 has made an 
unsecured loan to B, but this loan is utterly unconnected to its receipt of the check. That is, 
SP1 is, at best, a collection agent for B, and a lender to B, but collection and the unsecured 
loan must be unrelated and unconnected, if we are to give effect to the premise that no 
effective assignment of accoun~s by B to SP1 took place for lack of B's signature on a secur-
ity agreement. "Value," for the purposes of being a holder in due cours.e, is defined in 
section 3-303: If SP1 has an attachment theory, it is easy to find that Si\ took the checks 
for value. Section 3-303 says that value exists when SP1 has a security interest in the instru-
ment. Given attachment _of a security interest ·in accounts, SP1 would have a security 
interest in the checks because the checks are proceeds of the accounts that SP1, by hypothe-
sis, would own. But if there is no attachment theory, the only language in this definition 
that could be relevant to SP1 is section 3-303(b), which provides that "[a) holder takes the 
instrument for value ... (b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security for 
an antecedent claim against any person .... " This language, though, cannot describe SP1 
unless one also adds an attachment theory. The checks from the account debtors are in 
payment of an antecedent claim owned by B, but section 3-303(b) seems to require that SP, 
own the antecedent claim· which is paid. Otherwise, collecting agents would routinely be 
holders in due course, which is not the case. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 622-27 (3d ed. 1988). 
In the absence of an attachment theory,.SP1 has one remaining argument: Article 9 
(with its signature requirement) does not even cover this transaction. According to section 
9-104(f), Article 9 does not apply 
to a sale of accounts ... as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose, or 
an assignment of accounts ... which is for the purpose of collection only, or a transfer 
of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee who is also to do the perform-
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In case SP1 is not a holder in due course, further consideration 
of the priorities is necessary. The next point I would make is that 
the case should have been remanded for a determination of 
whether any of SPi's claim comes from advances or commitments 
made before the merger. There is a good chance that all of its 
claim is·pursuant to a pre-merger commitment to lend. Even if the 
advances were discretionary, it is still possible that some of the 
advances pre-date the merger. 
Let us suppose that some or all of the claims are pre-merger 
claims. The first thing that needs to be done is to investigate SP1's 
claim to inventory. If any pre-merger inventory still existed at the 
time of SP2's lawsuit, this should have been awarded to SP1 on the 
strength of pre-merger advances, even though• SP2 filed first.
203 
This is because the "first to file" rule is suspended in two-debtor 
cases. Instead, we apply the "first to perfect" rule. As to old inven-
tory, SP1 clearly perfected first to the extent SP1 gave pre-merger 
ance under the contract or a transfer of a single account to an assignee in whole or 
partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness . . . . 
We have said that SP1 is a mere collection agent, in the absence of an attachment theory, 
and section 9-104(0 does exempt collection agents form Article 9. SP1 might hope that it 
can tak~ a common-law assignment for the purpose of collection, and then, as. an unsecured 
creditor of B, SP1 might retain the collection by way of setoff against the unsecured loan it 
has made to B. If the common law of assignments applies, the statute of frauds might re-
quire a writing, but not B's signature. In Bank of the West, there was.a writing; it was the 
security agreement between Sand SP1• If Article 9 does not apply, then SP1 could claim to 
be the owner of accounts under the common-law doctrine of assignment. 
If so, then SP1 is a holder who takes "the instrument in payment of ... an antecedent 
claim against any person." U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (1987). That is, SP1 has taken the account 
debtors' checks in order to create a setoff against B. See U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1987) (setoffs 
not covered by Article 9). But this doesn't quite work. Section 3-303(b) requires the checks 
to be in payment of B's obligation to SP1• Here, SP1 is collecting checks for B, but they do 
not "pay" SP1's claim against B. Instead, the manifestation of a later setoff is the payment. 
Hence, the use of section 9-104(f) does not show that SP1 took the checks for value. 
Nor can SP1 claim that it took assignments of accounts in satisfaction of an antecedent 
claim by SP1 against B. The facts of Bank of the West probably are that, first, the account 
came into existence, and then it was assigned to SP, in exchange for an advance. Also, it is 
unlikely that the assignment is in satisfaction of antecedent debt. Rather, it appears that 
the accounts are security for B's obligation to pay back loans. 
If I am right, SP1 needs an attachment theory to be a holder in due course of the checks 
received from the account debtors of B. A de facto merger is a convenient theory because it 
explains how B signed a security agreement. Under this theory, B becomes S. Since S signed 
the security agreement, B signed it too (through merger theory). By this means the require-
ments of section 9-203(1)(a) would be met. 
203. Judge Thompson recognized this in his opinion. Bank of the West v. Commerical 
Credit Fin. Servs., 852 F.2d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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value. Now this inventory is not at issue in the lawsuit by SP2 for 
conversion of accounts. Nevertheless, this determination must be 
made in anticipation of the point that SP1 must be given a chance 
to trace pre-merger inventory and pre-merger accounts into post-
merger accounts. If this can be done, SP1 obtains complete priority 
for any traceable amounts. 
A different priority exists for post-merger accounts that can-
not be traced to SPi's pre-merger collateral. If SP1 had any pre-
merger claims or if it had made post-merger advances pursuant to 
a pre-merger commitment to lend, SP1 and SP2 must share the 
leftover disputed collateral on a pro rata basis?04 Since SP 1 has 
retained $60,000 in interest and commissions plus the principal 
amounts of any loans, SP1 could conceivably have some conversion 
liability· to SP 2 on this proposition, although it will depend on how 
successful SP 1 was in showing itself to be a holder in due course of 
checks or in tracing inventory into accounts and how large the 
claim of each secured party is. 
Finally, if SP1 gave discretionary advances after the merger, 
these advances are treated like pre-merger advances to the extent 
they can be brought under section 9-307(3). Thus, on remand, it 
could be necessary to determine when SP1 became knowledgeable 
of the sale of the beverage business to B. If SP1 remained ignorant 
of the sale for more than forty-five days, then any discretionary 
advances forty-five days after the de facto merger are to be treated 
as pre-merger advances.2011 That is, these advances will generate for 
SP1 a pro rata share of post-merger collateral. If SP~ obtained this 
knowledge earlier than forty-five days, then only advances made 
prior to gaining this knowledge will be treated as pre-merger ad-
vances. Any advances failing to come under the section 9-307(3) 
umbrella will not enjoy pro rata priority with SP2's claims and in-
stead will be entirely subordinated. 
204. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75. 
205. Of course, if SP1 had no knowledge of the merger for forty-five days, it was prob-
ably a· holder in due course of checks from the account debtors, and so would have a better 
priority than merely pari passu, as the use of section 9-307(3) would provide. See supra text 
accompanying notes 193-202. 
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2. Proceeds and Commingling Theory in McBee 
For those who scorn the above fancy theories for dissolving the 
seller into the buyer, there are two more pedigreed theories for es-
tablishing that SP1 gets a security interest in inventory acquired 
by B. First, if B took encumbered inventory and sold it, and then 
took the cash proceeds and bought new inventory (a plausible re-
sult), . then the new inventory would be proceeds of the old 
inventory. As such, the new inventory would belong to SP1•
206 Sec-
ond, if the old inventory were commingled with new inventory in 
such a way that neither the new nor the · old inventory could be 
identified, then SP1 might be awarded a security interest under 
UCC section 9-315, which pertains to security intere.sts in commin-
gled goods. 207 · · · · • . 
These theories-particularly commingling-do not explain the 
McBee case,208 unless there are additional facts beyond those dis-
closed in the published opinion. Neither Judge Williams of the 
Fifth Circuit nor Bankruptcy Judge Elliott mentions whether the 
proceeds of old .inventory went to buy new inventory, or whether 
inventory was commingled. Indeed, the inventory (guns and weap-
ons) is likely to be highly identifiable and hence it is unlikely that 
McBee was a secret commingling case. 
a. The Priority of SP3 (as Junior to SP1 and SP2).-Just in 
case McBee was a secret commingling case, Professor Harris offers 
us an interpretation. of section 9-315(2), which provides: 
When under subsection (1) [of Section 9-315] more than one secur-
ity interest attaches to the product or mass, they rank equally 
according to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each inter-
est originally attached bears to the cost of the total product or 
mass.200 
According to Harris, where SP1 and SP2 have security interests in 
inventory sold by S to B, and where B commingles the inventory 
with other property as to which SP1 and SP2 have no claim, and 
where, subsequent to commingling, B then grants a security inter-
est to SP3, then section 9-315(2) does not apply to make all these 
206. Harris, supra note 1, at 231-33. 
207. Id. at 233-36. 
208. As Professor Harris recognizes. Id. at 236. 
209. u.c.c. § 9-315(2) (1987). 
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secured parties equal in priority.210 Instead, SP1 and SP2 have pri-
ority over SP3• The exact order of events is crucial: 
(1) SP1 and SP2 attach and perfect; 
(2) S transfers inventory to B; 
(3) B commingles collateral and noncollateral; 
(4) B issues a junior security interest to SP3• 
If we switch the order around just a little: 
(1) SP1 and SP2 attach and perfect; 
, (2) S transfers inventory to B; 
(3) B issues a junior security interest to SP3 (on post-sale 
inventory); 
(4) B commingles the collateral of SP1 and SP2 with the col-
lateral of SP 3; 
then section 9-315(2) applies and all secured parties are equal in 
priority.211 Pari passu priority follows because, now, each secured 
party has a perfected security interest in uncommingled inventory 
and has now contributed collateral to the whole. Before, SP3 had 
not contributed its own collateral into the common pool, but sim-
ply took a junior security interest on the entire pool. Given the 
former temporal order that actually existed in the McBee case,212 I 
210. Harris states: 
To avoid dealing with subsection (2) altogether, one can argue that [SP3]'s security 
interest did not attach to the mass by virtue of commingling "under subsection (1)," 
but rather by virtue of its security agreement under sections 9-201 and 9-203(1). 
Under this approach, section 9-315(2) by its terms does not apply, and one must look 
elsewhere, to equitable principles, to resolve the priority dispute. When the buyer 
does not sell any of the commingled inventory, those principles award priority to SP1 
in an amount equal to the value of the collateral transferred. 
Harris, supra note 1, at 235-36 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). I will dispute the 
correctness of the italicized assumption later on. See also Carlson & Shupack, Part II, supra 
note 44, at 864 ("Although the matter is considered here for the first time, we suggest that a 
judicial lien attaching to the whole after the moment of commingling is, of course, always 
junior. The only security interests that survive to encumber the whole are security interests 
perfected before commingling. As such, they prevail under the "first in time" rule of section 
9-301."). 
211. This temporal order would have occurred as a matter of course if SP3 had an 
after-acquired property claim on inventory at the time the bulk seller transferred inventory 
to B. In such a case, SP3 would have a senior security on all inventory except that inventory 
transferred in the bulk sale. For a case involving just these facts, see In re San Juan Pack-
ers, Inc., 696 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling the parties to be pari passu under section 9-
315(2)). 
212. Though we are just pretending that the case involved commingling. 
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agree with Harris that SP3 is junior, not pari passu with SP1 and 
SP2, but Harris does not tell us who has priority between SP1 and 
SP2•
213 This subpriority issue is worth exploring. 
b. The Priority of SP1 and SP2 Inter Se-Before commin-
gling, SP1 was senior to SP2, but after commingling, section 9-
315(2), if read literally, equalizes SP1 and SP2• That is, SP1 has 
lost its priority vis-a-vis SP2• 
This should not be the rule. Instead, we should recognize that 
section 9-315(2) contains an unacknowledged assumption-that 
where two nonpurchase money security interests encumber a com-
ponent added to the common mass, with one senior to the other, 
their priority vis-a-vis each other is not affected by the pro rata 
rule of section 9-315(2). Instead, the portion that SP1 and SP2 
claim should be given to them jointly, with SP1 having priority 
over SP2 for this amount.
214 
As a matter of fact, SP 2 was a purchase money lender and so 
should have had priority over SP1.
215 But purchase money status 
requires that the purchase money collateral still be identifiable. 
SP2 must be able to point to the exact inventory that is purchase 
money inventory, or to inventory or other property that is proceeds 
of the purchase money inventory.216 If SP2 cannot do so, then an 
213. This may be because, in his article, SP1 and SP2 are collapsed for expositional 
purposes into a single entity. That is, my SP1 and SP2 equals Harris's SP1, whereas SP3 
does not exist in Harris's article. 
214. For example, suppose SP1 and SP2 both claim $10,000 in inventory. This amount 
is added to $5,000 of inventory as to which SP3 already had a pre-commingling perfected 
security interest. On these facts, SP3 is pari passu with the combined unit of SP1 and SP2• 
SP1 and SP2 are jointly entitled to $10,000 under the ratio described in section 9-315(2), but 
SP1 would have seniority to SP2 for the entire amount. 
215. Judge Williams evaded this issue by claiming that SP2 waived its purchase money 
status by not asserting it on appeal. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply 
Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316, 1330 n.9 (5th Cir. 1983). 
216. This tracing requirement can be shown to exist as a normal incident of property 
law. Suppose SP1 claims inventory items A, B, and C, and any after-acquired inventory. 
Suppose SP2 lends purchase money so that items D and E are acquired. Assume also that 
SP2 has obtained a superpriority by complying with section 9-312(3). Now suppose that the 
debtor commingled the group together, so that it is impossible to tell which item is which. 
SP2 has no security interest on items A, B, and C (or, if it claimed nonpurchase money 
inventory in addition to purchase money collateral, it is junior to these items). SP2 must 
repossess only its collateral. If SP2 grabs any old piece of inventory, regardless of whether it 
has a lien on it, then SP2 may be grabbing property of another. This is not allowed. SP2 can 
repossess only the items in which SP2 has a security interest. Hence, SP2 must be able to 
identify its collateral in order to repossess it. Cf. Raleigh Indus. of America, Inc. v. Tassone, 
74 Cal. App. 3d 692; 141 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1977)(purchase money security interest in items D 
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act of commingling must have occurred. That is, both SP1 and 
SP2 claimed perfected security interests in separate items of inven-
tory that subsequently found their way into a commingled mass. 
Because this occurred, SP1 and SP2 should have shared a pro rata 
priority under section 9-315(2). When the bulk sale to B occurred, 
followed by a hypothetical second commingling, the second com-
mingling invoked pro rata priority for a second time. Under this 
scenario, SP1 and SP2 should have shared a pro rata priority with 
SP3• 
David Frisch, who has written the leading article on commin-
gling, disagrees.217 He claims that SP1 and SP2 can never be pari 
passu under section 9-315(2).218 Instead, SP2 is either senior or 
junior to SP1, depending on whether SP2 perfected in time to pre-
serve her superpriority. He has two arguments for this position; 
one is linguistic, based on the language of Article 9, while the other 
emphasizes the potential for abuse if a pari passu priority were the 
rule. Neither argument is convincing. 
The linguistic argument is that section 9-315(2) requires each 
competing secured creditor to obtain a lien on the whole through 
section 9-315(1).219 That is, each secured party must have a lien on 
the whole solely because its collateral was commingled with 
noncollateral.220 In McBee,221 for example, SP1 obtained its lien on 
the whole (of the seller's inventory) through an after-acquired 
property clause, rather than solely through section 9-315(2).222 
Under Frisch's view, SP1 and SP2 would never be pari passu 
under section 9-315(2). 
and E did not create a security interest in other inventory). The Tassone case should be 
read with care. It involved California's nonuniform (and since amended) Article 6, which 
required nonpurchase money secured parties to notify general creditors as if the second 
party were a bulk buyer. 
217. Frisch, UCC Section 9-315: A Historical and Modern Perspective, 70 MINN. L. 
REV. 1, 49 (1985). 
218. Id. at 48-52. 
219. Id. at 49. 
220. Id. 
221. Recall that we are assuming that the seller commingled SP2's purchase money 
inventory with SP1's nonpurchase money inventory. The reported opinions do not say 
whether this really occurred. 
222. This commingling was presumed to have been accomplished by the seller; the 
bulk sale to B has not yet occurred. Note that the reported opinions say nothing about the 
seller's commingling or B's commingling. One suspects, however, that if one commingled, 
both did, since their business practices were probably identical. 
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The argument that SP 1 must have obtained a lien on the 
whole through commingling only is not convincing based on the 
language of section 9-315(2). SP1 can claim a lien through commin-
gling under section 9-315(1) and through the after-acquired 
property clause. Nothing in section 9-315(2) prevents an after-ac-
quired property clause from overlapping with security interests 
through section 9-315(1). 
As a second argument, Professor Frisch observes that if SP2 
has failed to send the advance letter to SP1 required by section 9-
312(3)223 and, subsequently, if SP2 is subordinated to SP1, then 
SP2 can recoup part of this lost priority by becoming pari passu 
under section 9-315(2).224 This partial recoupment is seen as sub-
verting the requirement that letters be sent to after-acquired 
property lenders in inventory cases. Hence, to prevent such abuses, 
whatever priorities are established under the ordinary purchase 
money rules should be continued in spite of commingling. 
This second point is a good one. Section 9-315(2) should not 
have the effect of mitigating perfection mistakes. If SP1 is senior 
because SP2 failed to send the letter required by section 9-312(3), 
then SP2 should not benefit from loss of identity of the purchase 
money collateral. From this admittedly good point, Professor 
Frisch concludes that a purchase money lender should continue to 
have priority, even in spite of commingling and loss of collateral 
identity.225 
This is fine if SP2 fails to send the letter. But suppose SP2 has 
sent the required letter and is senior to SP1 prior to commingling. 
After commingling, SP2 can no longer identify its collateral. Sup-
pose further that Frisch is correct and section 9-315(2) does not 
apply. If pari passu priorities are forbidden, we must either aban-
don the tracing rule and give SP2 her superpriority anyway, or we 
must apply the "first to file" rule. 
Frisch favors abandoning the tracing requirement.226 Yet, trac-
ing is what makes Article 9 a "first in time is first in right" 
property regime. Without tracing, a purchase money lender has an 
223. U.C.C. § 9-312(3)(b) (1987) (requiring purchase money secured party to give noti-
fication in writing to the holder of the conflicting security interest). 
224. Frisch, supra note 217, at 51. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 48 ("A mass is apportionable and it is therefore possible to recognize a 
[purchase money secured party's] superior right of disposition .... ") .. 
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effective floating lien on inventory;227 In effect, the abandonment 
of tracing renders Article 9 a regime of "last in time is first m 
right." 
Admiralty presents a lien system based in part on a rule of 
"last in time is first in right."228 The rule is no threat at all to 
secured financing if we can be sure that every new loan added an 
equivalent new value to the estate. But since we cannot be sure 
that purchase money loans are rational in this way, the abandon-
ment of tracing and the establishment of a "last in time" priority 
shifts the risk from the purchase money lender to the· after-ac-
quired property lender.229 _ · 
If we are resolved to hang onto tracing because it is fundamen-
tal to the rule of "first in time is first in right," then a purchase 
money lender loses the superpriority if the collateral cannot be 
identified.230 If, per Frisch, section 9-315(2) cannot apply, then the 
purchase money lender goes from superpriority to complete junior-
ity, just because the debtor commingled.231 Frisch's rule which is 
based on the results of hypothetical misconduct by SP2, now pun-
. ishes SP2 in spite of her good behavior. of sending the letter 
required by section 9-312(3)(a).232 · 
227. I am assuming that such a floating lien can be contained to inventory and that it 
would not float around the debtor's entire estate. 'This limitation is rather arbitrary. If we 
no longer care which items the purchase money lender grabs, why should the scope of floata-
tion be limited to inventory, or even personal property? 
228. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 588 (2d ed. 1975). 
229. Two often cited commentators have emotionally predicted that "[u]nless this ele-
mentary condition [of tracing] is satisfied, no creditor will ever agree to lend on a secured 
basis." Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE 
L.J. 1143, 1177 (1979). Such a statement is overwrought; collateral is constantly invaded by 
all sorts of legal and nonlegal factors, and yet, secured lending continues to exist. The state-
ment nevertheless does capture a partial truth: if the purchase money priority is enforced 
without strict attention to tracing, the property rights of the after-acquired property lender 
are compromised. · 
230. See Frisch, supra note 217, at 48. , 
231. See id. at 48-51. Frisch, of course, would favor SP2 by abandoning the tracing 
rule. The point made in the text is that if we keep tracing and still insist that pro rata 
sharing is inappropriate, then SP2 is rendered junior by any act of commingling. 
232. Ironically, while Frisch favors the survival of the purchase money status in case 
of commingling (even though the purchase money collateral can no longer be located), he 
disfavors it in accession cases, where the purchase money collateral can be identified. See id. 
at 58-59. I think he has it>precisely backwards! • 
One feature of an accession (a part added to the whole) is that a secured party claiming 
the part may elect her priority under the accessions statute (section 9-314) or under the 
commingling statute (section 9-315). See U.C.C. § 9-315 comment 3 (1987). If the secured 
party claiming the part elects to have a security interest in the whole under section 9-315, 
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The rule I advocate avoids the unfortunate side effect that 
Professor Frisch has identified and therefore constitutes the better 
medicine. First, if SP2 has perfected a purchase money security in-
terest, and if the debtor has commingled the purchase money 
inventory, then SP2 is demoted for failure to identifiy the collat-
eral, but only to pari passu____.:not total juniority. Second, if SP2 has 
not established priority over SP 1, then she is totally subordinated 
under section 9-315(2). 
An example of this is as follows: Assume that SP1 is an after-
acquired property lender who has advanced $150 and who claims 
$100 of existing inventory. SP2 is a purchase money lender who 
claims $80 of identifiable inventory and who lent $60. Before com-
mingling, SP1 has a junior security interest to the $80 in inventory 
(that is, a claim on the $20 in equity). SP2 has no claim on the 
other nonpurchase money collateral (or, if the security interest so 
provides, a claim that is junior to SP1's security interest). 
Now suppose that the debtor commingles and also that the 
total inventory has shrunk from $180 to $120 in value. That is, 
losses have occurred that must be allocated between SP1 and SP2• 
If SP 2 perfected by sending SP 1 the proper letter under section 9-
312 ( 3), then SP1 is pari passu with the combined SPrSP1 unit of 
purchase money inventory. Thus, SP1 is entitled to a pro rata 
share of the remaining inventory according to this formula:233 
Frisch thinks that such a secured party forfeits any purchase money status. His reason is 
that secured parties who originally had the whole (and not the part) might wish to give 
future advances on the basis of the existing whole. These would-be advancers should not be 
sent to the files to see if any parts are subject to purchase money priorities. Frisch, supra 
note 217, at 48. Hence, the lenders on the whole should be able to override the purchase 
money lender with future advances. 
This is a great argument for never permitting a purchase money priority-anytime, an-
ywhere. (Indeed, it has been followed with regard to- inventory, unless the purchase money 
lender warns the after-acquired property lender with a letter before the debtor receives pos-
session of the new collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987)). Unless Professor Frisch wants to 
abandon the entire purchase money priority, consistency demands that purchase money se-
curity interests in accessions retain their superpriority. 
Frisch thus gets it backwards in this way: where the purchase money collateral is identi-
fiable (accession cases), he denies the superpriority, but ought to allow it. Where the 
purchase money collateral is not identifiable (commingling cases), the superpriority should 
be deemed lost. 
233. This formula is based on section 9-315(2), which provides that SP1 and SP2 are to 
"rank equally according to the ratio that the cost of the goods to which each interest origi-
nally attached bears to the cost of the total product or mass." U.C.C. § 9-315(2) (1987). 
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100 
lOO + 80 X 120 = $66.66 
The combined SP2-SP1 unit (representing the purchase money 




X 120 = $53.33 
Of this combined share, SP2 is totally senior to SP1, so that SP2 
(who lent $60) takes it all. 
Now suppose that SP2 had not perfected according to section 
9-312(3). Now SP2 is junior as to the combined SPrSP1 unit of 
$53.33. Hence, SP1 (on these numbers) would take its own $66.66 
share and would take what it needs ($33.33) from the combined 
SP 2-SP 1 share of . $53.33. SP 2 is junior and gets only the leftovers 
of $20.00. In this way, if SP2 has not sent the letter that section 9-
312(3) requires, SP2 is totally junior to SP1, whether commingling 
occurs or not. But if SP2 has sent the fateful letter, SP2 does not 
fall all the way to juniority if tracing is impossible due to commin-
gling. Instead, SP2 becomes pari passu with SP1• 
c. Expansion and Shrinkage of Inventory.-Professor Harris 
has added another unstated assumption to the mechanics of sec-
tion 9-315(2)'s unusual priority: if SP1 and SP2 are undersecured, 
they may not use commingling as an excuse to improve their posi-
tion.234 That is, if the inventory encumbered by the liens of SP1 
and SP2 equals $10,000 in value, then $10,000 is the most they can 
receive, no matter what. 235 If the mass of commingled inventory 
expands, the excess constitutes debtor equity. In the context of the 
McBee case, this debtor equity was given to SP3, so that SP3 was 
the sole beneficiary of inventory expansion. 236 
234. See Harris, supra note 1, at 234-35. 
235. David Frisch locates this limitation idea in the origins of section 9-315(1)(b) in 
the equity doctrine of tracing, where improvement of position was never allowed. See 
Frisch, supra note 217, at 41-45. 
236. Judge Williams similarly limited SP1 and SP2 to a maximum entitlement-the 
amount of pre-sale inventory commingled in the mass (suggesting that perhaps McBee was 
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Although not stated in section 9-315, this innovation makes 
sense. 237 But I disagree with Harris's view that the security interest 
of SP1 and SP2 might shrink from the $10,000 li~it if the mass 
decreases in value (through sale to customers). Recall that Harris 
and I agree that SP1 and SP2 have priority to the mass over SP3, 
with the proviso that SP1 and -SP2 be limited to the amount of the 
an unacknowledged commingling case); See National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale 
Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2q l316, 1331 (5th Cir. 1983). ("While [SPiJ and [SP2's] 
priority is limited to the overallvatue of. the inventory transferred in bulk to [BJ, it is not 
limited to the actual inventory remaining and traceable to the bulk sale." (footnotes omitted 
and emphasis in original)). Judge Williams attempts to justify this limitation based upon 
comparison to voidable preference law: 
The trustee in bankruptcy is not a party to this proceeding. We note, however, that 
under the Bankruptcy Act an after-acquired property interest in collateral to the ex-
tent of the value of the collateral at a set pre~bankruptcy date may only be valid 
against the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 547. Thus, under the Act, a secured creditor-even 
without an intervening bulk sale_:might not be able to enforce his "floating" lien for 
the greater value of inventory at the time of bankruptcy. Without deciding whether 
the result we reach is required by this section of the Bankruptcy Act, we note its 
consistency with the result we reach under the U.C.C. 
Id. at 1331 n.20 (citation omitted). Roughly. translated, Judge Williams seems to be saying 
that occasionally a secured party claims inventory in the bankrupt estate but is limited by 
Bankruptcy Code section 547(c)(5) to a maximum amount of inventory to prevent an im-
provement of position by that secured party. SP1 and SP2 should be similarly limited, so 
they do not improve their position at the expense of SP3• 
237. David Frisch disagrees. He fears that the limited secured party will foreclose and 
have a poor incentive to obtain a'good price. That is, if the secured party is limited to the 
value of the contributed collateral and yet forecloses on the whole, the secured party will 
simply stop marketing the whole once her own security interest is satisfied; but if that se-
cured party had a higher entitlement, she would also have a better incentive. See Frisch, 
supra note 217, at 40. This ignores the fact that many of these cases will be litigated in 
bankruptcy where the trustee will have the· incentive to maximize the price, and making 
irrelevant the secured party's lack of an incentive. 
Frisch also points out that the. limitation view requires a judicial valuation, which is 
painful,· whereas the nonlimitation view simply gives the secured party collateral up to the 
fixed amount of her claim. See id: This also ignores the fact that, in bankruptcy, valuation 
may be necessary anyway, unless. an immediate· sale is planned, but otherwise, one has to 
admit that the necessity of valuations is unfortunate. 
Finally, Frisch notes that the secured party's right to proceeds is not limited by the 
amount of the collateral contributed byJhe"secured party. See id. at 40-41. That is, under a 
proceeds theory, the secured patty can· improve her position. By analogy, the secured party 
should be able to improve her position in commingling cases. It is true that a secured party 
can improve her position through proceeds, but proceeds must be identifiable, whereas, by 
definition, commingled assets are nQt identifiable. See id. at 42. Consequently, in commin-
gling cases, the secured party wants to get other people's property, whereas in proceeds 
theory, the secured party simply wants to collect the identifiable fruits of its own identifi-
able collateral. These differences weaken, or at least complicate, the aesthetics of Frisch's 
analogy. 
1990] Bulk Sales Under Article 9 801 
inventory sold to B ($10,000, in Harris's hypothetical numbers). If 
the mass expands, SP 3 benefits, but if the mass shrinks, then SP 3 
ought to lose out first before SP 1 and SP 2 suffer, just like any 
subordinate creditor would. Shrinkage should come out of the 
debtor equity first and out of the junior creditor's entitlement 
before the senior creditors are affected. This follows from the fact 
that security interests routinely work this way, and nothing in sec-
tion 9-315 changes this result.238 
In contrast, Harris believes that, as the mass shrinks, the per-
centage share that SP 1 and SP 2 hold should shrink as well. 
239 I 
believe there is no basis for this. According to Harris, shrinkage 
occurs if section 9-315(2) applies to the case,240 but the whole pre-
mise of the discussion is that section 9-315 does not apply when 
SP 3's security interest attaches after commingling. 
After the inventory shrinks, Harris pumps new inventory into 
his hypothetical example and commingles it with old inventory. 
Prior to commingling, the new-but-uncommingled inventory has 
been encumbered only by SP3's security interest, by virtue of its 
after-acquired property clause. 241 The security interests of SP 1 and 
SP2 do not attach to this inventory, ex hypothesi. Now section 9-
315(2) does apply, because both SP3, on the one hand, and SP1-
SPrSP3 are contributing collateral to a commingled pool. As to 
this newly constituted pool of inventory, SP3 shares equally with 
SPi-SPrSP3. In other words, as to past inventory SP1 and SP2, as 
a unit, are senior to SP3, but as to the new inventory added to the 
group, SP3 is pari passu with the combined share of SP1, SP2, and 
SP3. That is, part of SP3's claim is junior to SP1 and SP2, and part 
of the claim will be pari passu. In any case, there is no reason to 
apply section 9-315(2) until SP3 contributes inventory that SP1 
and SP2 cannot get. Professor Harris provides the following nu-
merical example: 
238. At least in the specific circumstance under consideration, this occurs where SP1 
and SP2 had perfected security interests before commingling, and SP3 took a perfected se-
curity interest in inventory after commingling. It is the post-commingling perfection that 
kept SP3 from being pro rata with its competitors. 
239. See Harris, supra note 1, at 236:37. 
240. See id. 
241. I am assuming that B is not bound on the after-acquired property agreement 
between S, SP1, and SP2• If Band Sare deemed merged, then SP1 and SP2 are pasi passu 
with regard to the new-but-uncommingled inventory. See supra text accompanying notes 
173-205. 
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[A]ssume that B owns $15,000 of commingled inventory, of which 
SP1's share is $10,000 and [SP3's] is $5000. If B sells $6000 of the 
inventory, then SP1 and [SP3] will share in the remaining $9000 as 
they did in the $15,000; that is, SP1 will receive two-thirds ($6000) 
and [SP3] will receive one-third ($3000).
242 
I take issue with the last sentence. I think that, on Harris's num-
bers, SP1 has $9000 of inventory, and SP3 has none. Harris 
continues: 
As B acquires new inventory and commingles it, [SP3]'s share will 
increase. Suppose that $11,000 of new collateral is added to the 
$9000 remaining. Because SP1's interest attaches to the goods when 
they are already encumbered by [ SP 3] 's security interest, the extent 
of [SP3]'s share of the mass should be increased by the $11,000 of 
newly added value.243 
Here is how we differ. I would say that SP1 and SP2 get 9/20, or 
$9,000, and SP3 gets 11/20, or $11,000. Harris gives SP1 and SP2 
less than I would ($6,000) because he has already knocked down 
SP1 and SP2 from $9000 (incorrectly in my view).
244 
From this point forward, the ratios of SP 1 and SP 2, on the 
one hand, and SP3, on the other, are preserved. This is because 
section 9-315 really does apply from now ori; SP3 has contributed 
collateral to the commingled mass after SP3 perfected a security 
interest in collateral to which SP1 and SP2 had no claim. Before, 
SP 3 took a security interest only after commingling had already 
occurred. Thus, an unstated premise of section 9-315(2) is that 
each pro rata security interest must have attached to uncommin-
gled property before commingling. 
B. A Short Statute of Limitations 
Besides awarding post-sale inventory to the seller's secured 
parties, McBee has a second interesting aspect. According to Judge 
Williams, if the perfected security interests of SP1 and SP2 survive 
the bulk sale because B did not comply with the provisions of Arti-
242. Harris, supra note 1, at 236-37. 
243. Id. at 237. The last remark that SP3 is senior because SP3's security interest at-
tached (and was perfected) first may seem a little confusing. All Harris is doing here is 
attempting to reconcile section 9-315(2) with the "first in time is first in right" rule. Harris 
means to apply section 9-315(2) in order that the parties share pro rata. 
244. "Thus [SP3] will be entitled to 70% (14/20), and SP1 to 30% (6/20)." Id. 
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cle 6, the security interests could survive for only six months. 245 In 
defending the view that SP1 and SP2 should have the inventory 
acquired by the buyer after the bulk sale, Judge Williams sought 
to calm SP3 with the following observation: 
We find further support for our conclusion in the statutory pattern. 
The transferor's creditor is not saved harmless forever in a non-com-
plying bulk transfer. Article 6 limits the period in which a 
transferor's creditor may assert a security interest to six months af-
ter the non-complying bulk transfer, unless there has beeri 
concealment of the transfer. This limitations period evidences a pol-
icy that at some point a diligent creditor should realize that a 
transfer has occurred absent concealment of that fact and despite 
his lack of notice. If the prior creditor does not exercise such dili-
gence, his security interest in the transferred property is lost. This 
time limitation was met in this case by [SP1 and SP2]. The time 
limitation supports our conclusion that Article 6 is a reasonable and 
balanced provision in preserving the security interests of the trans-
feror's creditors effective against the transferee.246 
Thus, according to Judge Williams, a perfected security interest 
survives a noncomplying bulk transfer, but not for long! Unless the 
transfer· has been concealed, the security interests are dead within 
six months, unless the secured parties bring an "action under this 
Article. "247 
In ruling that . the secured parties had only six months to ~s-
sert their perfected security interests, Judge Williams may have 
imagined that he was doing the secured parties a favor. According 
to Judge Williams, Article 9 provided only four months, compared 
to six months under Article 6. 248 Since the secured parties asserted 
their claims in the fifth month, they could be thankful that the 
Article 6 rules applied. According to Judge Williams: 
We agree with the bankruptcy court that the four-month period for 
refiling upon a name change of the debtor under [section 9-402(7)] 
does not apply here. If this general Article 9 provision applied, it 
would in effect reduce the specific provision in Article 6 from six to 
245. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 
F.2d 1316, 1328 (5th Cir. 1983). 
246. Id. at 1328-29 (footnote omitted) (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.111 
(Vernon 1968)). 
247. u.c.c. § 6-111 (1987). 
248. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1329 n.19. 
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four months. Where, as here, a specific section of the Code applies 
to a particular situation, the specific provision should govern. Thus, 
the six-month period in Article 6 relating to non-complying bulk 
sales, was correctly applied by the bankruptcy court.249 
The bankruptcy court refused to apply the four-month rule of sec-
tion 9-402(7)250 because no one changed her name. 251 Instead, the 
collateral was transferred from one person to another. It is possible 
to read the above passage from the appellate opinion as implying 
that the four-month rule did apply, except that the narrow Article 
6 rule trumps the more general Article 9 rule. 
If this is what Judge Williams meant, his view does not com-
port with the text of section 9-402(7). This by-now-all-too-familiar 
section provides: 
Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organiza-
tion its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing 
statement becomes seriously misleading, the filing is not effective to 
perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more 
than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financ-
ing statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed 
financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral 
transferred by the debtor even though the secured party knows of 
or consents to the transfer.252 
Judge Williams may have misread section 9-402(7) for two reasons. 
First, this section does not apply when property is transferred 
from one debtor. to another-only when a single debtor changes 
her name while retaining the collateral. This is the import of the 
last sentence of the above-qµoted passage. 253 Second, even if sec-
tion 9-402(7) did apply, it is no statute of limitations, as Judge 
Williams supposes. Instead, under section 9-402(7), old collateral 
remains encumbered by a perfected security interest. If collateral 
is acquired more than four months after the name change, section 
9-402(7) provides that the financing statement is no longer compe-
249. Id. (citation omitted). 
250. u.c.c. § 9-402(7) (1987). 
251. In re McBee, 20 Bankr. 361, 366 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982). 
252. U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1987) (emphasis added). 
253. See id. § 9-402 comment 8. In Bank of the West v. Commercial Credit Fin. Servs., 
Inc., 852 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1988), Judge Thompson thought the second sentence of 
section 9-402(7) might apply when buyer and seller are corporate subsidiaries owned by the 
same parent. But this ruling was totally unnecessary to his analysis. See supra text accom-
panying notes 161-64. 
..;;;i 
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tent to perfect the security interest that attaches thereto.264 Hence, 
in McBee, even if section 9-402(7) applied, any inventory acquired 
by the debtor or the noncomplying buyer on or before a date four 
months after the bulk sale would be encumbered by a perfected 
security interest subject to no statute of limitations at all. Any in-
ventory acquired four months after the bulk sale, would be 
encumbered by unperfected security interests as to which no stat-
ute of limitations applies. 
Article 9, then, contains no relevant statute of limitations. At 
best, it provides for occasional lapsed perfection.2n Therefore, 
Judge Williams wasn't handing out any favors when he applied the 
six-month statute of limitations in section 6-111. 
Judge Williams's reading of section 6qll is easily avoided. Ac-
cording to section 6-111, "No action under this Article shall be 
brought nor levy made more than six months after the date on 
which the transferee took possession of the goods unless the trans-
fer has been concealed."2116 Thus, the six-month statute of 
limitations applies only to actions under Article 6. If a secured 
party has a surviving security interest against inventory sold to a 
noncomplying bulk buyer, the secured party has an action under 
Article 9, not Article 6. Hence, the statute of limitations of Article 
6 does not apply. 
C. Subsequent Bona Fide Purchasers for Value 
According to section 6-110: 
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by 
reason of his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article, 
then: 
(1) a purchaser of any of such property from such transferee 
who pays no value or who takes with notice of such non-
compliance takes subject to such defect, but 
254. See Knippenberg, supra note 190, at 77-78. For an effective attack on section 9-
402(7), see Westbrook, Glitch: Section 9-402(7) and the U.C.C. Revision Process, 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 408 (1984). 
255. A perfected security interest becomes unperfected after five years, unless a con-
tinuation statement is timely filed. U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (1987). Furthermore, tangible 
collateral removed from the states becomes unperfected after four months. Id. § 9-103(d)(i). 
These are not statutes of limitations since the security interest lives on in an unperfected 
state. 
256. Id. § 6-111 (emphasis added). 
806 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 41:3:729 
(2) a purchaser for value in good faith and without such no-
tice takes free of such defect. m 
In the McBee case, the noncomplying transferee in bulk conveyed 
a security interest to SP3• SP3 argued that it should take free of 
security interests by virtue of section 6-110.2118 The McBee court 
reasoned that, since SP 1 and SP 2 had already filed a financing 
statement, SP3 automatically had notice.
259 Steven Harris argues260 
that the McBee court egregiously ignored the general definition of 
"notice" provided in section 1-201(26): "A person 'receives' a no-
tice or notification when (a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is 
duly delivered at the place of business through which the contract 
was made or at any other place held out by him as the place for 
rece1pt of such communications."261 But Harris overlooks section 
1-201(27), which provides: 
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organi-
zation is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it 
is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that trans-
action, and in any event from the time when it would have been 
brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due 
diligence. 262 
Section 1-201(27) indicates that knowledge is received when, 
through the use of due diligence, it should have been received. And 
knowledge "should have been received" if SP3 had taken the 
trouble to check put the UCC records. If SP3 had knowledge under 
this standard, surely it had notice within the meaning of section 6-
110. These observations vindicate Judge Williams against Profes-
sor Harris's criticism.263 
257. Id. § 6-110. 
258. National Bank of Tex. v. West Tex. Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 
F.2d 1316, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983). 
259. Id. 
260. Harris, supra note 1, at 226. 
261. u.c.c. § 1-201(26) (1987). 
262. Id. § 1-201(27). See supra text accompanying notes 55-57. 
263. One prominent case does emphasize that Article 6 imposes no duty of inquiry on 
SP3 with regard to general creditors. Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34 
N.Y.2d 210, 313 N.E.2d 66, 356 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1974). This is undoubtedly correct with re-
gard to general creditors, but we are concerned with whether SP3 can be a good faith 
purchaser for value under section 6-110 who takes free of perfected security interests. The 
whole purpose of perfecting a security interest should be to defeat subsequent purchasers 
for value, and even purchasers under section 6-110 should likewise be defeated. 
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To supplement his reasoning, Judge Williams also ruled that 
SP 3 could not be a "purchaser" within the meaning of section 6-
110. 264 This ignores the definition of "purchase" which provides, 
" 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mort-
gage, pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary 
transaction creating an interest in property."265 This particular ra-
tionale is neither satisfactory nor necessary to Judge Williams's 
result. If the McBee interpretation of section 6-110-secured par-
ties are not purchasers-is followed, then unfortunate 
consequences result. Suppose that SP1 and SP2 had failed to per-
fect. SP 3 took a security interest from the bulk transferee without 
knowledge of SP1 and SP2• Under the McBee interpretation of sec-
tion 6-110, SP3 would still be junior because she is not a 
"purchaser" and hence does not take free of the bulk transferee's 
failure to comply with Article 6. This should not be the rule. In-
stead, section 9-312(5)(a) should supply the rule; and SP3 should 
win as a good faith purchaser who was the first to file a financing 
statement under Article 9. 266 
264. McBee, 714 F.2d at 1330. 
265. U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1987). For a case holding a secured party is a purchaser under 
section 6-110, see Mayfield Dairy Farms, Inc. v. McKenney, 612 S.W.2d 154 (Tenn. 1981). 
266. There is a possible implication in section 6-110 that an unperfected SPa is a pur-
chaser for value entitled to priority. Professor Harris would still apply the "first-to-file" 
rule, with the proviso that SPa must always have no notice or knowledge of the earlier Arti-
de 6 defect. That is, SPa cannot have priority over SP1 or SP2 until SPa files a financing 
statement before SP1 or SP2• But even if SPa accomplishes this, SPa loses if she knew of the 
Article 6 defect. 
Thus, if SPa (who has filed first) knows of the unperfected security interest but not of 
the Article 6 defect, then it appears that Harris would give priority to SPa on the theory 
that section 6-110 is not to the contrary and because Article 9 creates a race priority. Harris, 
supra note 1, at 241 n.239 ("Even if [SPal takes its security interest after learning of SP1's, 
[ SP al still will prevail if [ SP al is the first to file."). 
Some have argued that Article 9 is not the brute race priority it is usually taken to be. 
Carlson, supra note 86, at 260-68; Nickles, Rethinking Some U.C.C. Article 9 
Problems-Subrogation; Equitable Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests; 
Secured Party Liability for Conversion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REV. 89 (1980); see U.C.C. 
§ 9-401(2) (1987) (ff SP1 has filed in the wroQ.g office, knowledgeable SP2 is junior to SP1). 
Except for this disagreement, Harris's reason for keeping Article 9 priorities in general 
(where B is a noncomplying bulk transferee) is sound: otherwise SPa, if unperfected, would 
beat out general creditors of the first debtor who have Article 6 remedies. Yet Article 9 
makes clear that judicial lien creditors should have priority over unperfected secured par-
ties. Id. § 9-301(1)(b). 
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IV. THE UNPERFECTED SECURED PARTY AND THE NONCOMPLYING 
BUYER 
The only quadrant of Figure One that should be difficult is the 
southeasterly one-where both the secured party and the buyer 
fail to do their duty under their respective articles. Now if the non-
complying buyer knows of the unperfected security interest, the 
priority solution is not hard. The buyer absolutely depends on be-
ing. a buyer or transferee in bulk without knowledge under section 
9-301(1)(c); If the buyer cannot qualify for priority here, the 
buyer's position is hopeless, whether or not she has complied with 
Article 6. 
But if the buyer is without knowledge within the meaning of 
section 9-301(1)(c), the solution to the priority problem is impon-
derable. On the one hand, the buyer has not complied with Article 
6 by sending notice to the creditors of the bulk sale. On the other 
hand, the secured party has not perfected. The dilemma can be 
stated this way. Article 6 makes the buyer the villain, and Article 9 
makes the unperfected secured party the villain,267 yet in this pri-
267. The two statutory schemes have a different perspective on who the villains and 
victims are. Under Article 6, the bulk transferee is the villain who is burdened with the duty 
of notifying preexisting victims (the seller's creditors) of the bulk sale. Under Article 9, the 
secured party is the villain who must notify subsequent victims (buyers and creditors). 
Commercial law never permits generalizations quite so elegant as this, and so I must 
qualify the above by exceptions. First, it must be said that Article 9 imposes a perfection 
duty on purchase money lenders with regard to parties who are coeval, not subsequent. 
Thus, to preserve priority against after-acquired lenders, a purchase money secured party 
must perfect within a ten-day grace period, in some cases. U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 9-312(4) 
(1987). See generally Carlson, Simultaneous Attachment, supra note 32, at 516-17. 
Second, a secured party requires perfection against not merely a coeval party but a later 
party who files and perfects before the purchase money lender does. If the collateral is not 
inventory, purchase money security interest status allows a "first in time" purchase money 
secured party to perfect second and still take priority, For example, suppose a secured party 
has established an unperfected purchase money security interest on equipment, and the 
debtor subsequently grants a security interest to a lender. This second security interest is 
not an after-acquired property interest; it is an ordinary security interest that is second in 
time. The purchase money security interest can still have priority if the purchase money 
security interest lender files within the grace period provided. This grace period commences 
when the debtor receives the collateral and terminates ten days later. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) 
(1987). In many states, this grace period has been extended to 20 days. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE 
§§ 7-9-301(2), 7-9-312(4) (1984); CAL. COMM. CODE § 9312(4) (1990); N.Y.U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2), 
9-312(4) (McKinney Supp. 1990). 
In such a case, the purchase money security interest is first in time, but its purchase 
money status allows it to defeat a lien which is not simultaneously created. Yet this subse-
quent lienor cannot possibly benefit from the perfecting act because. this perfection is 
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ority battle each party is both villain and victim together. Here, 
two scoundrels face off for the priority's puck when both should be 
in the penalty box. Hence, we are condemned to pick the lesser of 
two evils. 268 
A. The Frydlewicz Case 
If the noncompying buyer has no knowledge, she might win if 
she is still a "buyer" or "transferee in bulk" within the meaning of 
section 9-301(1)(c), in spite of the noncompliance. The one and 
only case on this question, National Bank of Royal Oak v. 
Frydlewicz,269 .was decided the other way. In Frydlewicz, the un-
perfected secured party won because a noncomplying bulk 
transferee is no bulk transferee ( or other buyer )270 at all. Hence, 
section 9-301(1)(c) could not be used to destroy or subordinate the 
unperfected security interest.271 
Such arguing must be recognized for what it is: conclusions 
smuggled into the analysis in the form of argument. The question 
is: What is a transferee in bulk? The argument just presented ("a 
subsequent, not advance, notice. That is, the second creditor has already advanced funds by 
the time the purchase money lender has perfected. 
This anomaly does not work for inventory, since no grace period is provided for such 
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-312(3) (1987). On the other hand, if the "second in time" lien is a 
judicial lien (or a bulk sale), then a grace period is provided for all kinds of collateral. Id. § 
9-301(2). 
268. Or, as Professor Harris would have it, with his law-and-economics search for the 
"least cost avoider," we must sl,larch for the most efficient victim. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 290-309. 
269. 67 Mich .. App. 417, 241 N.W.2d 471 (1976). 
270. Once again, section 9-301(1)(c) provides that an unperfected security interest is 
subordinate to "a person who is not a secured party and who is a transferee in bulk or other 
buyer not in ordinary course of business ... to the extent that he gives value and receives 
delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest and before it is per-
fected." U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(c) (1987). 
271. The court in Frydlewicz states: 
Normally, as a transferee in bulk, National would be entitled to priority over plain-
tiff's unperfected security interest ... [pjursuant to UCC § 9-30l(l)(c) .... However, 
National failed to satisfy the requirements necessary under the bulk transfer provi-
sions of UCC art. 6 to assert a claim of priority as a transferee in bulk. 
The trial court found National to be a transferee in bulk and, therefore, to be 
subordinate to plaintiff's rights in the disputed merchandise. 
Frydlewicz, 241 N.W.2d at 473. I read this passage to mean that National was a noncomply-
ing bulk transferee under Article 6 and hence not a bulk transferee under section 9-
301(1)( c). 
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noncomplying transferee in bulk is no transferee in bulk at all") 
seems infected by the preconceived notion that a noncomplying 
transferee should not prevail. 272 Hence, rather than depending on 
the words "transferee in bulk" for an objective and uncontroversial 
meaning, it might be better simply to look for policy reasons in 
lieu of inherent content in the words "transferee in bulk."273 
But such a retreat to policy may also disappoint. For example, 
one might argue that favoring the secured party would encourage 
the bulk transferee to comply. But one would have to concede that, 
to some degree, favoring the secured party would discourage the 
secured party from complying with Article 9. Thus, we are faced 
with an imponderable cost-benefit speculation for which no data 
exist. 274 
B. Resurrection of the Security Interest 
Steven Harris criticizes the reasoning of Frydlewicz, but likes 
the result. The new rationale he proposes, however, is self-contra-
dictory. According to Harris: 
Article 6 penalizes the noncomplying buyer by making the transfer 
"ineffective" against creditors of the seller .... A fair reading of the 
word "ineffective" as it applies to secured creditors should yield an 
analogous result: the secured creditor may disregard the transfer 
and treat the goods as still belonging to the transferor. That is, upon 
default the secured party may "foreclose or otherwise enforce the 
security interest by any available judicial procedure."275 
272. More precisely, the court held that the buyer was not a "transferee in bulk" 
within the meaning of section 9-30l(l)(c) because noncomplying transferees were not trans-
ferees at all. Id. 241 N.W.2d at 473. This leads Professor Harris to wonder whether the 
buyer should still win because, even though not a "transferee in bulk," it was still an "other 
buyer not in the ordinary course of business." Harris, supra note 1, at 205. But see U.C.C. § 
1-201(9) (1987) (" 'Buying' ... does not include a transfer in bulk .... "). This is not a good 
point. The court easily could have extended its reasoning to say that any transferee or buyer 
who is required to comply with Article 6 and does not is neither a transferee nor a buyer. 
273. For an eloquent plea against decision by categories and in favor of consequential-
ist reasoning, see Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 651-54 
(1989). 
274. Lack of data rarely deters an experienced law-and-economics scholar, and it is to 
Professor Harris's great credit that he largely avoids any definitive conclusions based on the 
intuited costs and benefits of secured parties and bulk buyers in the abstract. Comments on 
Harris's analysis can be found infra in the text accompanying notes 290-309. 
275. Harris, supra note 1, at 207-08 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (1987)) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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To put it another way, one of the remedies under Article 6 is sup-
posed to be the assertion of an Article 9 security interest 
(provided, of course, that the creditor had one in the first place).276 
The paradox-here is that, according to Harris, the noncomply-
ing bulk transferee is a bulk transferee for the purpose of section 
9-301(1)(c), so that the security interest that SP1 wants to assert 
has been killed off. That is, the noncomplying buyer had no knowl-
edge of the earlier unperfected security interest and so took free of 
it under section 9-301(1)(c). SPi's security interest is _therefore 
dead and gone. If so, how can SP 1 assert a security interest under 
Article 6?277 
In fact, Harris's view that secured parties have security inter-
ests under Article 6 is involved in a contradiction. This view 
depends upon the noncomplying transferee in bulk not being a 
buyer or transferee in bulk under section 9-301(1)(c), the very view 
Harris criticizes. Only if the noncomplying buyer fails to kill off 
the competing security interest under section 9-301(1)(c) can there 
still be a security interest for Article 6 to deal with. For this rea-
son, his doctrinal argument does not seem to work.278 
Since Harris's article was published, the Permanent Editorial 
Board of the UCC has promulgated a new Article 6. Under the 
revised version of Article 6, creditors of the noncomplying buyer no 
longer have any in rem claims against the buyer's property. In-
stead, they have only in personam rights against the buyer 
personally and only for proximately caused damage,279 which, to 
boot, is automatically subject to limitation.28° Furthermore, the 
noncomplying buyer is excused if her failure was in good faith.281 
276. This notion of resurrection tempts Harris to take the position that a short six-
month statute of limitations does apply to security interests that were unperfected at the 
time of the bulk sale, although Harris is tentative on this subject. See id. at 219 n.167. 
277. To use Harris's own words against him: "The rights of unsecured and secured 
creditors inter se are set forth clearly in Article 9. Nothing in Article 6 justifies adjusting 
them." Id. at 211. 
278. One point can be made in favor of the Frydlewicz reasoning: the transfer in bulk 
is "ineffective,'' according to Article 6, so that it can be said no transfer took place for the 
purposes of section 9-301(1)(c). 
279. u.c.c. § 6-107(1) (1988). 
280. The damage limitation is actually fairly generous and may even exceed what is 
available under the in rem system of the original Article 6. According to new section 6-
107( 4), the cumulative liability of the noncomplying buyer is twice the net contract price, 
minus any amount actually paid to the seller or the seller's creditors. See id. § 6-107(4). 
281. Id. § 6-107(3). 
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This change from property concepts in the style of fraudulent con-
veyance law is a blow to general creditors. Before, they could use a 
judgment against the seller and levy the property of the buyer.282 
Now, they will have to start a separate in personam action against 
the seller. Procedurally, this could take a much longer time. In ad-
dition, the creditors lose the "class action" quality that bankruptcy 
law provides, in case the seller files for bankruptcy.283 If the credi-
tors had in rem rights against the buyer, the trustee would be 
subrogated to these rights and would be able to recover the entire 
bulk transfer, even if the aggregated claims of creditors identified 
by the bankruptcy trustee are less than the value of the bulk trans-
fer.284 If the general creditors have no in rem rights (i.e., no power 
to avoid the bulk transfer),285 then the bankruptcy trustee has no 
ability to attack the bulk transfer at all under Article 6.286 
Meanwhile, this reform also deprives Professor Harris of his 
argument. 287 Harris needed statements from Article 6 which made 
the bulk transfer "ineffective'' against the seller's creditors, if the 
buyer did not comply with notice requirements.288 Under the new 
version, noncomplying bulk transfers are fully effective against 
creditors, who, in compensation, get in personam rights. This 
throws Harris back to the disdained289 reasoning of the Frydlewicz 
case, which held that noncomplying buyers are not buyers at all 
under Article 9. Ironically, under the new Act, the "good result" of 
Frydlewicz depends utterly on the essentializing argument ("who 
282. U.C.C, § 6-104 comment 2 (1987). 
283. "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ... 
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim [against the 
debtor]." 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1979). 
284. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931). Moore v. Bay is legislated into the Bankruptcy 
Code in section 550(a), which provides "[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided ... , the 
trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so 
orders, the value of such property .... " 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1979). See In re Figearo, 79 
Bankr. 914 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1987). 
285. The ability of a general creditor to "avoid" a transfer to the noncomplying buyer 
constitutes an in rem right in the buyer's assets. See Note, supra note 38, at 850. 
286. On the other hand, under the new revisions, any creditor who does feel motivated 
to pursue the bulk buyer can do so without fear of bankruptcy's automatic stay. Those first 
in time, however, will shut out the slower footed creditors who were better off with Moore v. 
Bay. 
287. Professor Harris was, in fact, the person who pointed this out to me. In his words, 
he feels "mooted out" by the new Article 6, for which he himself was the Reporter. 
288. u.c.c. §§ 6-104(1), 6-105 (1988). 
289. Harris, supra note 1, at 207-08. 
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is or is not a transferee in bulk or a buyer") that Harris expressly 
disfavored (but implicitly relied on). 
C. A Resort to Law-and-Economics 
The priority between two · scoundrels-the noncomplying 
buyer and the unperfected secured party-is undetermined by 
UCC statutory language. Hence, Professor Harris has succumbed 
to the temptation of turning to law-and-economics as a possible 
answer for solving this pdority dispute. The idea is to find the effi-
cient solution to the priority conundrum. Happily, the Harris 
article, so very strong in almost all respects, is also much better 
than average in its economic analysis. Harris;s CQnchision is that 
the data are inconchisive enough to hazard an intelligent position 
on what is efficient. 200 This should always be the answer in law-
and-economics. Ariyone who ever comes up with any different an-
swer simply has a deficient imagination about dreaming up 
potential costs. The costs are endless, and ignoring them is com-
pletely arbitrary and destructive of the premises of the science. To 
quote Arthur Alan Leff, anyone who hazards a guess without 
knowing the quantity of each afuf every cost is "a booby."291 
With this warning, let me say a few words about efficiency as a 
normative program. Efficiency; iri the welfare sense; is a form of 
utilitarianism. Efficiency · analysis hopes to maximize something. 
The usual choices are utility or wealth. The only diff eren:ce be-
tween these two maximands is the deontological assumption about 
what people are entitled to. If you are an egalitarian, you would 
choose a common form of utilitarianism, which starts from a base-
line wherein every human being is equally entitled to happiness. A 
competing form of utilitarianism is wealth maximization, where 
people are assumed to be unequal. They are entitled to whatever 
happiness their pre-existing wealth can buy. That is, the rich are 
disproportionately entitled to happiness compared to the poor. 
This disgraceful elitism is the only difference between wealth max-
imization and egalitarian utilitarianism.292 If wealth were 
290. Id. at 216. 
291. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. 
REV. 451, 476 (1974). 
292. There are actually infinite utilitarianisms, as many as there are imaginable enti-
tlement baselines. See Note, Judge Posner's Wealth Maximization Principle: Another 
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redistributed so that everyone was equal, there would be no differ-
ence whatsoever between these methods. Furthermore, ordinary 
utilitarianism demands that wealth be redistributed. This follows 
from the declining utility people obtain from increments of wealth. 
Wealth maximization, however succeeds in disabling income redis-
tribution as a normative program because wealth cannot be 
increased solely by shifting it around. There is no declining utility 
for wealth when wealth is the numeraire by which utility is mea-
sured. Therefore, not only are the rich favored, but the existing 
distributions of wealth are perpetuated by making wealth the 
numeraire by which human preference is measured. 293 
However it is measured, utilitarianism seeks to maximize 
human satisfactions. But let us step back for a moment and con-
sider what Harris implies by using law-and-economics on a 
microscopically insignificant priority problem such as the noncom-
plying buyer against the unperfected secured party.294 Could the 
proper priority between unperfected secured parties and noncom-
plying bulk buyers possibly have a visible impact upon happiness 
in the United States? Most people in the United States are una-
ware that bulk sales law even exists. How likely is it that the 
answer to this priority problem will impact on the national wel-
fare?295 Even if the priority question affected the price of credit 
and hence the cost of production-a fact that must be proven and 
Form of Utilitarianism?, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 815, 818 (1989). In fact, most people don't even 
acknowledge what the baselines are. Many utilitarians claim that everyone has an equal 
entitlement . to happiness, or entitlements according to wealth, but they often end up 
privileging Americans over foreigners, European cultures over third world cultures, human 
beings over animals, etc. 
293. Id. at 842-44. 
2.94. Harris does not specify whether wealth in some other form of utility is being 
maximized. But given his emphasis on cost reduction as per se desirable, I will assume that 
wealth is being maximized in his discussion. 
295. A somewhat different ploy would magnify tiny priority disputes into important 
efficiency issues by emphasizing the ethical preferences of nonparticipants in the market 
transactions. To illustrate, let us take Article 9's alleged race priority. Suppose D grants SP1 
a security interest. SP1 forgets to perfect, but nobody is misled because D lists the security 
interest in her financial reports. D then grants a security interest to SP2 who perfects 
promptly. The usual view is that SP2 is senior in spite of SP2's knowledge. See Special 
Project, The Priority Rules of Article Nine, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834, 849 (1977). 
The ethics of awarding priority to SP2 are unsavory. The dubious ethics become in 
themselves enormous efficiency concerns if (1) you assume perfect knowledge of the situa-
tion among the public; and (2) no transaction costs in making their preferences known. If 
every American (reconstituted through the assumption of perfect knowledge) would vote a 
few pennies toward an ethical commercial law, these "external preferences" would swamp 
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not assumed-there is still the intractable point that limited liabil-
ity of corporations (and bankruptcy discharges) are specifically 
designed to export costs to the unwitting public. If productive 
costs rise for marginal business enterprises, the increased cost may 
actually reduce externalities and therefore increase efficiency. In 
short, the connection between this tiny little priority problem and 
human happiness is so extravagantly tenuous that one may wonder 
whether indulging in law-and-economics is not a total waste of 
time.296 
So far, nothing I have said is inconsistent with Professor Har-
ris's analysis. He too finds no answers in law-and-economics, and 
all I have done so far is to suggest that this could have been pre-
dicted well in advance simply by the fact that the legal issue in 
question is utterly trivial in the scheme of things.297 There are, 
however, certain things that I would like to say about Harris's 
methodology. These points are harmless error, however, because 
any utilities registered by the parties involved in actual commercial transactions. See gener-
ally Carlson, supra note 86, at 223°30. 
Notice that this move makes ethical content-not the trivial commercial transaction 
itself-the focus of wealth maximization. Incidentally, it is precisely this strategy that drives 
Frank Michelman's celebrated efficiency analysis of fifth amendment compensation. 
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv: L. REV. 1165, 1214-15 (1967) (dealing with "demorali-
zation costs"). 
None of this analysis applies here, unless you think that the priority battle between 
noncomplying bulk buyers and unperfected secured parties implicates some ethical principle 
that the public actually holds. I do not 'perceive this to be the case in the priority dispute at 
hand-the unperfected secured party versus the noncomplying bulk buyer. 
296. In earlier days, I considered a priority problem that did not exceed Harris's prob-
lem in significance-the priority between judicial lien creditors who have served executions 
but who have not enjoyed a sheriff's levy versus the unperfected secured party. I too tried to 
figure out what was efficient. Carlson & Shupack, Part I, supra note 42, at 306-09. There-
fore, the above comments are directed at myself more than anyone else. Law-and-economics 
was just what you were expected to do in legal scholarship in the early 1980's. The last thing 
law-and-economics asks of itself-the last thing it can bear!-is to examine its own prem-
ises. Here · I hope to make up for an earlier uncritical perspective. 
297. Paradoxically, wealth maximization works better as the policy questions become 
more trivial and unimportant. If the policy question is monumental in scope, then the 
wealth at stake becomes a large percentage of the voting power of the preference holders. If 
this occurs, it triggers the "wealth effect" indeterminacy, where wealth maximization solu-
tions turn entirely on who is considered initially to own the entitlement in question. See 
generally Carlson, Reforming the Efficiency Criterion: Comments on Some Recent Sugges-
tions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 39, 52 (1986). Wealth effects imply that law-and-economics 
becomes more and more valid the more trivial its policy concerns become. Accordingly, law-
and-economics reaches its ultimate validity when it refuses to make any policy recommen-
dations at all. 
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Professor Harris reaches the right result-that law-and-economics 
is a big dud on this question of priority between noncomplying 
buyers and unperf ected secured parties. 
Harris writes: 
One common approach to problems of risk allocation is to impose 
the risk of loss on the party who can prevent or insure against the 
loss at less cost. This allocation usually has two effects. First, it min-
imizes the resources spent on loss avoidance, thereby freeing those 
resources for alternative uses. Second, because some losses are likely 
to exceed one party's cost of avoidance but be less than the other 
party's cost, allocating the loss to the efficient cost avoider is likely 
to reduce the total number of losses.298 
This passage invokes the concept of the "least cost avoider." This 
phrase is rhetorically more clever than most law-and-economics 
tropes because it evades the issue of hidden external costs and 
benefits and subsumes complete knowledge of these things into the 
phrase "least cost." That is, if you really could know who is the 
least cost avoider (and this cannot be known) then, by definition, it 
is efficient to assign costs to this person. Or, to say it another way, 
"least cost avoider" is simply a truism and has no more content 
than to say "do what is efficient." 
It is important to note that, if wealth is to be maximized, cost 
reduction has an efficiency consequence if and only if the costs im-
posed are marginal costs of production. If a cost is simply a one-
shot affair-a wealth transfer from one person to another-it has 
no efficiency consequences.299 For this reason, when Harris writes 
that total resources spent on loss avoidance might be conserved by 
the proper priority rule,300 he overlooks the fact that one person's 
loss is another's gain. As such, conservation of resources is a misno-
mer; wealth transfers by themselves neither decrease nor increase 
wealth. Instead, the cost reduction must be felt in each and every 
unit of future production. If the cost is marginal with respect to 
future production, then a higher marginal cost (coupled with a 
downward sloping demand curve) will produce genuine deadweight 
losses in the market in question. But even a showing of marginality 
298. Harris, supra note 1, at 211 (footnotes omitted). 
299. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 
232-33 (1980). 
300. Harris, supra note 1, at 211. 
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does not prove that least cost avoidance is per se efficient. A dead-
weight loss in one market may eliminate deadweight loss in 
another market, and hence maintenance of the deadweight loss is 
desirable. A "non-optimal" risk allocation might serve as a kind of 
Pigouvian tax on producers who export costs to the public.301 
Yet another problem with least cost avoider analysis is that 
the cost cannot be marginal unless the risk is noticeable, or unless 
the 'risk proximately causes its prevention.302 For example, if a 
bulk buyer already has powerful incentives to comply with Article 
6, a small reform in priorities between noncomplying buyers and 
unperfected secured parties may have no effect on the behavior of 
bulk buyers. If so, a change in the allocation of risk would make no 
difference whatsoever. Or, to say it another way, not every legal 
change induces human behavior to change. If the legal reform is 
too trivial to waste time on, there are rational economic reasons for 
not changing your behavior.303 
These problems-unacknowledged external costs and benefits 
and public indifference to the legal change in question----:are the 
grounds I assert to support the proposition that the priority be-
tween noncomplying buyers and unperfected secured parties has 
no efficiency consequences. Professor Harris's approach is differ-
301. A Pigouvian tax is one in which a producer is taxed by the amount of external 
costs exported to the public. As a result of the tax, the producer's incentives to invest are 
returned to optimal efficiency. 
302. Harris admirably recognizes this point, but only in part. He maintains that only 
unperfected secured parties have so many incentives to perfect that another marginal incen-
tive will make no difference. Harris, supra note 1, at 220. On the other hand, he thinks that 
noncomplying buyers really will be encouraged to comply because a cheap alterna-
tive-holding the sales price in. escrow· until the short six-month statute of limitations is 
past-:--cannot work for an unperfected security interest, which is subject to a much longer 
statute of limitations. Id. at 218-19. As a result of this asymmetry, a cheap alternative to 
complying with Article 6 is eliminated and so there will be more Article 6 compliance . 
. 303. This principle might be called "rational apathy." (I have borrowed this delightful 
phrase from a talk given by Melvin Eisenberg on efficiency and corporate law.) The response 
here, I suppose, is that if it makes no difference, why not go ahead and r..1ake the change? 
Perhaps, at the margin, there is a case so close to the line as to whether the bulk buyer 
should comply or not with Article 6 that even the slightest change in law will produce a 
slight change in behavior. See Carlson & Shupack, Part I, supra note 42, at 306-09 (cited 
here with disapproval). At such a margin, however, the stakes are very small indeed, and 
extremely marginal cases may not be worth the bother of scholarly activity worrying about 
it. Also, the existence of the marginal cases is a pure article of faith. It could easily be true 
that the marginal case has never arisen and will never arise-that the existing incentives 
will overwhelm the new reformist incentives in every case. 
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ent. He undertakes to list all the costs and benefits he can think of. 
Here is a list of his findings: 
Costs to Secured Party: Harris lists a series of costs to the 
unperfected secured party, many of them alternatives to higher 
costs elsewhere. 304 These items therefore significantly overlap: 
1. The cost of perfecting a security interest, including the 
cost of filing and the cost of ascertaining the debtor's correct 
name and address.305 
2. The cost of monitoring the debtor to discover changes 
in name or location of collateral. This cost is necessary to 
keep the security interest perfected. 
3. As an alternative to the costs of perfection, the secured 
party can monitor the debtor to see if any bulk sales are 
planned. If this monitoring reveals an impending bulk sale, 
the secured party can destroy the buyer's seniority under 
UCC section 9-301(1)(c) by telling the buyer about the un-
perfected security interest. 
4. As an alternative to perfecting the security interest or 
to monitoring the debtor to see if bulk sales are contemplated, 
the secured party could simply raise the price of the loan in 
order to compensate for the risk of loss absorbed. 
Costs to the Complying Buyer: Harris also lists costs to the 
bulk buyer and treats these costs as if the buyer bears them. 306 It 
should be emphasized, however, that any such cost, if anticipated, 
decreases the buyer's demand for another's inventory. That is, the 
buyer reduces the price she is willing to pay, and the seller bears 
all these costs. Therefore, the following list combines the cost 
borne by the buyer and seller, on the theory that ultimately, the 
seller bears all of the cost. Here is a list of those · costs: 
1. Determining that Article 6 applies. 
2. Preparing and distributing the required notice. 
304. Harris, supra note 1, at 212-15. 
305. One thing that Harris leaves out is the cost of learning the law, so that the se-
cured party knows enough to file at all. For most secured parties, this cost has already been 
capitalized through legal education. For a new entrant into business, this cost might be 
quite high. 
306. Harris, supra note 1, at 214-15. 
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· 3. The cost of tipping one's hand that one is buying in-
ventory. These costs include competitive losses from the lack 
of surprise. 
4. As an alternative to complying with Article 6, the 
buyer could search specifically for unrecorded security inter-
ests. If the seller refuses to disclose, or the buyer does not 
trust the seller, this cost could be high. 
5. The loss by the seller of creditor good will, once it is 
learned that a bulk sale of inventory is contemplated. 
6. In those states where the buyer must retain the pro-
ceeds for the benefit of creditors, ascertaining who the 
creditors are and how much they deserve is a cost. 
7. As an alternative to complying with Article 6, the bulk 
buyer could keep the sales price in escrow until the six-nionth 
statute of limitations runs out. 307 
This seems like a pretty good list of the costs that would arise in a 
universe that included only the buyer and the unperfected secured 
party. It leaves out, however, the effect of prices in other markets 
if the price in a specific market is raised or lowered (second-best 
phenomena). It also is not clear that these costs are marginal costs. 
In particular, one must wonder whether bulk sale costs are typi-
cally recurring costs of a retail business, such that inventory 
acquisition is routinely affected by them. If the costs are one-shot 
costs imposed upon a seller, then bearing high costs of this sort 
may be too unpredictable to be included in a (short-term) marginal 
cost curve. Such costs are typically incurred only when a business 
shuts down. They are exit costs and may in fact have been capital-
ized (or ignored) at the beginning of the life of the enterprise. 
In any case, even on the basis of the disclosed list, . Harris has 
the sense to proclaim, "it is difficult to determine which class of 
parties is able to avoid the loss at less cost."308 This is law-and-
economics brought to its most brilliant possible manifestation. 309 
307. This would not seem to help out against an unperfected security interest, which is 
subject to no statute of limitations whatsoever. Hence, this may not be an effective observa-
tion. Harris sees that the escrow option is not really viable against an unperfected secured 
party who is senior to the noncomplying buyer. Id. at 218-19. 
308. Id. at 216. 
309. After reaching this admirable conclusion, Harris regrettably backslides into some 
confusion. He goes on to note that some losses are inevitable and that these losses should be 
imposed on the party that would lose the least. Id. at 217. Now the problem with this asser-
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One would think that the priority between buyers (in bulk or 
otherwise) and secured parties would be clear and straightforward. 
Nothing is further from the case. In fact, the deep theory of prior-
ity turns out not to be very well worked out at all. I have tried to 
illuminate a few of the tricks and difficulties. Most of these were 
br~lliantly explored earlier by Professor Harris. If I have gone at 
least a little beyond his work, I feel as if I have accomplished 
something-proving once and for all that there is no such thing as 
an easy case in commercial law. Even the simple cases are founded 
on dark and misunderstood premises that come to the surface 
when two ignorant armies of law-here, bulk sales and Article 9 
security interests-clash by night. 
tion is that one person's loss is another person's gain. Thus, if the secured party loses, the 
noncomplying buyer gains, and vice versa. Harris would like to claim that these amounts are 
not symmetrical. Id. I do not think he has shown this. 
For asymmetry, Harris relies on the fact that the noncomplying buyer will lose the 
retail or wholesale value of the inventory, while the secured party would gain only the liqui-
dation value. Id. at 218. This overlooks the point that the secured party sells to somebody 
who then gets the wholesale or retail value. Thus, if we followed Harris's advice and im-
posed a loss on the secured party, this would also impose a loss on the secured party's buyer 
as well. These two losses should precisely equal the gain of retail or wholesale value of the 
noncomplying buyer. Because Harris has forgotten that the secured party gets liquidation 
value by selling the inventory to someone who resells (just like the noncomplying buyer) he 
is able to produce the illusion of asymmetry. If there is asymmetry, it has to be based on the 
premise that the secured party is less likely to channel the inventory to an eventual highest 
valuing user than is the noncomplying buyer. But since, in either case, the goods will move 
in roughly the same kind of distribution channels, such asymmetry is unlikely to be 
demonstrable. 
After incorrectly locating the smaller loss on the secured party, Harris then backslides 
again, by suggesting that the size of the loss will affect compliance with the UCC. That is, if 
the loss is imposed on the secured party, it is more likely that the secured party will comply 
with Article 9 filing requirements. And .if the loss is imposed on the noncomplying buyer, 
that buyer will more likely comply with the provisions of Article 6. This violates Harris's 
own premise of loss allocation-that these losses are the ones that are too expensive to 
prevent. But if they can be prevented by complying with the rules of the UCC, then they 
are not unpreventable losses. Therefore, Harris contradicts his own presuppositions. 
